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1 ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT OF ANTICIPATORY BREACH OF CONTRACT 
This first chapter will discuss the origin and development of anticipatory breach of contract in South 
African law, leading up to the decision in Datacolor International (Pty) Ltd v Intamarket (Pty) Ltd.1 
This decision is generally regarded as the culmination of the development of a ‘new approach’ 2 to 
repudiation, as a form of anticipatory breach of contract, in South African law and is the focus of the 
second chapter, where this ‘new approach’ and other aspects of the decision will be discussed in 
detail.  The third chapter will consider cancellation as a remedy for anticipatory breach of contract 
and the fourth chapter will discuss alternative remedies. This will be followed by a conclusion which 
forms the fifth chapter of this thesis. 
1.1 Actual and anticipatory breach of contract 
Where a party to a contract undertakes to deliver goods or perform a service and fails to comply 
with the terms of the contract, by for instance failing to perform the service at the agreed upon time 
or delivering defective or substandard goods, they will be in breach of a contractual obligation.3 In 
South African law, which has a fissured concept of breach of contract,4 these forms of breach of 
contract are generally known as mora debitoris and positive malperformance respectively.5  Using as 
an example an agreement for the sale of a painting to be delivered on 1 December, the seller could 
for instance deliver the painting only on 31 December, a delay amounting to mora debitoris, or 
deliver the painting timeously but in a damaged state, constituting positive malperformance. 6 
In addition to breach of contract by a person owing the obligation, the debtor, South African law 
recognises breach of contract by the person to whom the obligation is owed, the creditor. This can 
only occur where the debtor requires the creditor’s cooperation in order to perform their 
contractual obligation.7 Using our above example, the buyer could fail to make herself or himself 
available in order to accept the tender of delivery by the seller on 1 December. A delay by the 
                                                          
1
 Datacolor International (Pty) Ltd v Intamarket (Pty) Ltd 2001 (2) SA 284 (SCA). 
2
 SWJ (Schalk) Van der Merwe et al Contract General Principles 4 ed (2012) 359 ff; Dale Hutchison ‘Forms of 
Breach’ in Dale Hutchison and Chris-James Pretorius (eds) The Law of Contract in South Africa 2 ed (2012) 224 
ff; A D J Van Rensburg et al ‘Contract‘ (2014) in W A Joubert (founding ed) The Law of South Africa vol 9 Third 
Edition 408 ff; JC De Wet & AH van Wyk Kontraktereg en Handelsreg 5 ed (1992) 168 ff. 
3
 See generally the discussion of breach of contract in Van der Merwe et al et al op cit note 2 325 ff; Hutchison 
op cit note 2 278 ff; Van Rensburg et al op cit note 2 408 ff; AJ Kerr The Principles of the Law of Contract 6 ed 
(2002) 575 ff;  RH Christie & GB Bradfield The Law of Contract in South Africa 6 ed (2011) 534 ff; P M Nienaber 
‘Kontrakbreuk in antcipando in retrospek’ (1989) South African Law Journal 1. 
4
 A Cockrell ‘Breach of Contract’ in R Zimmermann & D Visser (eds) Southern Cross: Civil Law and Common Law 
in South Africa (1996) 303; E Clive & D Hutchison ‘Breach of Contract’ in R Zimmermann, D Visser & K Reid 
(eds) Mixed Legal Systems in Comparative Perspective (2004) 176;  Tjakie Naudé & Gerhard Lubbe 
‘Cancellation for “Material” or “Fundamental” Breach: A Comparative Analysis of South African Law, the UN 
Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (CISG) and the UNIDROIT Principles of 
International Commercial Contracts’ 12 (2001) Stellenbosch Law Review 371; Tjakie Naudé ‘The Typology of 
Breach of Contract: JC de Wet’s Contribution in Comparative Perspective’ in Jacques Du Plessis & Gerhard 
Lubbe (eds) A Man of Principle: The Life and Legacy of JC De Wet (2013). 
5
 Van der Merwe et al op cit note 2 291, 301. 
6
 This and the fivefold classification discussed below, which would appear to be based on the work of JC De 
Wet & JP Yeats Kontraktereg en Handelsreg (1947), would appear to be quite generally, if not universally, 
accepted. See Naudé (2013) op cit note 4  for a thorough discussion. 
7
 Van der Merwe et al op cit note 2 371-8. 
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creditor in providing the required cooperation is known as mora creditoris.8 Delay by a creditor is 
distinguished from delay by the debtor on the basis that any obligation of the creditor to cooperate 
is of an accessory nature and has no function or purpose independent of the primary obligation of 
the debtor.9 
A person’s interest in the performance for which they have contracted may be infringed by the other 
party in further ways. The other party to a contract may, instead of failing to comply with a 
contractual obligation, instead inhibit their ability to perform an obligation or indicate an 
unwillingness to perform an obligation. Referring back to our earlier example of the sale of the 
painting, a seller, prior to delivering the painting, could sell and deliver the painting to a third party, 
destroy it or simply state that they will not deliver the painting or even deny the existence of the 
contract.  
Anticipatory breach of contract in South African law is generally divided into three categories which 
correspond with the three examples given above.10 These are known as absolute prevention of 
performance, relative prevention of performance and repudiation respectively. 11 Broadly speaking, 
absolute prevention of performance occurs when a contracting party makes their performance 
entirely impossible, such as where the painting is destroyed. Relative prevention of performance 
occurs where, although the performance is still possible, the breaching party has seriously impeded 
her or his ability to perform, as in our example where she or he sells and delivers the painting to a 
third party. Lastly, a party repudiates a contract where she or he unequivocally indicate that she or 
he will not perform the contract, for example by stating that she or he will not deliver the painting. 
1.2 Nomenclature 
The discussion that follows is complicated by a degree of ambiguity that surrounds the terminology 
used to describe anticipatory breach of contract in South African and English law. In English law the 
term repudiation has historically been used to describe a number of different concepts. It has meant 
the ‘legitimate denial of the existence or validity of a contract’. But this usage would now seem to 
have been overridden in English law by use of the term ‘recission’, and which is consistent with the 
usage of the term recission in South African law.12 It has also been used to describe ‘lawfully putting 
a contract to an end’, now more often referred to as termination in English law and cancellation in 
South African law, although repudiation is still used in certain contexts in English law as being 
synonymous with termination.13  
Repudiation is also used as a synonym for renunciation, in English law an expression of an intention 
not to go on with the contract and thus corresponding with the traditional use of repudiation in 




 De Wet & Yeats (1947) op cit note 6; Van Rensburg et al op cit note 2 387; although see Cockrell op cit note 4 
310-2 who questions whether the duty qua creditor is in fact distinguishable from the duty qua debtor. 
10
 Whether or not this label is appropriate to a breach of contract consisting of a repudiation or prevention of 
performance occurring after the agreed time for performance is discussed below. 
11
 See Van der Merwe et al op cit note 2; Hutchison op cit note 2; Van Rensburg et al op cit note 2; 
Naudé (2013) op cit note 4. 
12
 Qiao Liu Anticipatory Breach (2011) 39-43; H G Beale (ed) Chitty on Contracts Volume 1 31 ed (2012) 24-001-
2; Jack Beatson, Andrew Burrows & John Cartwright Anson’s Law of Contract 29 ed (2010) 524; Van der Merwe 
et al op cit note 2 343. 
13
 Freeth v Burr (1874) LR 9 CP 208 214; Anson’s 514 op cit note 12; Liu (2011) 39-41 op cit note 12. 
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South African law. This would seem to have shifted and the term ‘repudiation’ is now normally used 
in a more general sense to encompass all forms of anticipatory breach, or even mean any serious 
contractual wrong giving rise to a right to cancel the contract, whereas renunciation is reserved for 
where a party has manifested an expression of an intention to not go along with the contract.14  
Further, as in South African law, there is an historical distinction (now being challenged) in English 
law between renunciation and disablement occurring before the time for performance and after the 
time for performance, with the former being referred to as anticipatory breaches of contract or 
anticipatory repudiation.15 However, the general usage of repudiation in English law would seem to 
correspond with how anticipatory breach of contract is defined below, that is encompassing 
renunciation, disablement and ‘impure anticipatory breach’,16 although still often distinguishing 
between anticipatory and non-anticipatory repudiation.17 
This confusion is luckily mitigated by a number of factors. Firstly, because the mechanism through 
which a party disables (prevents) themselves from being able to perform their contractual 
obligations usually manifests itself by conduct, a party is usually able to rely on this conduct as a 
reflection of an unwillingness to perform their obligations, which is known as repudiation in South 
African law and renunciation in English law. It would seem therefore that more often than not an 
aggrieved party will be relying on this unwillingness to establish the breach.18 Secondly, when 
establishing whether or not there has been a breach there is no distinction made between 
circumstances where the breach occurs before the time for performance and after the time for 
performance.19 
Finally, and most significantly, as is discussed in more detail below, anticipatory breach of contract 
rather than consisting of an actual breach of the obligation to perform, by delay in performing or 
defective performance, instead consists of conduct which predicts a future breach of such 
performance obligation. It is argued below that this has the effect of collapsing the distinction 
between repudiation and prevention of performance and, because it is the predictive nature of the 
breach which give anticipatory breach of contract its ‘anticipatory’ character, that all such breaches 
are anticipatory breaches. The principles relating to the specific categories of anticipatory breach of 
contract are therefore often relevant to anticipatory breach of contract generally and identifying the 
                                                          
14
 Heyman v Darwins Ltd [1942] AC 356, 397; Chitty 24-017, 24-042 op cit note 12; Anson’s 513 op cit note 12; 
Liu (2011) op cit note 12 41-2. 
15
 For South African law see for instance Sir J W Wessels Law of Contract in South Africa Volume 2 (1937) at 
2925 which can be contrasted with Van der Merwe et al op cit note 2 308; for English law contrast Liu (2011) 
op cit note 12 43 with Chitty op cit note 12 24-022 and Edwin Peel Treitel Law of Contract 13 ed (2011) 840-1 
(Peel restricts the use of renunciation and disablement to anticipatory breaches and recognises a refusal to 
perform and incapacitating oneself at or after the time for performance as forms of actual breach). 
16
 This term, originating from M Mustill ‘Anticipatory Breach’ in J Mustill and W Lorenz Butterworth Lectures 
1989-90 (1990)  38 54, is used to refer to the non- or malperformance of an obligation in a contract (usually an 
instalment contract) which suggests that future obligations will also not be performed correctly and was dealt 
with as a repudiation as in Freeth v Burr; see also Liu (2011) op cit note 12 52-6; Treitel op cit note 15 17-087. 
17
 This is the definition that Liu adopts and argues is consistent with the existing case law on repudiation (Liu 
(2011) op cit note 12 43 and 64-5).  
18
 Chitty op cit note 12 at 24-030; Cockrell op cit note 4 317. 
19
 Chitty op cit note 12 at 24-027; Treitel op cit note 15 844; Van der Merwe et al op cit note 2 307; Hutchison 
op cit note 2 297. 
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specific category of the anticipatory breach being discussed is often not relevant. Liu presents 
essentially the same argument in respect of the English law. 20 
Nonetheless, in the discussion below I will attempt, especially when discussing South African 
sources, to follow the South African convention of referring to a refusal to perform as repudiation 
and an impediment created by a party as prevention of performance, with anticipatory breach of 
contract being the general category into which these forms of breach fall. Unfortunately, because of 
the inconsistency in usage, some degree of confusion when discussing the historical development of 
anticipatory breach of contract is inevitable and, as noted above, when discussing English sources 
repudiation will generally refer to anticipatory breach of contract more generally. 
1.3 Origin 
Roman and Roman-Dutch law recognised certain instances where a party who had entirely 
prevented themselves from performing as a breach of contract which could give rise to an 
immediate action for damages, even where such breach occurred prior to the time set for 
performance.21 It would however seem doubtful that this was a generalised recognition of 
prevention of performance as a form of breach of contract as the Roman-Dutch texts ‘fail to provide 
us with any detailed exposition of the legal rules.’22 It is also uncertain whether relative prevention 
of performance was recognised as a form of breach of contract at all and it is clear that the Roman-
Dutch law did not recognise repudiation as a form of breach.23 
The recognition of repudiation as a form of breach of contract in South African law can be traced 
back to English law,24 with the decision of Hochster v De la Tour25 being of particular importance. 
This decision is recognised as the first decision by an English court that allowed a claim based on a 
refusal to perform the contract prior to the time at which the contract was to be performed.26 The 
plaintiff had been engaged by the defendant to accompany him on a tour to commence on 1 June 
1852.27 On 11 May 1852 the defendant then wrote to the plaintiff declining his services and refused 
to pay compensation, with the action being instituted by the plaintiff on 22 May 1852, before the 
tour was due to commence.28  
                                                          
20
 Liu (2011) op cit note 12 39-43. 
21
 Theodore Mommsen, Paul Krueger and Alan Watson (eds) The Digest of Justinian (1985) D. 45.1.91; 45.1.51; 
44.7.1.4; 44.7.1.5; 18.3.4 pr; 19.2.24.2; 19.2.55.2;19.1.54 pr; 19.2.13.5; Hugo De Groot Jurisprudence of 
Holland translated by RW Lee (1926) at 3.19.11, 3.20.7; Johannes Voet Commentary on the Pandects 
translated by T Berwick (1902) at 19.1.14; P M Nienaber Anticipatory Repudiation in English and South African 
Law of Contract (Unpublished PhD Thesis, Cambridge) (1961) 101-7; P M Nienaber ‘Enkele Beskouinge oor 
Kontrakbreuk in Anticipando’ (1963) 19 Tydskrif vir die Hedendaagse en Romeinse Reg 29; Cockrell op cit note 
4 317. 
22
 Cockrell op cit note 4 317; see also McCabe v Burisch 1930 TPD 261 268. 
23
 P M Nienaber (1963) op cit note 21; Nienaber (1961) op cit note 21 107-110. 
24
 Ibid; Novick v Benjamin 1972 (2) SA 842 853. 
25
 Hochster v De la Tour  (1853) El & Bl 678. 
26
 Nienaber (1961) op cit note 21 5; Mustill op cit note 16 38 ff; Liu (2011) op cit note 12 14; Djakhongir Saidov 
‘Anticipatory Non-Performance and Underlying Values of the UNIDROIT Principles’ (2006) 11 Uniform Law 
Review 795. 
27





Despite being faced with two earlier dicta by Parke B in cases dealing with a refusal at the time set 
for performance,29 which indicated that a refusal to perform before the time stipulated was a nullity, 
the court nonetheless upheld the claim.30 The court, in examining a number of earlier cases on 
disablement, found that where a party was to perform at some future date there was an implied 
promise that in the meantime the party would not do anything to prejudice the contractual 
relationship.31 So, flying in the face of criticisms being levelled at allowing an action before the time 
at which the contractual obligation became due, the doctrine of anticipatory breach was accepted 
and continued to be applied by the English courts and soon spread to other common law 
jurisdictions.32 
Liu and Mustill, both engaging in a detailed examination of the case law relating to renunciation and 
disablement which preceded Hochster, suggest that the ‘implied promise’ relied on by Campbell CJ 
in Hochster had a rather precarious historical basis.33 Without questioning the practical effectiveness 
of the doctrine both authors suggest that the general ‘implied promised that a party would do 
nothing inconsistent with the relationship constituted by the contract’ which Campbell CJ relied on is 
not supported by the earlier case law. Liu suggests that the majority of these earlier decisions either 
restricted the implication of the promise to specific circumstances or were based on the reasoning 
employed in Sir Anthony Main’s Case.34 In that case, the court found that since the self-disablement 
prevented the fulfilment of a condition precedent, the condition precedent should be exempted, 
making the disabling party immediately liable under the contract.35 
Both Liu and Mustill agree with Nienaber’s position that the English courts’ approach to disablement 
laid the foundations for the recognition of a repudiation occurring before the time set for 
performance as a breach of contract.36 However both stress that the ‘implied promise’ provided by 
Campbell CJ as a unified basis for renunciation and disablement as forms of anticipatory breach of 
contract was not fully supported by the earlier case law and Liu and Mustill suggest that the absence 
of any firm theoretical basis for the doctrine has resulted in confusion in its development and 
application.37  
Interestingly, notwithstanding any recognition of prevention of performance that was present in the 
Roman-Dutch sources the South African law on prevention of performance is also rooted in English 
law. In McCabe v Burisch38 Tindall J, finding little guidance in the Roman-Dutch authorities, relied on 
the discussion of the English cases on disablement in Hochster and justified their application on the 
                                                          
29
 Phillpotts v Evans (5 M & W 475) 477; confirmed in Ripley v M’clure (4 Exch. 359) 355; Liu (2011) op cit note 
12 10; Nienaber (1961) op cit note 21 7. 
30
 Hochster supra note 25. 
31
 Ibid 690. 
32
 Liu (2011) op cit note 12 1; Nienaber (1961) op cit note 21 8 – 10. 
33
 As noted above, the terms renunciation and disablement as generally used in English law correspond with 
the equivalent concepts of repudiation and prevention of performance in South African law; Liu (2011) op cit 
note 12 14-21; Mustill op cit note 16 43. 
34




 Liu (2011) op cit note 12; Mustill op cit note 16 43; Nienaber (1961) op cit note 21 8 – 10. 
37
 Liu (2011) op cit note 12 26; Mustill op cit note 16 43; Nienaber (1961) op cit note 21 8 – 10; L Vold ‘The Tort 
Aspect of Anticipatory Repudiation of Contracts’ (1928) 41 Harvard Law Review 340. 
38
 McCabe v Burisch op cit note 22. 
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basis that the principles are such as one would expect in ‘any rational system of law’.39 It is clear that 
the English principles on repudiation and anticipatory breach of contract provided the justification 
and basis for the recognition of breach in the form of prevention of performance in South African 
law.40 
1.4 Breach going to the ‘root’ of the contract and the acceptance requirement 
The later 19th century English cases on repudiation highlighted a further issue that could arise, 
whether a party could be entitled to cancel the entire contract on the basis of a repudiation which 
related to only a part of the contract or related to a single instance of performance in an ongoing 
contract.41 In Freeth v Burr42 the parties had entered into a contract for the sale of pig iron to be 
delivered in a series of parcels. The buyers withheld payment for the first delivery claiming an 
entitlement to set off payment against the costs incurred because of the late delivery of the iron. At 
the same time the purchasers urged timeous delivery of the second parcel. The sellers treated this as 
a repudiation. Coleridge CJ found that:  
’[t]he question is whether the fact of the plaintiff’s refusal to pay for the 125 tons delivered was 
such a refusal on the part of the purchasers to comply with their part of the contract as to set 
the seller free and to justify his refusal to continue to perform it.’
 43
 
Coleridge CJ went on to find that the buyers had not repudiated the contract, expressing the test for 
whether a party had repudiated a contract as: 
’whether the acts or conduct of the one do or do not amount to an intimation of an intention to 
abandon and altogether refuse performance of the contract. The true question is, whether the 
acts and conduct of the party evince an intention no longer to be bound by the contract.’ 
This confirmed an implicit aspect of the reasoning in Hochster, that in order to amount to a 
repudiation at all it was necessary for the offending party’s conduct to go to ‘the root of the whole 
and substantial consideration’,44 that is it had to be sufficiently serious so as to warrant 
cancellation.45 
Quite soon after Hochster, Campbell CJ would once again influence the development of the doctrine 
of repudiation through two similar dicta appearing in Avery v Bowden46 and Reid v Hoskins47 (later 
jointly decided on appeal)48 in which he noted that the repudiation was only completed by ‘putting 
                                                          
39




 It should be noted that this question is distinct from the question of whether obligations can be considered 
to be severable from the remainder of the contract, thus entitling a party to partially cancel a contract. For a 
discussion of this issue see Van der Merwe et al op cit note 2 351 relying on Walker’s Fruit Farms Ltd v Sumner 
1930 TPD (for South African law) and Anson’s op cit note 12 520, Chitty op cit note 12  24-046, Treitel op cit 
note 15 17-031 (for English law). 
42
 Freeth v Burr (1874) LR 9 CP 208. 
43
 Ibid 213. 
44
 Mersey Steel and Iron Co v Naylor, Benzon and Co (1884) 9 App 434. 
45
 Hochster supra note 25 685 and 693-4. 
46
 Avery v Bowden (1855) 5 El & Bl 714. 
47
 Reid v Hoskins (1855) 5 El & Bl 729. 
48
 Avery v Bowden; Reid v Hoskins (1856) 6 El & Bl 953. 
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an end to the contract.’49 Although the basis of the decisions, which was confirmed on appeal, was 
that the defendant’s conduct did not amount to a repudiation, it was the requirement that the 
aggrieved party accept the repudiation that was reported as the ratio of both decisions.50  
The requirement would actually appear to originate from cases dealing with a claim on a quantum 
meruit, where such cancellation was necessary in order to found a claim.51 In Hochster Campbell CJ 
had rather explicitly rejected the ‘offer to rescind’ theory put forward by counsel.52 Nonetheless, a 
subsequent finding in Frost v Knight53 confirmed this aspect of the decisions in Avery and Reid.54 It 
therefore became necessary to act on the repudiation and cancel the contract in order to convert it 
into a breach.55 This has been referred to as the ’principle of election’ or the requirement for 
acceptance by English commentators.56 
It was this doctrine, that repudiation consists of a breach going to the root of the contract that must 
be accepted in order to become complete, approved by the House of Lords in Mersey Steel and Iron 
Co v Naylor, Benzon and Co,57 which was imported into South African law58 where it has come to be 
labelled the ‘offer and acceptance model’.59 
1.5 Reception into South Africa 
The English law on repudiation provided the foundation for the South African law on repudiation 
and prevention of performance and established the doctrine of anticipatory breach of contract in 
South African law. It has continued to play a prominent role in the development of the doctrine and 
references to English decisions can be found throughout the modern South African case law.60  
The South African law has followed or mirrored English authorities in developing the test as 
expressed in Freeth v Burr and finding that a party does not have to have an actual intention to 
abandon the contract or refuse performance in order to repudiate the agreement.61 The test has 
                                                          
49
 Liu (2011) op cit note 12 22; Avery supra note 46 722; Reid supra note 47 738. 
50




 Hochster supra note 25 684-5. 
53
 Frost v Knight (1872) LR 7 Ex 111. 
54
 Avery v Bowden; supra note 46 and Reid v Hoskins supra note  47.  
55
 Frost v Knight supra note 53; Liu (2011) op cit 12 22-5; Nienaber (1961) op cit note 21 87. 
56
 Liu (2011) op cit note 12; Chitty op cit note 12 at 24-011; Mustill op cit note 16 43-5. 
57
 Mersey Steel supra note 44. 
58
 Nienaber (1961) op cit note 21 112; Atwell & Co v Logan (1884-1885) 3 SC 107; Wolff & Co v Bruce, Mavers & 
Co (1889-1890) 7 SC 133; Evans v Stranack (1890) 11 NLR 12 22; Bacon v Hartshorne (1899) 16 SC 230; Legate v 
Natal Land and Colonization Co. (1906) 27 NLR 439; Cotton v Arnold & Co. (1906-1909) 3 Buch AC 162; Frenkel 
& Co v Johannesburg Municipality (1909) TH 260; Dickinson & Fisher v Arndt & Cohn (1909) 30 NLR 172; 
Damont v Gevers 1914 CPD 140; Kameel Tin Co (Pty) Ltd v Brollomar Tin Exploration Ltd 1928 TPD 726; Aucamp 
v Morton 1949 (3) SA 611 (A). 
59
 Nienaber (1961) op cit note 21; Van der Merwe et al op cit note 2; Hutchison op cit note 2. 
60
 Schlinkmann v Van Der Walt and Others 1947 (2) SA 900 (E); Van Rooyen v Minister Van Openbare Werke en 
Gemeenskapsbou 1978 (2) SA 835 (A); Stewart Wrightson (Pty) Ltd v Thorpe 1977 (2) SA 943 (A); Tuckers Land 
and Development Corporation (Pty) Ltd v Hovis 1980 (1) SA 645 (A); Culverwell and Another v Brown 1990 (1) 
SA 7 (A); Metamil (Pty) Ltd v AECI Explosives and Chemicals Ltd 1994 3 SA 673 (A); Highveld 7 Properties (Pty) 
Ltd and Others v Bailes 1999 (4) SA 1307 (SCA); Datacolor supra note 1. 
61
 Schlinkmann v Van Der Walt supra note 60 919; Van Rooyen supra note 60 845 – 6; Ponisammy and Another 
v Versailles Estates (Pty) Ltd 1973 (1) SA 372 (A) 387; Metamil (Pty) Ltd v AECI Explosives and Chemicals Ltd 
1994 3 SA 673 (A) 685; Datacolor supra note 1 at [1], [16]. 
9 
 
been developed in two ways, firstly, by finding that a party’s conduct may amount to a repudiation 
where their intention is to perform the contract, but in a manner other than what was agreed or 
conditional upon a term that did not form part of the contract.62 A party therefore does not require 
a deliberate intention to repudiate a contract in order for their conduct to amount to an anticipatory 
breach. Secondly, where a party conducts themselves in a manner that would lead a reasonable 
person to conclude that they do not intend to perform the contract correctly, despite actually 
intending to do so, this may also constitute a repudiation.63  
There has been a tendency to use the first development, where a party repudiates a contract despite 
not having a deliberate intention to do so, as justification for the proposition that the test for 
repudiation is an objective test.64 This is then used as support for the second development, that a 
party may repudiate the contract even where they intend to perform correctly but where a 
reasonable person would infer from their conduct that they are not going to perform correctly.65 
These two developments are rather distinct. The first development still examines a party’s actual 
intention. Where the party actually intends to perform the contract but in a manner inconsistent 
with its terms, this will amount to a breach. This development would seem to be derived from the 
test in in Freeth v Burr where it was found that a party commits a breach where she or he ‘evince[s] 
an intention no longer to be bound by the contract’ rather than repudiation only being found where 
there is an intention to ‘abandon’ the contract.66 
The second development is rather a break from the test in Freeth v Burr and represents the 
application of an objective standard, as the repudiating party does not have to have any actual 
intention at all. As expressed in Universal Cargo Carriers v Citati ‘[t]he test of whether an intention 
[to repudiate] is sufficiently evinced by conduct is whether the party renunciating has acted in such a 
way as to lead a reasonable person to the conclusion that he does not intend to fulfil his part of the 
contract.’67  
1.6 Offer-Acceptance model 
 The South African label of the ‘offer-acceptance model’, noted above, which would seem to 
originate in Nienaber’s work, is perhaps somewhat misleading.68 Although the English law at the 
time clearly required an ‘acceptance’ of the repudiation, that is the cancellation of the contract by 
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the aggrieved party, the construction of the repudiation as an offer can be doubted. In Hochster 
Campbell CJ rejected counsel’s submission that the repudiation was nothing more than an offer to 
rescind,69 and Crompton J, in colloquy, although drawing an analogy with an offer, specifically 
contrasts the situation in Hochster with such an offer.70  
Nienaber relies on three later English cases, Morgan v Bain,71 Johnstone v Milling72  and Bradly v 
Newsom,73 to support his contention that repudiation was framed as an offer to rescind.74 Although 
it may have been possible to argue the facts in Morgan v Bain as supporting a repudiation by the 
plaintiff as a defence to the action, the defendants rather relied on a contention that both parties 
had the intention to rescind the contract, which the court accepted.75 The language of offer and 
acceptance was therefore entirely appropriate. 
In Johnstone76 Escher MR found that: 
’Such a renunciation does not of course amount to a rescission of the contract, because one 
party to a contract cannot by himself rescind it, but by wrongfully making such a renunciation of 
the contract he entitles the other party, if he pleases, to agree to the contract being put an end 




The use of the phrase ‘agree to the contract being put to an end’ by Escher MR does provide some 
support for Nienaber’s contention. However Bowen LJ rather notes ‘that it only becomes a breach 
when it is converted by force of what follows it into a wrongful renunciation of the contract’78 and 
Cotton LJ that ‘the promisee may, if he thinks proper, treat the repudiation of the other party as a 
wrongful  putting an end to the contract’.79 From this language and Escher MR’s reliance on similar 
language in Frost v Knight80 one would infer that Escher MR was, as is consistent with his finding, 
merely trying to emphasise the point that a party could not unilaterally terminate the contract. The 
repudiation, rather than being an offer open to acceptance, gave the aggrieved party the option to 
accept the breach, terminate the contract and claim damages. Similarly, little support for using the 
‘offer-acceptance’ model label can be found in the early South African case law.81 
The construction of repudiation as being based on an ‘offer and acceptance’ model finds its 
strongest support in Bradly v Newsom.82 Lord Wrenbury first notes that ‘consensus created the 
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contract, and consensus may determine it’83 and then goes on to find that the aggrieved party ‘may 
say ‘I take you at your word; I accept  repudiation of your promise, and will sue you for breach.’84 
‘This is really no addition to, but a particular application of, the principle first above stated.’85 
 Subsequent English86 and South African87 cases have drawn an analogy between the acceptance of a 
repudiation and the acceptance of an offer, incorporating notions of consent into the doctrine of 
repudiation. However, in the face of criticism of this approach they cannot be seen as being 
representative of the general approach to repudiation.88 Certainly construing a repudiation as any 
form of offer to rescind the contract would seem to be far-fetched, necessitating as it would that 
such an offer would need to include some further mechanism on which damages for breach of 
contract could be claimed.89 
Although it would seem clear that the acceptance requirement in English law is not based on any 
notions of consent, it is not entirely clear how far this requirement should extend. Certainly the 
finding by Asquith LJ in Howard v Pickford Tool Co90 that ‘a[n] unaccepted repudiation is a thing writ 
in water and of no value to anybody’91 has drawn criticism as being an oversimplification92 but is still 
quoted as good authority,93 albeit with these criticisms noted. 
The finding that an unaccepted repudiation has no effect would appear to be inconsistent with the 
Privy Council finding in Khatijabai Jiwa Hasham v Zenab94 where an unaccepted repudiation founded 
a claim for specific performance. The statement is also inconsistent with the decision in British 
Electrical and Associated Industries Cardiff Ld v Patley Pressings Ld95 where the court found that a 
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breach by the resellers was caused by an earlier repudiation by the sellers despite such earlier 
repudiation not having been accepted by the resellers at the time of their breach.96  
Additionally, the logic of the proposition that the breach arises not based on the wrongful conduct of 
the repudiating party but rather on the conduct of the aggrieved party in accepting the breach has 
been called into question.97 An unaccepted repudiation is not without effect,98 and the requirement 
that a party accept a repudiation in order to complete the breach would appear to be both 
inconsistent with other aspects of the doctrine of anticipatory breach, ‘illogical, historically ill-
founded, and detrimental to certainty and economic efficiency.’99 
However, Liu notes that the acceptance requirement does not necessarily imply that a repudiation 
only becomes a breach of contract on acceptance of such.100 Rather Liu distinguishes between the 
rule that a repudiation is only completed upon acceptance, which he labels the ‘breach conversion’ 
rule, and a rule which recognises the repudiation as an immediate breach but with the damages 
claim being conditional upon the acceptance of the repudiation, that is the cancellation of the 
contract, which he labels the ‘conditional damages claim’ rule.101 Liu suggests that the ‘conditional 
damages claim’ rule is consistent with the decided cases and, in promoting finality and consistency, 
is the better statement of English law.102 
Although earlier cases, relying on English authorities, repeated the requirement that a repudiation 
required acceptance in order to be completed,103 South African law has subsequently departed from 
the English approach. In Stewart Wrightson, Jansen JA found that a right to terminate the contract 
arose as a result of the breach of the contract and that the language of offer and acceptance had no 
place.104  
Importantly the rejection of the acceptance requirement in Stewart Wrightson was founded on a 
rejection of the notion that a repudiation arose out of some form of consent.105 The possibility of 
construing the acceptance requirement as a ‘conditional damages claim’ rule was not considered. As 
discussed above, it would seem clear that the acceptance requirement in English law was never 
premised on any notion of consent and rather arose from the requirement to cancel the contract in 
order to claim on a quantum meruit and was used later to emphasise that the repudiating party 
could not unilaterally terminate the contract.  
Confusing the issue further, despite the clear finding in Stewart Wrightson that the breach of 
contract arose as a result of the repudiating party’s wrongful conduct and not from the acceptance 
of the repudiation by the aggrieved party, the acceptance requirement continued to be applied in 
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some South African cases.106 It was only in Datacolor, which is the focus of the next chapter, that 
Jansen JA’s position in Stewart Wrightson was authoritatively confirmed. 107  
It is not immediately clear what basis the acceptance requirement would find in the Roman-Dutch 
principles of contract law applied in South Africa, which has never had to grapple with the 
problematic English phrase ‘discharge by breach’. 108 Nonetheless the basis on which the acceptance 
requirement was rejected was unsatisfactory as it failed to consider a construction of the rule that 
did not require the flawed application of any notions of consent.  
1.7 Basis 
As noted above, the validity of Campbell CJ’s reliance in Hochster on earlier case law to support the 
implication of a promise ‘that neither will do anything to the prejudice of the other inconsistent with 
that [contractual] relationship’109 has been called into question. Further criticisms have been levelled 
at the desirability of this construction and commentators have provided a number of alternative 
bases for anticipatory breach of contract,110 including that it should rather be viewed as something 
analogous to tort (or delict as such is labelled in South African law).111 Although construction of 
anticipatory breach of contract as a tort has never found favour,112 the ‘implied promise’ basis for 
anticipatory breach of contract, despite strong criticism,113 has never been formally rejected as the 
foundation of anticipatory breach of contract in English law.114 
These various constructions have been strongly disputed by Nienaber.115 Nienaber convincingly 
argues that such a duty could not be based on any consensus between the parties nor does it meet 
the requirements for a term implied by law.116 Nienaber suggests that anticipatory breach of 
contract rather arises as a result of a breach of an ex lege duty that is an incident of the duty to 
render performance in terms of the contract.117 This was accepted in part in Tuckers Land and 
Development Corporation v Hovis where Jansen JA, referencing Nienaber, found that a repudiation 
was an immediate breach of an obligation flowing from the bona fides underlying contractual 
relations in South African law.118 
This decision, on the basis that it is a firm departure from any construction of repudiation as being 
based on notions of offer and acceptance, was welcomed by Nienaber.119 Nienaber however 
criticised the decision on the basis that anticipatory breach should not be seen as a breach of a duty 
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not to repudiate but rather as being a breach of the primary duty to perform in terms of the 
contract.120 
In the context of positive malperformance and mora there is no separate ex lege duty not to 
perform incorrectly or duty to not delay or fail to perform respectively.121 To clarify, a contracting 
party’s obligation to perform correctly can be expressed in the negative as being a duty not to 
perform the specific contractual obligations incorrectly. This is not the same as a general ex lege 
duty to not malperform but rather just an alternative expression of the contracting party’s duty to 
perform. Similarly, in the context of anticipatory breach, there is no general duty not to commit an 
anticipatory breach. Nienaber notes that it is the aggrieved party’s interest in the promised 
performance which is infringed and that breach of contract, as a matter of positive law, is defined by 
the wrongfulness of such infringing conduct.122 
Throughout his work Nienaber stresses the essential connection between the conduct in question 
and the promised performance.123 It is conduct which predicts that such promised performance will 
not be rendered consistently with the terms of the contract which is recognised as being an 
anticipatory breach of contract. Nienaber draws on the construction of anticipatory breach given by 
Devlin J in Universal Cargo Carriers: 
’So anticipatory breach means simply that a party is in breach from the moment that his actual 
breach becomes inevitable. Since the reason for the rule is that a party is allowed to anticipate 
an inevitable event and is not obliged to wait till it happens, it must follow that the breach 
which he anticipates is of just the same character as the breach which would actually have 
occurred if he had waited.’
124
 
 As such, it is the nature and extent to which the promised performance will be compromised which 
should ultimately define whether or not conduct by a contracting party amounts to an anticipatory 
breach.125 
Although Nienaber uses the phrase ‘conduct by a contracting party which predicts a non- or 
malperformance’ to define anticipatory breach of contract, a consequence of basing anticipatory 
breach on the predicted non- or malperformance is that such breach need not consist of conduct by 
the breaching party.126 Where repudiation derives its basis from an implied promise or the ex lege 
duty suggested by Jansen JA, the repudiating party must engage in some conduct which would 
breach such promise or duty. However, because the conclusion that a party will commit a breach 
need not be based on conduct by that party, where the basis for anticipatory breach rests in the 
predicted breach, an anticipatory breach need not consist of conduct by the party in question. An 
anticipatory breach could then consist of a failure by a contracting party to act so as to ensure that 
their contractual obligations will be correctly performed.127 Whether anticipatory breach can 
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nonetheless be accurately defined as consisting of ‘conduct by a contracting party’ is discussed in 
more detail below.128 
This construction of repudiation, and breach of contract more generally, has been accepted by Van 
der Merwe et al.129 Van der Merwe et al qualify Nienaber’s position on breach of contract only by 
suggesting that breach of contract may not always be explained as an infringement of the right to 
claim performance as it would be difficult to construe a breach by a creditor consisting of mora 
creditoris as an infringement of the right to claim performance.130 They therefore suggest that 
breach should be described as the infringement of a contractual obligation.131 The authors provide 
further support for Nienaber’s contention with the argument that the construction used in Tuckers 
Land and Development Corporation comes too close to equating repudiation with positive 
malperformance.132 
Jansen JA’s construction in Tuckers Land and Development Corporation gives no actual content to 
the ex lege duty not to repudiate. It rather begs the question what would constitute a repudiation of 
the contract. This runs the risk of becoming a mechanism for ‘sanctioning the termination of a 
contract in whatever circumstances the courts think fit.’133 Unlike other forms of breach of contract, 
where the party’s contractual obligations inform the content of what constitutes a breach, what 
constitutes a repudiation would inform the content of the party’s contractual obligations. Viewed in 
this way repudiation would then not run the risk of becoming equated with positive 
malperformance. It would rather run the risk of losing all similarity with the other accepted forms of 
breach of contract. The better approach, as advocated by Liu and Nienaber, is to examine the 
anticipated consequences in order to determine whether conduct constitutes an anticipatory 
breach. 
Liu, writing on English law, makes very similar arguments in favour of using the predicted 
malperformance to determine whether an anticipatory breach has occurred, and labels this the 
‘inferential breach analysis’.134 In terms of this approach an anticipatory breach is distinguishable 
from an actual breach on the basis that rather than consisting of a malperformance it consists of 
conduct which supports an inference that such malperformance will occur.135 Like Nienaber, Liu 
stresses the connection between the future actual breach and the present anticipatory breach.136 
What would constitute an anticipatory breach of contract, consistent with positive malperformance 
and mora, is determined by the content of the contractual obligation to perform. 137 
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 This would also seem to hold true in the case of mora creditoris. Whether conduct constitutes mora 
creditoris is also dependent on the content of the performance obligation. That is whether the debtor requires 




A common objection to this construction of anticipatory breach, as being an infringement of a 
contracting party’s right to receive the promised performance, is that at the time an anticipatory 
breach occurs the obligation to perform may not yet have become due and so would not be capable 
of being breached.138 This essentially mirrors the objections to recognition of anticipatory breach of 
contract as a breach at all that were raised by Parke B in the early 19th Century which were noted 
above.139 Liu however notes that there is ‘nothing in principle or reason that compels the conclusion 
that a breach of contract must be an actual breach.’140  
The right to the performance is an existing right that is capable of transfer by cession and it would 
seem to be unproblematic to recognise that an infringement of this right, consisting of a repudiation 
or by making it impossible to perform, could be recognised as a breach of contract. 141 This would not 
consist of a what is often labelled actual breach, consisting of a malperformance. It would consist of 
conduct which predicts an actual breach with sufficient certainty that it immediately infringes the 
aggrieved party’s interest in her or his right to the performance. 
1.8 A breach justifying cancellation 
A further consequence of the rejection of the ‘offer acceptance model’ in Stewart Wrightson and the 
construction of repudiation as rather being a violation of an ex lege duty in Tuckers Land and 
Development Corporation was the possibility that a party’s conduct could be recognised as a 
repudiation even where it was not sufficiently serious as to warrant cancellation of the contract.142 If 
a repudiation is rather a breach of an ex lege duty it is no longer necessary to restrict repudiation to 
circumstances where the refusal to perform contractual obligations correctly relates to the contract 
as a whole, or a severable portion thereof.143 Again, this idea would seem to originate in Nienaber’s 
work where he noted that: 
’From a purely doctrinal point of view, then, repudiation would reach its ultimate stage of 
development if it is recognized that a promisor repudiates the contract if he so conducts himself 




This statement summarises Nienaber’s position on the two interrelated issues of what forms the 
basis for recognising an anticipatory breach of contract (discussed above) and what conduct 
constitutes an anticipatory breach. Recognising not just serious infringements of a contracting 
party’s rights, those that would justify cancellation, as conduct which could constitute an 
anticipatory breach of contract has the advantage of affording an aggrieved party a remedy in 
circumstances where they are faced with, for instance, a refusal to perform the contract correctly, 
but in a manner that would not justify cancellation of the contract. Under the ‘traditional approach’ 
to repudiation, this refusal would not constitute a breach and the aggrieved party would have to 
wait until such malperformance actually arose before they could act upon it. 
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Here however Nienaber’s label of the ‘offer acceptance model’ can be criticised again. As noted 
above the ‘offer acceptance model’ or ‘traditional approach’ actually consists of two separate 
propositions. The first proposition is that a repudiation must consist of a breach that goes to the 
‘root’ of the contract, that is a breach justifying cancellation, in order to amount to a repudiation at 
all, what is often labelled a ‘fundamental’ or ‘material’ breach.145 The second proposition is that a 
repudiation must be accepted in order to be completed. The requirements are complementary to 
the extent that the second requirement, the ‘principle of election’, even in the form of an 
acceptance requirement as described by Liu, necessitates the application of the first requirement, 
that the breach must go to the root of the contract. This is because the acceptance of the 
repudiation is effected by cancelling the contract. The repudiation must then logically relate to 
either the entire contract or a severable portion thereof in order to constitute a repudiation. As such 
in order to constitute a repudiation the breach must be sufficiently serious so as to justify 
cancellation.146 
The issue that arises is that contrary to Nienaber’s assumption, the requirement that a repudiation 
must justify cancellation neither originates from, nor is implied by, the requirement that a 
repudiation must be accepted. As was noted above, the requirement that a breach must justify 
cancellation can be traced back to Hochster, thus originating before the acceptance requirement 
which was established in Avery,147 Reid148 and Frost v Knight.149 Further such a requirement has an 
independent justification. The provision of a remedy prior to the time for performance, as the 
doctrine of anticipatory breach does, can be best justified on the grounds that it avoids waste and 
promotes efficiency.150 Importantly however this only occurs where ‘the inferred breach is so serious 
as to deprive the victim of substantially all the benefit intended to be acquired under the 
contract.’151 
As was noted above, the extent to which repudiation was ever construed as consisting of an offer 
and an acceptance can be questioned. Further doubt can be cast on Nienaber’s reasoning on the 
basis that it assumes that the requirement that a repudiation must justify cancellation originates 
from and is justified on the basis that the repudiation must be accepted when in fact the reverse 
would appear to be true.152 
As attractive as Nienaber’s position might be it is difficult to reconcile with Jansen JA’s reasoning. In 
Stewart Wrightson, Jansen JA considered the origin in English law of a right to cancel a contract in 
the face of ‘a “repudiation” in the sense of a fundamental breach’.153 It was in reconciling  this right 
with South African legal principles that he found that such right did not arise from ‘any application of 
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a theory of offer and acceptance.’154 Jansen JA explicitly restricts recognition of anticipatory breach 
of contract to conduct which amounts to a ‘fundamental breach’.155  
Similarly in Tuckers Land and Development Corporation, Jansen JA, in giving content to the ex lege 
duty, the violation of which constituted a repudiation, found that the test was whether a party 
‘acted in such a way as to lead a reasonable person to the conclusion that he does not intend to fulfil 
his part of the contract’. This would again seem premised on the position that in order for conduct 
to constitute a repudiation it must justify cancellation of the contract by the aggrieved party. 
Nonetheless the position that conduct heralding any actual breach, and not just a breach justifying 
cancellation, could amount to a repudiation would come to be endorsed in Datacolor and has been 
recognised as a feature of the ‘new approach’ to anticipatory breach of contract. 156 
Accordingly, in terms of the ‘new approach’, which was given authoritative recognition in 
Datacolor,157  anticipatory breach of contract rather than consisting of an actual breach of the 
obligation to perform, by delay in performing or defective performance, instead consists of conduct 
which predicts a future breach of such performance obligation.158 The provision of a remedy for this 
anticipated actual breach of contract forms the basis for the label of anticipatory breach and it is this 
prospective element which distinguishes anticipatory breach from direct or actual breaches of 
contractual obligations.159 
Therefore, following the ‘new approach’, even when occurring at or after the time agreed for 
performance, a breach taking such a form remains ‘anticipatory’.160 This is in contrast to the earlier 
approach in South African law which clearly distinguished between repudiation and prevention of 
performance occurring before the time for performance and the same conduct which occurred after 
the time for performance, with only the former being ‘anticipatory’ breach of contract.161 This 
position, that repudiation and prevention of performance occurring at or after the time for 
performance are nonetheless forms of anticipatory breach, has not been universally endorsed by 
South African writers but, as discussed below, would appear to be a consequence of the adoption of 
the ‘new approach’.162 
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2 DATACOLOR INTERNATIONAL V INTAMARKET 
The discussion in the first chapter was largely directed at the introduction of the doctrine of 
anticipatory breach of contract into South African law and its development leading up to the 
decision in Datacolor.163 This second chapter will be directed at an in depth analysis of the Datacolor 
judgment and the findings made by Nienaber JA in the majority judgment. 
2.1 Datacolor International v Intamarket 
In Datacolor, the appellant (Datacolor), a company based in the United Kingdom, had concluded a 
distributorship agreement with the respondent (Intamarket) in terms of which it appointed 
Intamarket as its exclusive distributor for the sale of computerised equipment for the matching, 
measuring and dispensing of colour. This continued for a number of years until, in 1991, the 
appellant was taken over by a Swiss conglomerate. In the ensuing restructuring Intamarket was 
advised, by means of a telephone call and two letters, that their distributorship agreement was 
being terminated. Importantly, although the agreement contained a clause providing for the 
termination of the agreement by either party on not less than 12 months written notice, none of the 
communications by Datacolor to Intamarket contained any reference to this clause.164  
Intamarket’s response to this was to contact their clients advising them that they would no longer be 
distributing products on behalf of Datacolor and would instead be distributing products on behalf of 
a rival company, Spectrum. A copy of this announcement was eventually sent by one of Intamarket’s 
clients to Datacolor who then suspended execution of all further orders to Intamarket. Datacolor 
advised Intamarket that it was terminating the agreement as a result of Intamarket’s breach of the 
exclusivity provisions in their agreement. 165 
Nienaber JA, writing for the majority, ultimately found that the letters sent by Datacolor to 
Intamarket constituted a repudiation of the agreement on the basis that a reasonable person would 
conclude that they were intended to immediately terminate the agreement without providing for 
the notice stipulated in the termination clause. 166 The announcement of the change in supplier by 
Intamarket, upon Datacolor being made aware of it, therefore constituted notice of termination of 
the agreement.167 Scott JA, agreeing with the legal principles set out by Nienaber JA, differed only on 
the interpretation of the letters, which Scott JA found did not constitute a repudiation.168 This was 
on the basis that the letter did not convey an intention that the contract was to be terminated 
immediately without compliance with the terms of the cancellation clause.169 
It is however Nienaber JA’s discussion of the legal principles on which his decision was based that is 
of particular interest. As noted above, the Datacolor judgment is generally regarded as the 
culmination of the ‘new approach’ to repudiation in South African law and is given as authoritative 
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confirmation of the approach adopted by Jansen JA in Tuckers Land and Development Corporation 170 
and Stewart Wrightson.171  What does not appear to have received much attention is that Datacolor, 
in addition to confirming these earlier cases, goes considerably further than the line of cases on 
which it is based.172 If these developments are accepted in their entirety they will necessitate that 
the law on repudiation be significantly reconceptualised. This chapter will examine the findings in 
Datacolor and whether they represent desirable developments of the South African law of 
repudiation and anticipatory breach of contract. 
As part of his analysis of the legal principles on which repudiation is based, Nienaber JA makes a 
number of important findings regarding the law on repudiation. Nienaber JA’s discussion of 
repudiation can be reduced to four primary findings on the nature of repudiation: 
(1) ‘the test for repudiation is not subjective but objective’;173 
(2) ‘the so-called “acceptance”, although a  convenient catchword, does not “complete” the 
breach but is simply the exercise by the aggrieved party of his right to terminate the 
agreement’;174  
(3) ‘a repudiatory breach may be typified as an intimation … that all or some of the obligations 
arising from the agreement will not be performed according to their true tenor’;175 and 
(4) ‘[w]hether the innocent party will be entitled to resile from the agreement will ultimately 
depend on the nature and the degree of the impending non- or malperformance.’176  
The first two findings represent fairly well established principles forming part of the law on 
repudiation, although subject to some equivocation and confusion in the South African case law.177 
The significance of these findings in Datacolor is therefore to confirm and clarify the application of 
these principles rather than representing novel developments of the law. The discussion below will 
also briefly examine the further implications of applying these findings together, something which 
has gone largely unexamined. The scope of the third and fourth findings is considerably less clear 
and their significance is largely determined by the interaction between these two findings. As a 
result they will be discussed together below.178 
2.2 Development of an objective test 
An important aspect of the court’s decision in Datacolor was that although Nienaber JA queried 
whether Datacolor’s representatives had intended to comply with the contract’s cancellation clause, 
no finding was made on this issue. This meant that the court made no finding as to what subjective 
intention, if any, Datacolor’s representatives had held.179 Nor were the representatives insisting on 
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performing the contract in a manner other than had been agreed upon. Therefore the only basis on 
which Intamarket could establish that Datacolor had repudiated the contract was by showing that 
their conduct would have lead a reasonable person to the conclusion that Datacolor did not intend 
to do perform the contract correctly.  
Nienaber JA’s finding that Datacolor had repudiated the contract was therefore contingent on the 
court confirming that the test for repudiation was an objective test. Drawing support from a number 
of earlier cases Nienaber JA emphasised this point.180 However, because of the confusion between 
the rule that a party does not require a deliberate intention in order to repudiate a contract and an 
objective test, which was discussed above,181 support for this proposition is perhaps not as strong as 
the judgment makes out. Further, merely labelling the test applied in Datacolor as being an objective 
test cloaks the further development that occurred in Nienaber JA’s judgment which is labelled as 
point three above. For these reasons it becomes necessary to discuss the development of the 
objective test in South African law prior to the Datacolor judgment and the decisions which Nienaber 
JA relied on. 
In Freeth v Burr182 the court was required to decide a matter where the conduct alleged to constitute 
a repudiation was not a clearly expressed refusal to perform the entire contract, as had occurred in 
Hochster,183 but rather a breach relating only to a single part of an instalment contract. Coleridge CJ 
in determining whether such breach amounted to a repudiation expressed the test for repudiation 
as being whether the conduct amounts ‘to an intimation of an intention to abandon and altogether 
refuse performance of the contract’ or such as to ‘evince an intention no longer to be bound by the 
contract.’184 In both Freeth v Burr and the Mersey Steel and Iron Company,185 where the Freeth test 
was approved, the court considered the subjective desire of the buyer (the breaching party) to 
continue with the contract as supporting the conclusion that the buyer had not repudiated the 
contract.186  
The first quoted test in Freeth v Burr ‘an intention to abandon …’ would seem to connote that an 
element of deliberateness in the conduct is required in order to constitute a repudiation.187 
However, in terms of the second expression of the test in Freeth v Burr, a party repudiates a contract 
where they ‘evince an intention no longer to be bound by the contract’, which would allow for a 
finding that a party had repudiated the contract without deliberately intending to do so.188 As noted 
above,189 this is not an objective test as it is dependent on the subjective intention of the potentially 
breaching party. The test however does not require an intention to repudiate the contract, rather 
only an intention to perform in a manner inconsistent with the agreed upon terms of the contract. 
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The second test from Freeth v Burr, which does not require a deliberate intention, was applied in 
Schlinkman v Van der Walt,190 where it was argued that the plaintiff ‘endeavoured to ‘force upon the 
defendants’ a lease containing unusual terms’. The court did not consider whether the plaintiff had 
deliberately repudiated the contract but rather whether the plaintiff evinced an intention no longer 
to be bound by the contract.191 This was by no means the first application of the test for repudiation 
in this manner in South African law and there is nothing to suggest that courts considered this 
anything other than a standard application of the subjective test set out in Freeth v Burr.192  
Using a party’s subjective intention provided a basis for determining whether the conduct 
complained of was a sufficiently serious infringement so as to justify cancellation, and thus whether 
the conduct constituted a repudiation. This test was able to deal with circumstances where the 
repudiation did not relate to the entire contract, where there was an insistence on performing the 
contract in a manner otherwise than had been agreed and with circumstances where there was not 
an explicit refusal but rather conduct which suggested a reluctance to perform the contractual 
obligations. 
This reliance on the infringing party’s subjective intentions is however not without difficulties. In 
Forslind v Bechely Crundall,193 a Scottish case decided by the Privy Council, the respondent, a timber 
merchant, had bought eleven lots of growing timber. In terms of the agreement the purchasers were 
however only entitled to fell trees on up to four of those lots at a time.194 The appellant entered into 
an agreement for the purchase of the timber from one of these lots. Because the respondent was at 
the time busy felling timber on four of the lots he was unable to commence felling the timber for the 
appellant and repeatedly delayed commencing cutting the timber.195  
The issue that arose was that it would seem that the respondent’s conduct did not amount to a 
clearly expressed refusal to perform but rather a sustained failure to perform correctly. This failure 
suggested that the respondent did not intend to perform correctly at all. Lord Dunedin noted that 
‘the respondent assumed such a shilly-shallying attitude in regard to the contract that the 
appellant was entitled to draw the inference that the respondent did not really mean to fulfil his 
part of the contract timeously, although he might, if he found it suited him.’
196
 
Absent a clearly expressed refusal, adopting an approach which considered the subjective intention 
of the potentially breaching party would mean that if that party showed that she or he did actually 
intend to perform correctly, as was possibly the case in Forslind, then her or his conduct would not 
constitute a breach. The aggrieved party, by acting on the purported repudiation and cancelling the 
contract, would then be committing a breach.  
This would operate particularly inequitably when an aggrieved party, who had been led to believe by 
the other party’s conduct that they did not intend to perform, was in fact committing a breach by 
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cancelling the contract on the basis of the apparent repudiation. The difficulties posed by the facts 
of Forslind are illustrated by the approaches adopted by the different judges. Viscount Finlay, in the 
minority, required the appellant to show something clearly amounting to a refusal to perform the 
contract, which in his opinion the appellant failed to do.197 
On the other hand Viscount Haldane found that ‘[i]n order to establish such a repudiation it was not 
necessary for the appellant to prove any express, or even conscious, intention on the respondent’s 
part.’198 Viscount Haldane then expressed the test for repudiation as rather being whether the 
potentially repudiating party had ‘… behaved in such a way that a reasonable person would properly 
conclude that he does not intend to perform the obligations he has undertaken’.199 As is evident 
from the quotation from his judgment above, Lord Dunedin looked at the respondent’s conduct 
more generally in order to support his agreement with Viscount Haldane. 
A party then commits a breach when their conduct would indicate that they do not intend to 
perform their obligations correctly. This reliance on the apparent intention, rather than the actual 
intention, of the party is generally referred to as the objective, as opposed to the subjective, test for 
repudiation. Lord Shaw, acknowledging how entrenched Lord Coleridge’s language in Freeth v Burr 
with its emphasis on intention was, found himself inclined to go further.200 Lord Shaw does this by 
casting doubt on the use of intention at all.201 His reasoning is  founded on the basis that a party’s 
intention may be very difficult to analyse or may lack clarity and not amount to any specific intention 
one way or the other and that the emphasis should rather be placed on whether the conduct would 
‘fundamentally affect the fair carrying out of the bargain as a whole’.202 The significance of this view 
is discussed in more detail below.203 
Despite what would seem to be the obvious advantages of an objective test, and the recognition of 
this approach in academic writing, the South African and English courts continued to apply the test 
set out by Coleridge CJ in Freeth v Burr throughout the earlier half of the 20th century.204 An 
explanation for this can perhaps be found in the analysis conducted by Nienaber, where he found 
that although the South African and English courts stated the test as being subjective, their approach 
was in general equally consistent with the application of an objective test.205 It would seem that in 
most cases the apparent intention of the potentially breaching party either reflected their actual 
intentions or, as Nienaber suggests, the courts were merely paying lip service to the subjective test 
while actually applying an objective test.206 
A full half century after the decision in Forslind v Bechely-Crundall, in Ponisammy and Another v 
Versailles Estates207 Muller JA quoted Devlin J’s expression of the Forslind test in Universal Cargo 
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Carriers Corporation v Citati.208  The dispute in Ponisammy concerned the sale of a portion of the 
farm Versailles from Mrs Ponisammy to the respondent, a company incorporated for the purpose of 
acquiring the farm and represented by a Mr Pienaar. The buyer encountered some difficulties in 
furnishing the required banker’s guarantee and after a number of delays phoned the seller to ask for 
a further extension. The seller rejected this proposal and summarily cancelled the contract and sold 
the portion of the farm to a third party. 
Importantly, as the contract did not contain a cancellation clause and it was clear from the contract 
that ‘time was not of the essence of the contract’ the seller was not entitled to cancel the contract 
without notice. The seller therefore argued that the buyer’s conduct, in requesting an extension, had 
amounted to a repudiation of the contract. As a result, it  was as authority for the proposition that a 
repudiation could be established on the basis of conduct that Muller JA relied on the statement by 
Devlin J from Universal Cargo Carriers v Citati that: 
 'A renunciation can be made either by words or by conduct, provided it is clearly made. It is 
often put that the party renunciating must 'evince an intention' not to go on with the contract. 
The intention can be evinced either by words or by conduct. The test of whether an intention is 
sufficiently evinced by conduct is whether the party renunciating has acted in such a way as to 




Despite including Devlin JA’s expression of the objective test from Forslind in the quotation Muller JA 
did not rely on this in order to come to the conclusion that the buyer had not repudiated the 
contract. Rather, Muller JA would appear to have accepted that Mr Pienaar’s words and conduct 
were consistent with his actual intention, that being to arrange for an extension of time within which 
the buyer could perform.210 
In deciding whether this constituted a repudiation the focus of Muller JA’s analysis was not on Mr 
Pienaar’s intention, apparent or actual, but rather on the consequences that were predicted by Mr 
Pienaar’s conduct. Muller JA ultimately found that the indication that: 
’the plaintiff company would not be able to furnish the banker's guarantee by 23rd January, 
1971, cannot be regarded as an intimation that the said company would also be unable to do so 
within a reasonable time after that date. On the contrary, it must have been clear to [the seller’s 
representative] that the very object of Mr. Pienaar's visit was to obtain a further extension of 
time so as to enable the plaintiff company to perform its obligation.’
211
 
The specific relevance of making the predicted consequences the focus of the enquiry, over the 
breaching party’s intentions, is discussed below.212 
The Appellate Division’s subsequent finding in Van Rooyen v Minister van Openbare Werke213 that a 
subjective intention to bring the contract to an end is not required, although suggesting a shift to an 
objective approach, again rather dealt with the question of whether a repudiation had to be 
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deliberate. It was therefore only in Tuckers Land and Development Corporation v Hovis214 that the 
court based its determination on the apparent, rather than actual intention, of the breaching party. 
In Tuckers Land and Development Corporation, another dispute concerning the sale of land, the 
appellant, a township developer, had sold two plots to the respondents. The agreement was 
suspended until such time as the proposed township in which the plots were situated had been 
approved by the relevant authority. The appellant, running into difficulties in obtaining such 
approval, submitted a revised plan which omitted the plots in question. Jansen JA, noting that 
‘[w]hat the proper test to be applied to the promisor’s conduct [was] not obvious’, used the 
decisions in Van Rooyen and Ponisammy as justification for applying the test from Mainline Cargo 
Carriers v Citati.215 
Without any finding as to what the appellant’s actual intention may have been, Jansen JA concluded 
that the appellant’s conduct would have lead a reasonable person to the conclusion that the 
appellant no longer intended to deliver the plots in question and had therefore repudiated the 
contract.216 Despite this, and causing some confusion, the same court then went on to state and 
apply the test for repudiation in subjective terms in Nash v Golden Dumps217 and Culverwell v 
Brown.218 
This position was clarified with the subsequent statements in O K Bazaars (1929) Ltd v Grosvenor 
Building (Pty) Ltd and Another219 and Metalmil (Pty) Ltd v AECI Explosives and Chemicals Ltd220 that 
the test for repudiation is objective. It is however noteworthy that in each of these cases the 
statement was used to justify a finding that the breaching party had repudiated the contract despite 
not having a deliberate intention to repudiate the contract. This is evident as in each case the court 
based its decision on a finding that the breaching party intended to perform the contract in a 
manner inconsistent with the contract’s objective interpretation. It was only in the case of Highveld 
7 Properties (Pty) Ltd and Others v Bailes221 that the court based its reasoning on what a reasonable 
person in the position of the aggrieved party would have concluded. 
It should be noted that as the apparent intentions of the parties in Nash, Culverwell, O K Bazaars and 
Metalmil were consistent with their actual intentions, application of the objective test would have 
yielded the same outcome as was reached using the breaching party’s actual intention. It is 
nonetheless significant that in each case the court considered the actual intention of the parties, 
even where, as in O K Bazaars and Metalmil, the test was stated in objective terms. Although the 
objective test was given judicial approval in a number of cases at the level of the Supreme Court of 
Appeal, the court went on to justify a finding that a party was in breach on the basis of the party’s 
actual intentions (applying a subjective test) as often as it based its finding on the party’s apparent 
intentions (applying the test in a truly objective manner).   
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These cases are indicative of a reluctance to move away from using a party’s actual intention as a 
basis for determining whether or not they have committed a repudiatory breach. At a minimum, 
these cases speak to a failure to clearly state that the finding that a party had breached the contract 
was based on what a reasonable person would have concluded the breaching party’s intentions 
were. It would seem fairly uncontroversial that an objective test is preferable to a subjective test and 
as such this somewhat equivocal stance certainly justifies Nienaber JA’s reiteration and explanation 
of the objective test in Datacolor.222  
2.3 The predicted breach 
The emphasis that has been placed on the objective nature of the test for repudiation means that 
there has been less emphasis placed on Nienaber JA’s other significant finding regarding the test. 
Nienaber JA first confirms that ‘repudiation is not a matter of intention, it is a matter of perception’, 
the perception being that of a reasonable person.223 This is reflected in his characterization of 
repudiation as being 
’an intimation by or on behalf of the repudiating party, by word or conduct and without lawful 
excuse, that all or some of the obligations arising from the agreement will not be performed 
according to their true tenor.’
224
 
Significantly however Nienaber JA also found that: 





’Whether the innocent party will be entitled to resile from the agreement will ultimately depend 
on the nature and the degree of the impending non- or malperformance.’
226
 
The question addressed by Nienaber JA here is not whether or not it would appear that a potentially 
breaching party is going to commit a breach but rather whether or not such impending breach would 
justify the aggrieved party cancelling the contract. 
The test for repudiation formulated in Freeth v Burr,  that a party must ‘evince an intention no 
longer to be bound by the contract’ in order to repudiate the contract does not explicitly address 
what conduct would amount to an expression of intention to no longer be bound by the terms of the 
contract. Regardless of whether a party’s intention is assessed subjectively or objectively it must still 
be determined whether the conduct is such as to demonstrate this intention to no longer be bound.  
In the English case of Johnstone v Milling227 the lessor covenanted to repair the premises after the 
end of the first four years at the option of the lessee. Before the elapse of the first four years the 
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lessor repeatedly told the lessee that he would be unable to obtain the money necessary in order to 
have the premises repaired. Lord Esher, although finding that it was not necessary to decide the 
point, found that as the covenant in question did not go to the whole consideration of the lease that 
an anticipatory breach of such covenant would not entitle the lessee to cancel the contract.228  
This issue was again considered by the House of Lords in Mersey Steel and Iron Co v Naylor, Benzon 
and Co229 where the different judges took different approaches. Lord Selborne found that ‘you must 
examine what the conduct is, so as to see whether it amount to a renunciation, to an absolute 
refusal to perform the contract’.230 This focus on the intentions of the party can be seen again in the 
judgment of McCardie J in the English case of In Re Rubel Bronze and Metal Company v Vos231  where 
he found that: 
‘‘In every case the question of repudiation must depend on the character of the contract, the 
number and weight of the wrongful acts or assertions, the intention indicated by such acts or 
words, the deliberation or otherwise with which they are committed or uttered, and on the 
general circumstances of the case.’
232
 
Liu labels this focus on intention as the ‘renunciation approach’ contrasting it with an approach that 
instead focuses on the consequences of the repudiation, rather than the party’s intentions.233 
This focus on the consequences of the breach can be seen in Lord Blackburn’s judgment in Mersey 
Steel where, unlike Lord Selborne, he built on Lord Esher’s findings in Johnstone, and distinguished 
between terms the breach of which entitles the other party to cancel the contract, a breach which 
goes to ‘the root of the whole and substantial consideration’, and those which do not.234 This focus 
on the consequences of the breach, whether the breach will ‘deprive [the aggrieved party] of 
substantially the whole of the consideration’ or amounts to a ‘fundamental breach’, Liu labels the 
‘fundamental breach approach’. 235 
Liu uses two decisions of the House of Lords, Federal Commerce & Navigation Ltd v Molena Alpha 
Inc236 and Woodar Investment Development Ltd v Wimpey Construction,237 to illustrate this ‘patent 
dichotomy’ in approach.238 Briefly, in Federal Commerce the dispute concerned a charterparty 
agreement where the charterers, in response to a ‘disastrous slump’ in the shipping market 
operating to the disadvantage of the charterers, had made a number of deductions from the hire 
due under the charter.239 The owners, taking exception to such deductions, instructed the master of 
the ship not to sign any bill of lading endorsed ‘freight prepaid’. The House of Lords, focusing on the 
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severe consequences for the charterers which would arise if such instruction had been carried out, 
found that the owner’s conduct would have deprived the charterers of ‘substantially the whole 
benefit of the contract.’240 
Woodar, decided just one year later with Lord Wilberforce, Lord Scarman and Lord Russell being 
present on the bench in both cases, involved a dispute concerning the sale of land. The purchasers, 
responding to a falling market, purported to cancel the agreement in terms of a special condition 
contained in the contract.241 The sellers correctly rejected such cancellation as being unfounded and 
cancelled the contract on the basis of the purchasers’ repudiation and resold the property to a third 
party. Although involving a sale of land rather than a charterparty in both cases a party took steps 
which pointed to a future breach of contract. Yet the approach of the court in Woodar was not to 
focus on this predicted breach, but rather on the intention of the purchaser.242 
The majority’s focus on intention in Woodar is illustrated by the findings which they used to support 
the conclusion that the buyers had ‘manifested no intention to abandon, or to refuse future 
performance of or to repudiate the contract.’243 These included that the sellers were relying on their 
solicitor’s advice, that the notice of cancellation was a neutral document merely invoking one of the 
contract’s terms and that as the notice was being disputed by the buyers that it was not an absolute 
refusal but rather conditional upon the court’s decision.244 This would suggest that whether an 
aggrieved party is entitled to cancel a contract is based on the seriousness or absoluteness of the 
other party’s refusal. 
These two approaches can also be seen in the South African case law. For instance Lewis J, in his 
judgment in Schlinkman v van der Walt, 245 quoted the same finding of McCardie J’s from In Re Rubel 
Bronze and Metal Company as is quoted above.246 Two years later we see Watermeyer CJ in Aucamp 
v Morton quoting from Lord Blackburn’s judgment in Mersey Steel and Iron Co v Naylor, Benzon and 
Co.247 Even more clearly, Alfred Molena and Woodar were considered alongside each other by 
Streicher JA in Highveld 7 Properties.248 The respondent in this case, the seller of a piece of land, 
relied on Woodar to argue that like the seller in Woodar they had intended the validity of their 
assertions to be tested in court and as such they did not amount to a repudiation.249 It is 
unsurprising then that Streicher JA drew on Alfred Molena for support of his finding against the 
respondents.250 The tension between these two decisions has led to the perhaps overly polite finding 
that the decisions are ‘highly fact sensitive’ and as such are difficult to reconcile.251 
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However, it is not clear that these finding represent two entirely distinct approaches by South 
African courts with either intention or the consequences being emphasised. Certainly the South 
African courts use the language of the ‘renunciation approach’ co-extensively with a discussion of 
consequences typical of the ‘fundamental breach approach’. In Ponisammy Muller JA noted that a 
repudiation can be made by words or conduct provided that they ‘must evince a clear intention not 
to perform the obligation due under the contract’.252 After this Muller JA supports his decision with 
the finding that the buyer’s representative’s communication to the seller that it would not be able to 
perform by the agreed date could not be regarded as indicating that the buyer would also be unable 
to perform within a reasonable period after that date.253 
In circumstances where a party has given a clear indication that they do not intend to perform the 
contract in its entirety the renunciation approach is not without merit.254 More often than not where 
a party’s intentions are to not perform the contract at all or to perform it in a manner that is 
substantially at odds with their actual obligations one would expect that she or he will be able to 
give effect to their intention. It follows that once such an intention has been established that party 
should be found to have repudiated the contract. 
We therefore see that where a party has exhibited an intention to not perform the contract in its 
entirety, or at least the significant part thereof, courts would seem to follow what is the orthodox 
and predominant approach in English law, the ‘renunciation approach’.255 In such cases the 
consequences are generally obvious, the breaching party will not perform their agreed obligations 
and thus will entirely compromise the aggrieved party’s interest in the contract. 
Metalmil v AECI256 provides an example of such a situation, where it was the breaching party’s 
intention which was going to be determinative of the eventual outcomes. The dispute concerned a 
contract for the supply of scrap copper.257 The respondent had undertaken to source all of its 
objective needs for scrap copper from the appellant. The respondent, taking the incorrect view that 
it was entitled to do so, instead sourced copper from a third party. The respondent had a clear 
intention to perform the contract in a manner that was inconsistent with the terms of the contract. 
The focus of the judgment on the repudiating party’s intention rather than on the consequences of 
their attitude can easily be attributed to the fact that the breach which had occurred (ordering scrap 
copper from a third party instead of the appellant), and the further breaches which were predicted, 
were entirely determined by the respondent’s attitude to the contract.258 
By contrast, in cases where the breach threatened by a party is not as conclusive as a complete 
repudiation of the contract, a court is required to delve into what consequences would flow from 
such breach. This is well illustrated by the facts of Ponisammy, where the buyer’s conduct indicated 
that a breach in the form of a delay was going to occur but gave no indication that the buyer would 
not be able to perform within a reasonable period after the due date.  
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It is also necessary to examine the consequences where a party’s intentions are unclear. In Tuckers 
Land and Development Corporation,259 the facts of which are discussed above, it was uncertain what 
the land developer’s intentions were and Jansen JA focused on the predicted consequences of its 
actions, being the non-delivery of the properties which were the subject of the sale agreement.260 
Courts are not often required to emphasise the consequences of the breach as cases involving 
repudiation frequently involve conduct that indicates a complete unwillingness to perform, such as 
arising from the invalid cancellation of an agreement.261 
Prior to Datacolor, the South African courts continued to make use of the test for repudiation set out 
in Freeth v Burr,  being whether a party demonstrates ‘an intention no longer to be bound’262 
without giving explicit content to what would amount to such an intention. We therefore see 
decisions where the court has had recourse to the predicted consequences of the potentially 
repudiating party’s conduct and also decisions where the enquiry seems to be restricted to the 
intention and attitude of the potentially repudiating party’s conduct.263 Nonetheless this does not 
demonstrate the ‘patent dichotomy’ found by Liu in the English case law. South African courts 
would, in general, appear to consider the consequences of the potentially breaching party’s conduct 
where this is not a complete or substantial denial of their obligations or where their intentions are 
not clear.264 Certainly Streicher JA in Highveld Properties was quick to emphasise the consequences 
predicted by the seller’s conduct in response to an argument by counsel based on the decision in 
Woodar.265 
Where the decision in Datacolor differs from these earlier cases is that it makes an explicit 
connection between the remedies available to the aggrieved party and the predicted breach. In 
terms of the decision in Datacolor whether or not an aggrieved party will be entitled to cancel the 
contract is determined with specific reference to the predicted consequences of the offending 
party’s conduct. This would suggest a two stage approach with the consequences predicted by the 
offending party’s conduct first being determined and then these consequences assessed to 
determine whether such breach justifies cancellation.266 
As is illustrated above, an approach which considers the consequences of the offending party’s 
conduct, rather than merely their intentions and attitude, is well established in the South African 
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case law. Nienaber JA’s finding nevertheless represents a significant shift in the law as it makes it 
necessary to consider what consequences are predicted by a party’s conduct. 
The test set out in Datacolor provides a mechanism for determining whether the conduct 
complained of by the aggrieved party justifies the cancellation of the contract. It does this with 
reference to the ‘non- or malperformance’ predicted by the offending party’s conduct. This is 
consistent with the position that a right of action arises from an anticipatory breach on the basis that 
the breaching party’s actions have compromised the aggrieved party’s interest in the promised 
performance which is discussed above.267 If it is the anticipated breach of the promised performance 
that gives rise to an anticipatory breach then the extent of this effect should determine whether a 
right to cancel arises. 
The combination of an objective test for repudiation and the requirement that whether a party will 
be entitled to cancel the contract be determined with reference to the predicted breach has the 
further effect of requiring that the predicted outcomes should not be determined with reference 
only to the offending party’s objectively determined intentions.268 That is, the predicted ‘non- or 
malperformance’ should be determined by looking at what outcome the offending party’s conduct 
predicts, an entirely objective test, rather than only what their apparent (objective) intention 
predicts.269 
This fairly subtle distinction is required because an objective intention may not be determinative of 
the likely outcome. This can occur where a party has no particular intention one way or the other or 
where they are not likely to be able to bring about what they intend to occur.270 Interestingly these 
shortcomings of an approach which focuses on the breaching party’s intentions, are exactly those 
identified by Lord Shaw in Forslind v Bechely-Crundall which were noted above.271 
Nienaber JA’s judgment in Datacolor does not make it entirely clear whether or not he considered, 
and intended this implication, that an entirely objective test should be used, as he continues to use 
the ‘inferred intention’ as the basis for determining the threatened breach.272 However, the test that 
is implied by a purely objective approach is essentially what Nienaber JA sets out in Datacolor, being 
that: 
’a repudiatory breach may be typified as an intimation by or on behalf of the repudiating party, 
by word or conduct and without lawful excuse, that all or some of the obligations arising from 
the agreement will not be performed according to their true tenor. Whether the innocent party 
will be entitled to resile from the agreement will ultimately depend on the nature and the 
degree of the impending non- or malperformance.’ 
Nienaber’s academic writings would also suggest that he did consider and intended the entirely 
objective test set out above.  There he notes that ‘as soon as emphasis is placed not on the actual 
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animus of the repudiator, but on the effect of his conduct on the mind of a reasonable person, the 
animus falls away’273 and that as soon as an inferred intention is used the test is objective.274 
Further, in his academic writing Nienaber distinguishes between repudiation, relative prevention of 
performance and absolute prevention of performance on the basis of the certainty with which they 
predict a breach.275 He therefore groups repudiation and relative prevention of performance as they 
predict a breach with relative certainty and distinguish these categories from absolute prevention of 
performance, which predicts a breach with absolute certainty. Importantly Nienaber does not use 
the more traditional basis for distinguishing these forms of breach on the basis that a repudiation 
consists in positive expression of intent in contrast to prevention of performance which does not.276  
If it is the predicted non- or malperformance which determines the existence of a repudiatory 
breach and whether a right to cancel the contract arises then it is no longer possible to distinguish 
between repudiation and prevention of performance on the basis that repudiation requires some 
positive expression of intent by the offending party.277 It would seem therefore that Nienaber likely 
intended for the test to be applied as an entirely objective test which considers whether the 
outcomes predicted by the breaching party’s conduct would justify affording the aggrieved party a 
right to cancel the contract. 
It should be noted that one consequence of applying a purely objective test would appear to conflict 
with Nienaber JA’s findings in Datacolor, 278 that being that an anticipatory breach need not consist 
of any positive conduct by the breaching party. It is possible to reach a conclusion that a party will 
not correctly perform their obligations without relying on any action by the contracting party. There 
is then no reason to limit anticipatory breach to circumstances where the conduct of the contracting 
party in question forms the basis for such conclusion. Where the conduct of a third party makes it 
clear in the circumstances that a contracting party will commit a non- or malperformance this can 
also amount to an anticipatory breach by that contracting party.279 
Circumstances that could amount to an anticipatory breach would therefore go beyond a ‘speaking 
silence’,280 that is where ‘the previous conduct of a party in refusing to perform another related 
contract may give rise to the inference that he will refuse to perform the contract in question’.281 
Rather, consistent with the view expressed by Devlin J in respect of prevention of performance but 
applying also to repudiation, a party commits an anticipatory breach ‘when by his [or her] own act or 
default circumstances arise which render him unable [or apparently unwilling] to perform his side of 
the contract or some essential part thereof.’282 
Drawing on the example discussed in the first chapter, where A has entered into a contract for the 
sale of a painting to B and B has entered into a contract of sale for the painting with C, if A 
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communicates to C that she or he will not deliver the painting to B, this could amount to an 
anticipatory breach of contract by B in respect of the contract between B and C (it would also be an 
anticipatory breach by A in respect of the contract between A and B). This is consistent with the 
unified approach to anticipatory breach of contract necessitated by applying a purely objective test 
as the same conclusion would be reached if the anticipatory breach consisted of prevention of 
performance rather than repudiation. Using the same example, if A destroyed the painting, making it 
impossible for B to deliver the painting to C, this would also amount to an anticipatory breach by B 
of the contract between B and C, despite there being no positive conduct by B. 
This is difficult to reconcile with Nienaber JA’s definition which relies on ‘an intimation’ by a 
contracting party.283 At the same time Nienaber JA reasons that it is not the repudiating party’s 
intentions which form the basis of an anticipatory breach but the conclusion which would be drawn 
by a notional reasonable person in the position of the defendant.284 Following this reasoning there is 
no basis for insisting that an anticipatory breach must consist of conduct by the contracting party. If 
circumstances were such that a reasonable person would conclude that a party had acted in a 
manner that amounted to an anticipatory breach this would be sufficient to establish that a breach 
had occurred, even if the repudiating party had not in fact acted in this way. It is clear that the 
conclusion need not be based on the breaching party’s conduct. 
The decision in Datacolor is not clear on this point but it is clear that if the basis for an anticipatory 
breach rests in the predicted non- or malperformance and that there is no reason to limit 
anticipatory breach to circumstances where this prediction is based on the conduct of the breaching 
party. The use of the terminology of ‘conduct by a contracting party’ in defining anticipatory breach 
of contract is therefore not ideal. The ‘conduct’ in question could take the form of a failure to act in 
circumstances where absent any positive action a conclusion that the contract will not be correctly 
performed will be reached. 
The potential problems that arise through restricting anticipatory breach to ‘conduct by a 
contracting party’ are best illustrated using the example of the first seller A destroying the painting. 
Where there is no course of action open to B to prevent the destruction of the painting this would 
nonetheless amount to an anticipatory breach of contract. It is however difficult to describe the 
conclusion that B will not correctly perform her or his obligations to C as being based on B’s 
‘conduct’ even if ‘conduct’ includes omissions. A better description would be to describe 
anticipatory breach as ‘conduct or circumstances which predict a non- or malperformance’.  
Although not ideal, the use of ‘conduct’ as a description is not overly problematic as long as it is 
accepted that the conduct in question can consist of a failure or inability to prevent circumstances 
arising which support a conclusion that the contract will not be correctly performed. Nonetheless 
preference will be given to the use of ‘conduct or circumstances’ in this thesis where possible. 
Liu proposes a substantially similar test for repudiation to the test set out in Datacolor for use in the 
English law. He characterises an anticipatory breach as an ‘inferred fundamental breach’ and notes 
that the intention based test was ‘developed from and tailored for an “outright refusal” to perform’, 
placing form over substance.285 By focusing on the outward expression of intent it can overlook the 
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underlying reason why a remedy is granted, that being the anticipated breach.286 A further 
consequence of the adoption of such a test which gets the support of both Liu and Nienaber is that 
because anticipatory breach is defined with reference to the predicted consequences and not with 
reference to time set for performance, a breach will constitute an anticipatory breach even if it 
occurs after the time stipulated for performance.287 The distinction between repudiation and 
prevention of performance occurring before the time for performance and after the time for 
performance disappears. Liu further notes that a consequence of this construction is that the 
inference that a party will commit a fundamental breach need not be based on conduct by the party 
in question, as is suggested above.288  
Because anticipatory breach of contract is established on the basis of a prediction of a future non- or 
malperformance it is necessary to establish the degree of likelihood which is required in order to 
recognise a breach. Nienaber JA’s judgment addresses this issue with a finding that  
‘[t]he conduct from which the inference of an impending non- or malperformance is to be drawn 




Unfortunately this finding is somewhat misleading and is inconsistent with the structure of the 
objective test proposed by Nienaber JA in the preceding paragraphs. If an anticipatory breach is to 
be established on the basis of an inference of impending non- or malperformance as Nienaber JA 
suggests then it is the likelihood of such non- or malperformance which should be determinative of 
whether conduct constitutes an anticipatory breach rather than whether such conduct is ‘clearcut 
and unequivocal’. 
Where the existence of a repudiation is determined by the intentions of the potentially breaching 
party it is appropriate to use the clarity with which their conduct expresses an intention to repudiate 
as a basis for determining whether an anticipatory breach has occurred. Where an anticipatory 
breach is rather based on an inference of impending non- or malperformance the clarity of 
expression is relevant only to the extent that it provides support for such inference, the ultimate 
criterion must be the likelihood of a breach occurring. 
That a relatively high degree of likelihood is required is established by the finding that an 
anticipatory breach is ‘not lightly to be presumed’.290 This is consistent with findings in English cases 
that what is required is a ‘firm conclusion, reasonably inferred’291 and which distinguish between a 
‘possibility of breach and a reasonable probability’.292 The most succinct exposition of this standard 
can be found in the CISG, PECL and PICC which require that it be ‘clear’ that a party will commit a 
non-performance.293 The test employed in these transnational instruments provides a standard that 
is consistent with basing anticipatory breach on an inferred future breach while remaining consistent 
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with the requirement that an anticipatory breach should not be lightly presumed. Liu draws on 
English case law to suggest that an anticipatory breach should be established on the normal 
standard of a balance of probabilities.294 However, this would seem to be at odds with much of the 
language quoted above which would suggest a higher standard than merely ‘more likely than not’. 
The requirement that it be ‘clear’ that a party will commit a non- or malperformance provides a 
general standard for determining whether a party’s conduct sufficiently supports the inference that 
they will commit a breach. The standard set out by Nienaber JA that a party’s conduct must be ‘clear 
and unequivocal’, although still applicable where an anticipatory breach is being established only on 
the basis of a statement of intent by a party, as in Datacolor, is not adaptable to circumstances 
where the breaching party’s intentions are not the basis for establishing the anticipatory breach or 
are not likely to be determinative of the eventual outcome. The requirement that it be ‘clear’ that a 
party will commit a non- or malperformance is therefore preferable as it is more consistent with the 
purely objective test. 
That Nienaber JA still applied the ‘clear and unequivocal’ standard does undermine the argument 
presented above that Nienaber JA intended to apply a purely objective test.  The purely objective 
test is more consistent with Nienaber JA’s academic writing and judgment as a whole than the 
alternatives. It would seem that the purpose of the ‘clear and unequivocal’ standard was to stress 
the position that a repudiation was not to be lightly presumed, that is that a relatively high degree of 
probability was required, rather than to suggest that the test was subjective in nature. 
The development of an objective test is consistent with the test used in transnational instruments 
which are again structured in a substantially similar manner to the test set out in Datacolor.295 It 
should be noted that the two stage approach which the test suggests, that is considering what non- 
or malperformance is predicted and then determining whether such breach would give rise to a right 
to cancel by applying the normal rules on breach of contract does give rise to some uncertainty as a 
result of the fissured concept of breach of contract, 296 particularly in the case of mora debitoris, and 
this is discussed in more detail below.297 
2.4 Repudiation is a material breach 
As noted above the ‘traditional approach’ or ‘offer acceptance model’ in terms of which repudiation 
must go to the ‘root’ of the contract and is completed upon the acceptance of the repudiation by the 
aggrieved party was quickly established in English law as the foundation of this form of breach of 
contract.298 This ‘traditional approach’ is viewed as having been conclusively rejected by Datacolor 
and a ‘new approach’ to repudiation established.299 In terms of this ‘new approach’ repudiation 
consists of conduct intimating that ‘all or some of the obligations arising from the agreement will not 
be performed according to their true tenor’ and ‘the so-called “acceptance”, although a convenient 
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catchword, does not “complete” the breach but is simply the exercise by the aggrieved party of his 
right to terminate the agreement.’300 
Although Nienaber JA clearly endorses Jansen JA’s characterisation of the ‘acceptance’ as being the 
exercise of a right to cancel,301 his position with respect to the requirement that a repudiation 
consists of a material breach is not as clear in his Datacolor judgment.302 Rather than explicitly 
rejecting this aspect of repudiation, Nienaber JA rather provides the definition of repudiation given 
above, which omits the requirement that an anticipatory breach must consist of a predicted material 
breach. That Nienaber JA’s intention was to redefine repudiation as consisting of the intimation of 
any breach, and not just material breaches, and that the rejection of such material breach 
requirement was founded on the basis of a rejection of the ‘offer acceptance model’ has been 
accepted by academic authors and is clear from Nienaber’s academic writing.303 
However, as was discussed above, this new construction of repudiation is open to criticism. Firstly, 
the rejection of the ‘offer and acceptance model’ does not necessarily entail a rejection of the 
requirement that the aggrieved party cancel the contract before claiming damages.304 As Liu notes, 
the ‘principle of election’ can be broken down into two separate propositions. Liu labels these the 
‘breach conversion’ rule, that until acceptance a repudiation is not complete and thus no breach at 
all, and the ‘conditional damages claim’ rule, that a repudiation is an immediate breach however the 
claim for damages is conditional upon cancellation of the contract.305 It is clear from Nienaber’s 
academic writings that he does not consider retaining the ‘conditional damages claim rule’ while 
dispensing with the ‘breach conversion rule’ as a possibility.306 
Secondly, contrary to Nienaber’s view, the rejection of the acceptance requirement, although 
allowing for conduct or circumstances predicting a non-material breach to constitute repudiation, 
does not require, or even support, the rejection of the ‘conditional damages claim rule’. Importantly, 
in Datacolor, the breach predicted by the respondent’s non-compliance with the cancellation 
provisions in the contract was complete non-performance, which would constitute a material 
breach.307 The plaintiff also communicated to the respondents an intention to cancel the contract, as 
did the aggrieved party in Stewart Wrightson from which Nienaber JA drew support.308 Following 
from this, any finding by the court that a repudiation need not consist of conduct or circumstances 
predicting a material breach or that cancellation of the contract is not necessary is obiter. These 
findings have also not been confirmed or supported in subsequent decisions on repudiation and are 
therefore open to reconsideration. 309 
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Dealing first with the ‘acceptance requirement’, it is clear that the ‘breach conversion rule’ is illogical 
and also at odds with decided case law and Jansen JA’s rejection of such in Stewart Wrightson is to 
be welcomed.310 The ‘conditional damages claim rule’ does not suffer from such a flaw, as the 
breach of contract is immediately constituted by the offending party’s wrongful repudiation of the 
contract. It is only the claim for damages which is conditional on the cancellation of the contract by 
the aggrieved party. 
Liu justifies the ‘conditional damages claim’ proposition with reference to the reasoning employed 
by Cockburn CJ in Frost v Knight.311 Cockburn CJ found that the repudiation impaired the aggrieved 
party’s ‘inchoate right to performance’, the ‘right to have the contract kept open as a subsisting and 
effective contract.’312 He then went on to find that as a result of the ‘contract having been thus 
broken by the promisor, and treated as broken by the promisee’ that the ‘eventual non-performance 
may therefore, by anticipation be treated as a cause of action, and damages be assessed and 
recovered.’313 Liu submits:  
’Cockburn CJ in effect recognised that an anticipatory breach, although a present breach, was 
not sufficient automatically to give rise to a damages claim on its own, and a damages claim 
could only arise when an actual breach at the time for performance became “inevitable”.’
314
 
Lubbe employs similar reasoning in discussing the retraction of repudiation, a topic which will be 
discussed more fully below.315 Importantly he notes that the ‘basis for cancellation … is not the 
envisaged malperformance, nor the expectation of it, but the present breach of an existing duty’ 
and, criticising Nienaber’s reasoning, that ‘it is not clear that the right to cancel can be brought home 
under the element of prospectivity to the same extent as the claim for damages.’316 Although not 
written in support of the conditional damages claim rule, Lubbe’s discussion of the justification for 
the right to cancel, which is founded on the immediate breach by the repudiator, as separate from 
the right to claim damages, which arises once the non-performance is made certain by the aggrieved 
party’s cancellation of the contract, is consistent with and would appear to support the application 
of Liu’s reasoning to the South African law.317 
The justification for the right to cancel is then founded in the immediate breach constituted by the 
repudiation itself and the claim for damages is justified by the prospective non-performance of the 
breaching party’s obligations, which arise from the cancellation. This construction is suggested by 
Cockburn CJ in Frost v Knight and endorsed by Liu and Lubbe. It would then seem entirely plausible 
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that the right to cancel could arise immediately and the claim for damages arises only upon 
cancellation, that is after this anticipated breach had become ‘inevitable’.  
Liu supports this approach on the basis that it promotes finality and consistency. Prior to the 
cancellation of the contract by the aggrieved party the losses such party might sustain are not 
certain, the offending party might for instance change their mind based on the aggrieved party’s 
insistence on holding them to the contract, and perform the contract.318 The act of cancellation  
‘crystallise[s] the parties’ positions in the sense that from the moment of acceptance neither party 
[can] change his mind and no future fluctuations of the market [will] affect the amount of damages.’ 
The ‘conditional damages claim’ also requires the aggrieved party to behave consistently, they may 
not claim damages while also attempting to uphold the contract.319 
Liu provides two exceptions to the ‘conditional damages claim’ rule. The first arises where the 
anticipatory breach makes performance immediately impossible, restricting this to cases of ‘physical 
impossibility’, consistent with what is labelled ‘absolute impossibility’ in South African law.320 In 
these circumstances the anticipated breach is immediately inevitable without cancellation of the 
contract and the ‘conditional damages claim’ rule serves no purpose.321 Interestingly this division of 
anticipatory breach into absolute impossibility, where performance is physically impossible, on the 
one hand and relative impossibility and repudiation, where performance is still possible, on the 
other hand is consistent with the distinction suggested by Nienaber.322 
The second exception Liu provides is where an anticipatory breach itself causes a loss to the 
aggrieved party.323 Liu suggests that in an executory contract where the impact on the contractual 
relationship is sufficient to cause an immediate loss that a claim for this loss should not be 
contingent on cancelling the contract. In these circumstances the role of damages is to put the 
aggrieved party in the position she or he would have been in if the repudiation had not occurred, 
keeping the contractual relationship intact, rather than the position she or he would have been in if 
the contract had been performed correctly.324 
It should be noted however that it is not clear how these circumstances could arise and what such 
damages could consist of and it may be that this exception is in fact devoid of content. Nienaber, 
who uses the possibility of immediate damages arising from a repudiation as a reason for rejecting 
the ‘offer and acceptance model’, notes only that the ability to cede the right may be compromised 
because the monetary value of the right could be diminished and that the aggrieved party should be 
entitled to claim the difference in value.325  This would however seem to be problematic as the 
cessionary would still be entitled to claim for damages arising from the defective performance if the 
latter did arise and the offending party would end up having to pay double compensation. 
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If the ‘conditional damages claim’ rule is accepted, requiring a party to cancel the contract before 
claiming damages on the basis of an anticipatory breach, then the requirement that the anticipated 
breach must justify cancellation, that is it must be a material breach, follows logically. There are 
nonetheless independent reasons to recognise only conduct or circumstances which predict a 
material breach as amounting to anticipatory breaches of contract. It would seem that some of the 
strongest justifications for providing a remedy in the case of an anticipatory breach of contract are 
that it avoids wasted efforts and promotes economic efficiency.326 
It allows a party to avoid the waste of engaging in potentially expensive preparations for a 
contractual performance that is not going to be forthcoming and instead take steps to mitigate such 
losses immediately. These reasons are however only compelling where the anticipated breach would 
deprive the aggrieved party of ‘substantially all the benefit to be acquired’.327 Where a minor breach 
is anticipated, the aggrieved party’s efforts are not wasted and there is no barrier to them engaging 
in efforts to mitigate the loss without taking action against the offending party. It is the uncertainty 
inherent in predicting the breach that ultimately justifies limiting the recognition of a breach to 
circumstances where a material actual breach of contract is anticipated. Further issues arise when 
determining what remedies would be available to an aggrieved party in circumstances where a non-
material breach is anticipated, and these are discussed in Chapter 4.328 
A general criticism levelled at the doctrine of anticipatory breach of contract is that it gives too much 
power to the aggrieved party and can accelerate liability under the contract.329 Although extending 
the doctrine to include non-material breaches would not allow an aggrieved party to cancel the 
contract, it could potentially be abused by contracting parties wishing to frustrate or impede the 
effective operation of the contract and accelerate liability under the contract. It could further 
promote uncertainty and lead to wasteful litigation. Where an action is allowed on the basis of an 
anticipated non-material breach, the potential for abuse is not counter balanced by the same 
benefits that the doctrine provides in relation to anticipated material breaches and should therefore 
be avoided. 
An aggrieved party is able to establish that the offending party has committed an anticipatory 
breach on the basis of conduct or circumstances which support an inference that the offending party 
will commit an actual breach of contract. Anticipatory breach of contract is inherently speculative in 
nature and is based on the apparent rather than actual intentions and ability of the offending party. 
Although the standard required is high, ‘[t]he conduct from which the inference of impending non- 
or malperformance is to be drawn must be clearcut and unequivocal, ie not equally consistent with 
any other feasible hypothesis’,330 it nonetheless has the possibility of disrupting a contract which 
would otherwise be correctly performed. The justification for intervening and providing a remedy 
should therefore be strong. This justification is present where it is clear that a breach is going to 
occur and that such breach, if it arises, would have a material impact on the aggrieved party’s 
interest in the contract. It is the combination of a material breach and the high likelihood of such 
occurring which justifies granting the remedy before any actual breach has materialised. 
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Restricting anticipatory breach to circumstances where an offending party’s conduct or the 
surrounding circumstances predict a material breach and, dispensing with the ‘breach conversion’ 
rule, making the claim for damages conditional upon the cancellation of the contract, subject to the 
exemptions discussed above,331 promotes certainty and economic efficiency. Further, it reduces the 
risk of abuse of contractual powers by restricting the circumstances in which it applies to those 
where a material breach is foreseen. This position is also consistent with the existing body of case 
law, both South African and Anglo-American, and is further consistent with transnational contractual 
instruments and the Uniform Commercial Code used in the United States of America.332 Although 
Nienaber JA’s judgment in Datacolor provides a basis for a construction of anticipatory breach of 
contract that does not include these requirements this development should be avoided. 
2.5 Conclusion 
Nienaber JA makes findings in Datacolor  that the test for repudiation is an objective test and that 
whether a party should be entitled to cancel the contract on the basis of repudiation should be 
determined with reference to the predicted non- or malperformance. Although it had long been 
acknowledged that the test for repudiation was an objective test, what an objective test required 
had not been clearly defined. Similarly, although the nature of the predicted breach had been 
considered in the context of repudiation, it was only in Datacolor that an explicit link was made 
between whether or not the aggrieved party would be entitled to cancel the contract and the nature 
of the predicted breach. Applied together these findings clarify which forms of conduct and 
circumstances constitute a repudiation necessitating a more substantial shift in the conception of 
repudiation and anticipatory breach of contract in South African law than has previously been 
appreciated. 
If the non- or malperformance predicted by an offending party’s conduct (where ‘conduct’ 
encompasses a failure to prevent such a situation from arising) is to form the basis for determining 
whether the aggrieved party has a right to cancel the contract, then whether or not conduct 
amounts to a repudiation should be determined by examining whether or not such conduct predicts 
a non- or malperformance, that is an entirely objective test. Although relevant, the offending party’s 
apparent intentions cannot be the sole basis on which the nature of such non- or malperformance is 
determined. Importantly, this has the effect of collapsing the basis on which repudiation and 
prevention of performance have been distinguished in South African law and creates a unified 
concept of anticipatory breach of contract.   
The two further findings by Nienaber JA in Datacolor in relation to repudiation, that the ‘acceptance’ 
is ‘simply the exercise by the aggrieved party of [her or] his right to terminate the agreement’333 and 
that a repudiation can consist of conduct predicting any, not just a material, breach of contract are 
not as clearly beneficial. Contrary to Nienaber’s position the ‘acceptance requirement’ in the form of 
the ‘conditional damages claim’ rule, serves a useful function in enhancing certainty in cases of an 
anticipatory breach of contract. 
Lastly, contrary to the test expressed in Datacolor, that a breach consists of conduct intimating that 
‘the obligations arising from the agreement will not be performed according to their true tenor’, 
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anticipatory breach should be restricted to conduct by a party intimating that they will commit a 
material breach or circumstances predicting such. Including anticipated non-material breaches 
within the ambit of anticipatory breach of contract would provide a remedy in circumstances where 
a contracting party’s interest in the contract has been impaired. However, allowing a remedy in 
circumstances where it is only a non-material breach which is anticipated is not adequately justified. 
Unlike in circumstances of an anticipated material breach, it does not avoid wasted efforts and could 
undermine instead of enhance certainty. The opportunity for abuse by a contracting party and the 
possibility of engendering wasteful litigation further suggests that an anticipatory breach should only 
be recognised where it is clear that a material breach will be committed. 
Consistent with the definition for anticipatory breach of contract given in the previous chapter, an 
anticipatory breach of contract then consists of conduct by a contracting party or circumstances 
which support a reasonable inference that such party will commit a material breach of contract. The 
aggrieved party’s right to claim damages on the basis of such breach is contingent upon such party 
cancelling the contract. 
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3 CANCELLATION AND ANTICIPATORY BREACH OF CONTRACT 
In Chapter 2 it was shown that Datacolor established that an aggrieved party should be afforded a 
right to cancel a contract where the offending party has given a clear indication that they will 
commit a breach of contract which justifies cancellation, that is, committed an anticipatory breach 
of contract.  However, Nienaber JA’s finding in Datacolor that ‘[w]hether the innocent party will be 
entitled to resile from the agreement will ultimately depend on the nature and the degree of the 
impending non- or malperformance’ leaves open the question of under what circumstances a breach 
will justify cancellation and what forms the basis for affording a party a right to cancel.   
In Chapter 2 it was suggested, departing from the findings in Datacolor and Nienaber’s academic 
writing, that anticipatory breach of contract should be restricted to material breach, that is breach 
justifying cancellation. The issue of what forms of breach would justify cancellation was not 
specifically dealt with. This chapter is intended to address this issue by discussing the development 
of cancellation for breach of contract in South African law and how the existing law could be 
adapted and developed to create a model for cancellation for anticipatory breach of contract in 
South African law.   
Roman-Dutch contract law recognised specific instances where an aggrieved party was entitled to 
cancel the contract, it did not however recognise a general right to cancel the contract arising from a 
breach of contract absent a provision in the contract allowing for such.334 The South African courts 
began to develop such a generalised right to cancel towards the end of the 19th century and 
although some of this can be traced to the development of Roman-Dutch principles and influence 
from Pothier’s writing, it was the influence of English law, and the doctrine of anticipatory breach of 
contract derived therefrom, which would prove to be the decisive catalyst.335 
Partly as a product of this mixed historical development, the South African law of contract does not 
recognise a general concept of ‘material’ or ‘fundamental’ breach and rather approaches the 
analysis of whether an aggrieved party should be entitled to cancel the contract on the basis of a 
breach of contract by using a ‘pigeon-holed approach’.336 Also described as a ‘fissured concept of 
breach’, this approach means that the answer to the question posed above, what forms of breach 
justify cancellation, does not admit of an easy answer, as different rules are applied depending on 
the nature of the breach.337 
Applying this ‘fissured concept of breach’ means that the test which is employed to determine 
whether a party will be entitled to cancel on the basis of an anticipatory breach will depend on 
which category of breach of contract the breaching party’s conduct predicts. As will be discussed 
below, where positive malperformance is predicted this does not raise any significant issues, 
however where negative malperformance, or mora, is predicted a number of issues arise. Under the 
current South African law an aggrieved party is not entitled to cancel purely on the basis of a delay 
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by the breaching party causing material detriment.338 The aggrieved party may, in addition, be 
required to serve a notice on the delaying party specifying a date for performance and/or a notice 
making time of the essence.339 Applying the existing rules on cancellation for mora to anticipated 
delays would result in confusion and uncertainty as it is not clear how these procedural steps could 
operate where the delay has not yet occurred.      
The focus of this chapter will then be to attempt to provide a structure for cancellation for 
anticipatory breach of contract which is consistent with the model of anticipatory breach of contract 
set out in Chapter 2. The proposed structure for cancellation for anticipatory breach requires looking 
at whether a party’s conduct or the surrounding circumstances indicate that they will likely commit 
an actual breach of contract and whether this actual breach would justify cancellation. This will 
require considering the origins and development of cancellation for the forms of actual breach of 
contract recognised in South African law, being positive and negative malperformance. This chapter 
will also consider and draw on the English rules on cancellation for breach of contract and those 
used in transnational instruments which are based on the English rules. 
First the development of the rules on cancellation for positive malperformance in South African law 
is discussed.340 How these rules could be applied to anticipatory breach of contract is then 
considered.341 The development of the rules on cancellation for negative malperformance is then 
discussed and the shortcomings of these rules, which become particularly evident when attempting 
to apply them in the context of anticipatory breach of contract, are then considered.342 The third 
section will attempt to provide a unitary basis for cancellation for breach, across anticipatory and 
actual breach, by considering cancellation for breach of contract in English law, in which the South 
African law on cancellation finds its roots.343 After considering the rules on cancellation for 
anticipatory breach of contract in certain transnational instruments, a basis and mechanism for 
cancellation for anticipatory breach of contract in South African law is then proposed.344 
3.1 Origin and development of cancellation for positive malperformance  
Some of the first references to the remedy of cancellation in South African law can be found in early 
cases which, referring to English authorities, recognised  repudiation as a form of breach of contract 
in South African law.345 As a repudiation necessarily justified cancellation of the contract this 
recognition resulted in the further recognition of the English remedy of cancellation as a response to 
a repudiation.346 The discussion in Wolff & Co v Bruce, Mavers & Co,347 a dispute concerning the sale 
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of shares, is of interest as De Villiers CJ distinguishes repudiation from other forms of breach, finding 
that:  
‘If the refusal to accept arises from mere inability to pay the price, different considerations: [sic] 
might arise as, for instance, whether time was of the essence of the contract, but the present 
case is free from difficulties of this nature inasmuch as the declaration, which is excepted to, 
avers that the defendant had repudiated the contract of sale.’
 348
 
In rather questionable reasoning De Villiers CJ avoided application of the Roman-Dutch law, which 
clearly did not allow for cancellation on the grounds of non-payment of the price, by making the 
seller’s right to cancel the contract depend on whether or not delivery of the goods had occurred.349 
Although De Villiers CJ would later confirm this in Hiddingh v Von Schade350 it can be questioned 
whether this held any doctrinal basis or was merely in response to the plaintiff’s arguments in Wolff 
that the English law was better adapted to resolving a dispute surrounding a share transaction, a 
form of transaction unknown to Roman-Dutch lawyers.351 
These decisions illustrate the tension that arose as a result of the importation and establishment of 
the English concept of repudiation as a form of breach of contract into the South African law. 
Recognition of repudiation as an independent form of breach entered into a lacuna in the Roman-
Dutch law, which had not recognised this form of breach. However, it also introduced cancellation as 
a general remedy for repudiation, something which was only available in specific circumstances 
under Roman-Dutch law. Whether or not an aggrieved party would be entitled to cancel a contract 
as a result would then depend on whether they could avoid application of the Roman-Dutch law in 
favour of the application of the English concept of repudiation. 
By the early twentieth century repudiation had come to be recognised as an independent form of 
breach and it became well established that the aggrieved party could elect to either cancel the 
contract and claim damages or abide by the contract and claim performance.352 This, and how 
repudiation operated in parallel to the Roman-Dutch law, is illustrated in Dennil v Atkins & Co353 by 
Innes CJ’s finding that: 
‘Where the sale is repudiated by the buyer the vendor may elect to claim damages; whatever 
other remedy he may have, he has that one; he is not bound to bring the actio venditi. It is too 
late now, in view of the South African decisions, to question that position.’
354
 
The tests in Freeth v Burr355 and Mersey Steel and Iron Company v Naylor Benzom,356 discussed 
above,357 had been formulated to identify when a breach, although relating to a single instalment of 
the contract, was nonetheless sufficiently serious as to justify cancellation of the entire contract and 
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hence amount to a repudiation of the contract (these are examples of ‘impure’ anticipatory 
breaches, as such term is used by Liu and Mustill).358 It is clear that these tests, whether a party has 
‘evinced an intention no longer to be bound’359 or whether the breach ‘goes to the root of the 
contract’,360 were particularly well suited to distinguishing a repudiation, where the English law 
applied, from other forms of breach, where the Roman-Dutch law applied, and it would seem likely 
that this played a role in the adoption of these tests. 
The extension of these principles into the context of positive malperformance came with the 
construction that such an ‘intention to no longer be bound’ could be inferred from a contracting 
party’s malperformance. This made it possible to construe any significant failure to correctly perform 
contractual obligations as being demonstrative of an intention to abandon the contract and hence a 
repudiation. This equation of a material breach and repudiation can be seen in Cotton v Arnold 
where De Villiers CJ found that: 
‘Where there is a further delay in the payment of the price, the vendor can only cancel the sale if 
it can fairly be inferred from the acts and conduct of the purchaser that he no longer considered 
himself bound by the contract.’
361
 
Similarly in Brown v Sessell362 Bristowe J found that: 
‘I think that the rule, that the breach of an essential term of a contract justifies the other party in 
putting an end to it, depends upon the consideration that the breach of an essential term is 
equivalent to a refusal to carry out the contract.’
363
 
Despite some reluctance to allow cancellation in this manner in the context of a contract of sale 
where there was still some insistence on the use of the actio redhibitoria,364 this construction soon 
became generally accepted.365 Although there were some attempts to introduce it, the South African 
law did not adopt the notorious complex English rules on cancellation for defective performance but 
rather extended the test for repudiation into the context of positive malperformance.366 
The next step, separating the right to cancel for positive malperformance from the implication of an 
‘intention to no longer be bound’ is illustrated by Strachan v Prinsloo.367 Here the dispute concerned 
an agreement in terms of which the plaintiff was to manage the defendant’s farm. After repeated 
absences the defendant cancelled the contract. Counsel relied on Brown v Sessel,368 and put forward 
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the argument that the plaintiff’s conduct was equivalent to a refusal to carry out the contract. 
Tindall J however found that:  
‘I am not sure that the two things are equivalent. And I do not think that the party rescinding 
must necessarily show that the other party has “evinced an intention to no longer be bound by 
the contract.”’ 
Tindall J then relies on Pollock’s discussion of the test for cancellation set out in Freeth v Burr and 
Mersey Steel and Iron Co. Pollock accepts the proposition that the aggrieved party may cancel a 
contract on the basis of an ‘evinced intention no longer to be bound’.369 However, he then questions 
whether this was the only available basis on which a party may cancel.370 Tindall J quotes with 
approval Pollock framing the question as being: 
‘Can it be said that the promisee got what he bargained for, with some shortcoming which 




On this basis, writing in the context of instalment sales, Pollock suggests allowing a general right to 
cancel where, quoting from Blackburn J in Bettini v Gye, a term ‘goes to the root of the matter, so 
that a failure to perform it would render the performance of the contract by the plaintiff a thing 
different in substance from what the defendant had stipulated for’.372 Tindall J, finding that the 
plaintiff’s absence from the farm constituted such a failure ‘to perform a vital part of his agreement’, 
found that the defendant was justified in cancelling the contract.373 
As was discussed above, the intention based test in Freeth v Burr and Mersey Steel and Iron Co was 
formulated in order to deal with a breach relating to a single instalment of an instalment sale.374 It 
was necessary to determine whether the breaching party’s conduct was sufficiently serious to justify 
cancellation and hence constitute a repudiation and their expressed or inferred intentions toward 
the contract provided a convenient basis for distinguishing breaches justifying cancellation from 
those that did not. The artificiality of construing a serious breach as inevitably expressing an 
intention on the part of the breaching party to abandon the contract was then abandoned and it has 
been accepted that a party may cancel the contract on the basis of a sufficiently serious breach 
without proving an intention to repudiate.375 
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This right to cancel on the basis of a material positive malperformance has now been completely 
generalised376 and the test to determine when it is available has been variously expressed as being 
that the breach must ‘concern a vital part of the contract’,377 ‘amount to a failure to substantially 
perform’,378 ‘essential to the continuation of the contractual tie’379 or, going back to the earlier 
formulation, go ‘to the root of the contract'.380 The underlying rationale for these test is considered 
by Olivier JA in Singh v McCarthy Retail Ltd t/a McIntosh Motors381 with the finding that: 
‘The ultimate criterion must be one of treating both parties, under the circumstances, fairly, 
bearing in mind that rescission, rather than specific performance or damages, is the more 
radical remedy. Is the breach so serious that it is fair to allow the innocent party to cancel the 
contract and undo all its consequences?’ 
This provides a generalised justification for affording an aggrieved party a right to cancel a contract 
on the basis of a breach by the other party and identifies the balancing of interests that would 
appear to be implicit in Pollock’s reasoning above.382 
The development of a generalised right to cancel  as remedy for breach of contract by positive 
malperformance in South African law was strongly influenced by the reception of anticipatory 
breach of contract and the accompanying remedy of cancellation. As Cockrell notes, ‘most of the 
tests which have been employed for “materiality” in this context can be traced back to English law,  
and indeed the courts have been unusually  candid in acknowledging the location of their sources in 
the common law tradition.’383 
This did not mean a wholesale reception of the complex English law on cancellation for breach of 
contract. A number of English concepts, including its distinction between conditions and other 
terms, remain foreign to the South African law.384 Rather, South African law drew on the ‘materiality’ 
criteria drawn from cases on anticipatory breach of contract, and applied them in the context of 
both positive malperformance and repudiation, as was discussed in Chapter 2 above, to develop a 
general remedy of cancellation for material breach. 
As was discussed above,385 Nienaber JA’s findings in Datacolor suggest a test which considers the 
predicted consequences of a party’s conduct and then determines whether these would justify 
cancellation. That the general right to cancel for a material malperformance and the tests applied to 
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determine whether such a right arises are derived from anticipatory breach of contract mean that 
the current tests employed in the context of positive malperformance are relatively easily adaptable 
to the structure suggested by Datacolor. This can be contrasted with the South African law on 
cancellation for negative malperformance, discussed below, which has been more strongly 
influenced by Roman-Dutch law and where difficulties arise. 
3.2 Origin and development of cancellation for mora 
The application of principles drawn from the writings of the Roman-Dutch jurists to delay in 
performance was established at an early stage in the development of the South African law of 
contract.386 However, the Roman-Dutch authorities again provided only limited opportunities for an 
aggrieved party to cancel a contract. Cancellation on the basis of a delay was only allowed where a 
debtor was in mora, that is they failed to perform by a specified date, and the contract contained a 
lex commissoria, a provision specifically providing for cancellation on the basis of delay.387  
The Roman-Dutch jurists also distinguished between mora ex re, where the contract stipulated a 
time for performance and the rule that dies interpellat pro homine applied (a debtor is in mora from 
the moment when she or he culpably fails to perform), and mora ex persona, where no time was set 
and there was a need for an interpellatio, a notice setting a date for performance, to trigger mora.388 
Again it was necessary to look to outside sources to extend these rules and the broadening of the 
availability of the remedy of cancellation under the influence of English law also occurred in the 
context of delay.389 This resulted in judges grafting the English rules on cancellation onto the existing 
Roman-Dutch rules relating to mora debitoris through the introduction of the English doctrine that 
allowed for cancellation ‘where time was of the essence of the contract’.390 
The ‘time of the essence’ doctrine allows for cancellation of a contract on the basis of a delay where 
the contract expressly provides that time is of the essence or where such delay causes or is likely to 
cause serious prejudice to the aggrieved party.391 Where the delay relates to a material term of the 
contract, a party may also unilaterally make time of the essence by giving a notice of recission to the 
other party.392 This notice must provide a reasonable time for the other party to perform and if the 
other party fails to perform the party giving notice is entitled to cancel the contract.393 
The influential work of Van Zijl Steyn, although critical of the introduction of the English principles, 
served to cement this position in relation to mora debitoris.394 The later work of A B De Villiers and 
De Wet’s endorsement thereof would establish a basis for mora creditoris.395 Although not 
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frequently invoked in judgments, mora creditoris has developed along analogous lines, with it now 
being recognised that the same requirements for cancellation apply to both forms of negative 
malperformance.396 This discussion therefore deals with both forms of mora as a general concept.  
The majority judgment in Nel v Cloete397 confirmed the application of Roman-Dutch principles in 
relation to the giving of a notice to put the non-performing debtor into mora, an interpellatio, and of 
the English remedy of cancellation by means of giving a notice in order to make time of the 
essence.398 Although appearing to accept the use of the term ‘time of the essence’ this did not 
amount to a wholesale acceptance of the English rules on cancellation for delay. Wessels JA for the 
majority, rather found that the notice must operate according to the principles of the Roman-Dutch 
law, explicitly divorcing the operation of the notice making ‘time of the essence’ from its English 
roots.399 This left open what formed the basis for the right to cancel. 
The ‘time of the essence’ doctrine being separated from it English roots then resulted in contention 
as to the basis for a finding that time was impliedly of the essence, with some supporting the notion 
that this was based on a tacit lex commissoria400 while others criticized this construction.401 Without 
excluding the possibility of a party demonstrating the existence of a tacit lex commissoria, it would 
seem preferable to base the right to cancel where ‘time is of the essence’ on the objective detriment 
likely to be suffered by a party as a result of the delay rather than on the possibility of an 
unexpressed intention to allow for cancellation (a tacit lex commissoria).402 
The explanation for the operation of a notice making ‘time of the essence’ found in Anglo-American 
law, that the failure to perform within the time allowed by a notice making time of the essence 
amounts to a repudiation, would also seem preferable.403 The delaying party’s failure to perform 
within the period allowed indicates that the delaying party’s performance will be either significantly 
delayed or not occur at all.404 The operation of a notice making ‘time of the essence’ is then justified 
on the basis that it provides a mechanism for relieving the uncertainty of whether the delaying 
party’s performance will be forthcoming within a reasonable period that occurs when a party is 
faced with delay. 
Unfortunately what is reflected in Nel v Cloete  and Greenfield Manufacturers (Temba) (Pty) Ltd v 
Royton Electrical Engineering (Pty) Ltd,405 is confirmation of Van Zijl Steyn’s position that the 
application of English principles was unfounded and unfortunate.406 This was typical of the ‘purist’ 
movement of the time which was extremely critical of the reception of English principles into the 
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Roman-Dutch law.407 The result of Van Zijl Steyn’s position, as confirmed in Nel v Cloete and 
Greenfield Manufacturers (Temba) (Pty) Ltd v Royton Electrical Engineering (Pty) Ltd,408 was to limit 
the influence of English principles and stifle further development of any general right to cancel on  
the basis of delay. 
This is well illustrated by the question as to whether a party will automatically fall into mora 
following the elapse of a reasonable period, even where no time for performance has been set. A 
line of cases commencing with Federal Tobacco Works v Baron and Co409 and culminating in 
Broderick Properties v Rood410 suggested that a party should be entitled to cancel a contract where 
time was of the essence even where no date had been set for performance, either expressly in the 
contract or by means of an interpellatio.411 
A number of justifications for these decisions have been offered all of which would seem to have 
been considered unsatisfactory.412 It would now seem to be universally accepted that this view 
confuses the requirements for putting a delaying party in mora and the requirements for cancelling 
on the basis of mora.413 It should be noted however that in English law it was, and still is, possible to 
cancel on the basis of an unreasonable delay on a contract where ‘time is of the essence’ without 
setting a date for performance.414 A ready explanation for Innes JA’s decision is that that it was 
merely reflective of the general trend at the time of applying English principles, often without any 
justification or even acknowledgement, as part of the South African contract law.415 
Although the decisions have not been explicitly overruled, the generally accepted position would 
nonetheless appear to be that it is necessary to set a date for performance, either as a term of the 
contract or by means of an interpellatio, before a party will fall into mora.416 Further a party will only 
be entitled to cancel the contract on the basis of such mora where the contract contains a lex 
commissoria or time is of the essence of the contract or made to be through a notice of recission.417 
This is regardless of the duration of the delay in performance. The absence of either of these 
conditions will mean that party will not be entitled to cancel even where there has been a significant 
and prejudicial delay.418 Unlike in the context of positive malperformance, the English rules allowing 
for a more generally applicable right to cancel were not received into the South African law relating 
to cancellation for delay. 
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The requirement that a party will not be in breach for a delay unless a date for performance has 
been set can be justified on the grounds that it enhances certainty and protects the delaying party 
who may have overestimated what would constitute a reasonable period in which to perform. This 
must be balanced against the potential prejudice to the aggrieved party. This prejudice would arise 
in cases where the other party has delayed significantly and because no date has been set for 
performance that party will not be in breach and the aggrieved party will not have an immediate 
remedy. The absence of an ex lege right to cancel a contract on the basis of a delay where the 
offending party is in mora and the aggrieved party has suffered significant detriment without a lex 
commissoria or time being of the essence does not appear to have any good justification. Cockrell 
noted that:  
‘[it] is anomalous that a debtor in this situation who fails to perform a vital term is better placed 
than one whose timeous performance is materially defective; yet in the former case the debtor 
must receive a “notice of rescission” before a right to cancel accrues, while in the latter case the 
creditor can cancel immediately.’
419
 
Harker justifies the position in South Africa law on the basis that as Roman-Dutch law does not 
regard delay as ever constituting a fundamental breach, a delay must always be elevated to a 
fundamental breach by means of an express or tacit lex commissoria or in terms of the ‘time of the 
essence’ doctrine.420 The requirements for cancelling on the basis of delay are then not true 
exceptions to the general position that a party may cancel for material breach. This is because the 
delaying party does not commit a breach unless a date has been set for performance and this breach 
will not be of a material nature unless elevated to such by a lex commissoria or the ‘time of the 
essence’ doctrine.421  
This position is however very difficult to reconcile with the underlying justification for affording an 
aggrieved party the right to cancel a contract, of treating both parties fairly, discussed in Singh v 
McCarthy Retail Ltd t/a McIntosh Motors.422 The current structure can clearly treat an aggrieved 
party who has suffered significant prejudice unfairly. The rule that a delay cannot amount to a 
material breach unless elevated by a lex commissoria has no underlying justification and flies in the 
face of the actual prejudice which an aggrieved party could suffer. 
The development of cancellation as a general remedy as a response to a breach constituted by a 
delay in performance did not arise as easily as in the context of positive malperformance and there 
continue to be a number of exceptions to the position that a party may cancel on the basis of a 
material breach. This can likely be attributed to the highly influential work of Van Zijl Steyn, which 
has formed the basis for much of the law on mora, where he criticised the use of English rules and 
resisted further development along English lines.423 The result of this is that applying the existing 
rules on cancellation for mora to an anticipated delay would result in confusion and uncertainty as it 
is unclear how the potentially necessary interpellatio and notice making time of the essence could 
operate where the delay has not yet occurred but is anticipated. The reconciliation of these 
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principles with the structure for cancellation of anticipatory breach set out in Datacolor is discussed 
below.424 
3.3 Cancellation for breach of contract in English law 
Before considering what structure should be used to determine whether a right to cancel arises from 
an anticipatory breach of contract in South African law it is worthwhile engaging in a brief overview 
of other sets of rules which are employed in this context. The English principles on cancellation for 
breach of contract, and those relating specifically to anticipatory breach of contract, are of particular 
relevance given the role that they have played in the development of the South African law. Certain 
transnational instruments which, like the South African rules on breach, are also based on the 
English rules are considered in the following section. 
In respect of English law, McKendrick in Chitty on Contracts discusses ‘Renunciation’, ‘Impossibility 
created by one party’ and ‘Failure of performance’ as forms of breach of contract, with renunciation 
and impossibility constituting anticipatory breaches where they occur before the time for 
performance.425 Peel in Treitel on the Law of Contract on the other hand discusses renunciation and 
disablement under the heading of anticipatory breach, again defined as a breach of contract 
occurring before the time for performance has arrived, and rather includes a refusal to perform 
occurring at or after the time for performance under the discussion of breach by ‘Failure or Refusal 
to Perform’.426 These terminological differences do not appear to be significant as the discussion of 
cancellation for breach of contract by these authors and those in Anson’s Law of Contract and the 
authors of Furmston’s The Law of Contract would appear to be broadly consistent.427 
Peel, McKendrick and the authors of Anson’s Law of Contract and Furmston’s The Law of Contract 
have not accepted Liu’s construction of anticipatory breach of contract as being an ‘inferred 
fundamental breach’ noted above and continue to distinguish anticipatory breach of contract from 
actual breach of contract on the basis that anticipatory breaches occur before the time for 
performance.428 However, all the authors note that for both actual and anticipatory breaches the 
same principles are applied when determining whether a breach of contract gives rise to a right to 
cancel the agreement.429 The authors’ discussions, separated as they are into various categories of 
breach (each with its own requirements), demonstrate that English law applies different rules to the 
various forms of breach of contract which it recognises.430 The English law nonetheless displays a 
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more unitary conception of breach than does the South African law and includes a generalised 
remedy of cancellation for a breach of sufficient seriousness.431 
This unitary conception of breach finds expression in the rule that a breach will justify cancellation 
where it goes to the ‘the root of the whole and substantial consideration’ or in a more modern 
expression by Diplock LJ: 
‘does the occurrence of the event deprive the party who has further undertakings still to 
perform of substantially the whole benefit which it was the intention of the parties as expressed 




Peel summarises this proposition, that ‘any defect in performance must attain a minimum degree of 
seriousness to entitle the injured party to terminate’ as the requirement of ‘”substantial failure” in 
performance’.433 Although Liu prefers the term ‘fundamental breach’, as it is defined by Lord Diplock 
in Photo Production Ltd v Securicor Transport Ltd,434 McKendrick’s discussion in Chitty makes it clear 
that the concept referred to with these labels is the same.435 Peel notes that whether a breach will 
amount to a substantial failure in performance is determined by a court considering whether 
‘termination (as opposed to damages) is necessary to protect the injured party and, on the other 
hand, take into account the prejudice which termination will cause to the other party.’436 The 
similarity with the approach adopted by Olivier JA in Singh v Mccarthy Retailers noted above is 
evident. 
The conceptual structure underlying breach of contract in English law endorsed by McKendrick, Peel 
and the authors of in Anson’s Law of Contract is that set out by Lord Diplock in Hong Kong Fir 
Shipping and Photo Production.437 Lord Diplock draws a distinction between primary obligations 
under the contract, being the obligations to render the performance promised, and secondary 
obligations, to pay damages, which arise in the event of a breach of contract or cancellation of the 
contract.438  
In Photo Production Lord Diplock describes a general rule that a breach of the primary obligations in 
a contract gives rise to a secondary obligation on the breaching party to pay damages while leaving 
the primary obligations of the breaching party intact.439 This rule is subject to two exceptions, the 
first is where the resulting failure by one party to perform a primary obligation has the effect of 
depriving the aggrieved party of substantially the whole benefit that was intended (corresponding 
with the ex lege right to cancel discussed above).440 The second arises where the contracting parties 
have agreed that any failure by one party to perform an obligation will entitle the aggrieved party to 
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cancel.441 In the case of these two exceptions, a breach will entitle the aggrieved party, as an 
alternative to claiming damages, to elect to put an end to the primary obligations of both parties 
remaining unperformed, that is, to cancel the contract. Where such an election is made an 
alternative secondary obligation, what Lord Diplock labels an anticipatory secondary obligation, to 
pay monetary compensation to the aggrieved party for the loss sustained in consequence of the 
breaching party’s non-performance arises.442 
Lord Diplock noted in The Afovos that ‘[t]he doctrine of anticipatory breach is but a species of the 
genus repudiation and applies only to fundamental breach.’443 Whether conduct or circumstances 
amount to an anticipatory breach: 
‘depends upon whether the threatened non-performance would have the effect of depriving 
that other party of substantially the whole benefit which it was the intention of the parties that 




Following this reasoning, for both actual and anticipatory breach it is the prospect of an aggrieved 
party being substantially deprived of the benefit of the contract which justifies affording the 
aggrieved party an ex lege right to cancel the contract. This equality of treatment can be easily 
justified. Conduct or circumstances which indicate, with sufficient certainty, that a party will fail to 
perform their primary obligations correctly can support the conclusion that a party will be 
substantially deprived of the benefit of the contract just as easily as an actual failure to perform such 
primary obligations. In cases of both actual and anticipatory breach it is the prospective substantial 
deprivation which the aggrieved party will suffer which justifies affording the aggrieved party a right 
to cancel the contract. 
Applying this analysis to anticipatory breach of contract, a right to cancel arises where a party’s 
conduct or the surrounding circumstances indicate, with sufficient certainty, that they are going to 
fail to correctly perform their primary obligations and that this failure will substantially deprive the 
other party of the benefit of the contract. It is this substantial deprivation which justifies affording 
the aggrieved party a right to cancel the primary obligations under the contract and it is the relative 
certainty that the offending party will commit a breach causing substantial deprivation which 
justifies affording such right to the aggrieved party immediately, rather than awaiting the actual 
breach. If the aggrieved party elects to cancel the contract, the cancellation of the primary 
obligations then triggers an anticipatory secondary obligation on the offending party to pay 
monetary compensation for the loss sustained by the aggrieved party as a consequence of the 
cancellation of the primary obligations. 
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Lord Diplock’s model distinguishes between, and provides different justifications, for the right to 
claim damages arising from breach of contract generally and the right to cancel the contract and 
claim damages for fundamental breach. The general secondary obligation to pay damages arises 
where a party fails to perform their primary contractual obligations correctly. This secondary 
obligation to pay damages for breach generally is justified by the losses sustained by the aggrieved 
party attributable to the offending party’s failure to correctly perform their primary obligations.445 
Performance of the secondary obligation then has the effect of mitigating the effects of the 
imperfect performance of the primary obligation.446 
As noted above, the justification for the ex lege right to cancel a contract arises where a party 
commits a fundamental breach. This right to cancel rather than arising directly from the failure to 
perform is instead founded in the prospective substantial deprivation that the aggrieved party will 
suffer as a result of the breaching party’s conduct. This recognises that where a party will be 
substantially deprived of the benefit of the contract a right to claim damages would insufficiently 
mitigate the effects of the imperfect performance. As an alternative the aggrieved party may elect to 
cancel the primary obligations and trigger an ‘anticipatory secondary obligation’, justified by the 
cancellation rather than the breach itself, to pay damages arising from the cancellation. 
Lord Diplock’s model therefore provides different bases and justifications for the general right to 
claim damages that arises on a breach of contract (the secondary obligation to pay damages) and 
the right to claim damages following cancellation (the anticipatory secondary obligation to pay 
damages). The general secondary obligation to pay damages has the breach as its basis and is 
justified by the losses sustained by the aggrieved party as a result of that breach. The anticipatory 
secondary obligation to pay damages has the cancellation of the contract following a fundamental 
breach as its basis and is justified by the losses sustained by the aggrieved party arising from the 
cancellation. This then provides a doctrinal basis for the position that a party must, in general, cancel 
the contract before claiming damages for an anticipatory breach of contract and the exception to 
that rule which allows for a claim for damages where the anticipatory breach causes an immediate 
loss through breach of a primary obligation.447  
Unlike an actual breach of contract an anticipatory breach of contract does not necessarily imply 
that a party has failed to correctly perform her or his primary contractual obligations. Where a party 
has not failed to perform their primary obligations under the contract there is no actual breach of 
contract and the secondary obligation to pay damages does not arise. There is no reason that it 
should. The party committing the anticipatory breach has not breached her or his primary 
obligations and so the aggrieved party could not have suffered any losses arising from such breach. 
In general therefore a secondary obligation to pay damages to the aggrieved party does not arise. It 
is only on cancellation that the anticipatory secondary obligation to pay damages arises. The 
exception occurs where the conduct amounting to an anticipatory breach also consists of a breach of 
the primary obligation and as such causes immediate losses to the aggrieved party potentially 
triggering the secondary obligation to pay damages. 
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Lord Diplock frames circumstances giving rise to a right to cancel the agreement as exceptions to the 
general rule that ‘[e]very failure to perform a primary obligation is a breach of contract’ which gives 
rise to a secondary obligation on the contract breaker to pay damages but leaves ‘the primary 
obligations of both parties so far as they have not yet been fully performed unchanged.’ Despite this, 
in light of the separate justifications for this secondary obligation to pay damages and the provision 
of a right to cancel the contract to the aggrieved party, it is possible to construe actions by a 
contracting party or circumstances which do not consist of a failure to perform the primary 
obligations, and as such do not justify a secondary obligation to pay damages, but still justify 
affording the aggrieved party a right to cancel. 
These circumstances arise in the context of an anticipatory breach of contract occurring before the 
date set for performance. As noted above, the conclusion that a party will suffer substantial 
detriment can also be based on conduct or circumstances which indicate that the offending party 
will fail to correctly perform their primary obligations. Because the right to cancel arises from the 
substantial detriment rather than directly from a failure to perform the primary obligations the right 
to cancel could be justified with reference to conduct or circumstances indicating that the offending 
party will fail to perform their primary obligations rather than only by an actual failure, as in the case 
of actual breach. Where an offending party has not failed to correctly perform a primary obligation 
the aggrieved party will not have suffered any loss as yet. Absent any loss there is no justification for 
affording a party a right to claim damages merely on the basis of the anticipatory breach. 
Although Lord Diplock notes that every failure to perform a primary obligation is a breach of 
contract, this does not imply that every breach of contract consists of a failure to perform a primary 
obligation. Anticipatory breach of contract, although a breach of contract, does not necessarily 
consist of a failure to perform a primary obligation, it rather consists of conduct or circumstances 
which indicate that a party will commit a fundamental breach.448 This may consist of an actual failure 
to perform a primary obligation, as can occur in the context of instalment contracts, or may be 
merely indicative that such a failure will occur, as in the case of a refusal to perform in the future. 
What these circumstances have in common, and what makes them anticipatory breaches, is that 
they support the conclusion that a party will commit a fundamental breach. 
Lord Diplock’s model also provides a justification for his statement that ‘it is to fundamental 
breaches alone that the doctrine of anticipatory breach is applicable.’449 In terms of the model, a 
right to cancel a contract is afforded to an aggrieved party where that party will be substantially 
deprived of the benefit of the contract. The right to claim damages, in terms of a secondary 
obligation, arises where a party fails to correctly perform their primary obligations under the 
contract. As was demonstrated above, the conclusion that a party will be substantially deprived of 
the benefit of the contract can be based on conduct or circumstances occurring before the time for 
performance which indicate, with sufficient certainty, that a party will commit a breach of their 
primary contractual obligations. On the other hand, conduct occurring before the time for 
performance which indicates that a party will fail to correctly perform their primary obligations is 
not a failure to correctly perform such primary obligations. Because this conduct is not a failure to 
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perform the primary obligations it does not trigger a secondary obligation to pay damages, and, if it 
does not amount to a material breach, is not a breach of contract at all. 
Lord Diplock’s model then offers a unitary explanation for providing an ex lege right to cancel a 
contract on the basis of an actual or anticipated fundamental breach. This unified basis for 
cancellation provides a doctrinal explanation for why anticipatory breach of contract occurs only 
where a material or fundamental breach is predicted and for the requirement that an aggrieved 
party must, in general, cancel the contract in order to claim damages, reinforcing the practical 
considerations discussed above.450 
Although Mckendrick, Peel and the authors of Anson’s Law of Contract and Furmston’s The Law of 
Contract have accepted Lord Diplock’s model they have failed to recognise that the unitary 
explanation for the ex lege right to cancel provided by Lord Diplock in Photo Production would 
suggest a formulation of anticipatory breach of contract that is based on the predicted 
consequences of a party’s conduct. Liu further notes that the English case law predominantly 
supports an approach that considers the consequences of the breaching party’s conduct as a basis 
for establishing whether or not the aggrieved party should be afforded a right to cancel.451 A clear 
example of this outside of Lord Diplock’s judgments can be seen in Federal Commerce & Navigation 
Ltd v Molena Alpha Inc.452 Here the charterers would have faced the severe consequences of being 
blacklisted if the owners’ instructions had been carried out and this would have substantially 
deprived the charterers of the benefit of the contract. 453 It was this which justified granting them a 
right to cancel the contract.454 
Following Lord Diplock’s model, an ex lege right to cancel, in both actual and anticipatory breach, is 
then based on the prospective substantial deprivation which the aggrieved party will suffer. An 
actual breach of contract which justifies cancellation consists of a failure to perform a primary 
obligation, which failure will result in the aggrieved party being substantially deprived of the benefit 
of the contract. An anticipatory breach rather consists of conduct or circumstances which support a 
conclusion that a party will commit an actual breach which will result in the aggrieved party being 
substantially deprived of the benefit of the contract. 
That an anticipatory breach does not necessarily consist of a present failure to perform the primary 
obligations which will result in the aggrieved party being substantially deprived of the benefit of the 
contract but rather of conduct or circumstances predicting such a failure must then be the basis on 
which actual and anticipatory breach of contract are distinguished rather than on the basis of 
whether or not it occurs before the time set for performance. This is consistent with the ‘inferred 
fundamental breach’ model suggested by Liu. The approach adopted by current English authors 
including McKendrick, Peel and the authors of Anson’s Law of Contract of differentiating between 
actual and anticipatory breach of contract on the basis that a breach is an anticipatory breach where 
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it occurs before the time set for performance and an actual breach where it occurs at or after the 
time set for performance is then inconsistent with Lord Diplock’s model.  
The unitary conception of ‘fundamental breach’ is also consistent with, and supports, the conclusion 
that there is no doctrinal basis for the historical differentiation between repudiation and 
impossibility which many English and South African authors continue to make. Both species of 
anticipatory breach must consist of conduct or circumstances which support a conclusion that a 
party will commit an actual breach of the primary obligations under the contract which will result in 
the aggrieved party being substantially deprived of the benefit of the contract. Although possibly 
helpful in ascertaining which facts may be relevant for determining the likelihood of the predicted 
breach it is clear that it does not matter whether the breach will be caused by the breaching party’s 
unwillingness or inability to perform the primary obligations or even a combination of unwillingness 
and inability. As Devlin J noted in Universal Cargo Carriers v Citati: 
‘unwillingness and inability are often difficult to disentangle, and it is rarely necessary to make 
the attempt. Inability often lies at the root of unwillingness to perform.’
455
 
The terminology of primary and secondary obligations has been applied in a similar sense to that 
used by Lord Diplock in a small number of South African decisions, without any reference to Lord 
Diplock’s judgments, and enjoys some academic support.456 Cockrell notes that this distinction did 
not exist in the Roman-Dutch law and suggests that the distinction originates in Lord Diplock’s 
judgments.457 However, the use of the terminology of primary and secondary rights and obligations 
in South African law may rather originate from De Vos’s writing where he describes sleeping 
secondary rights under a contract which become active upon breach of the contract.458 This is 
consistent with the usage by Smalberger JA in Atteridgeville Town Council where he notes that 
although primary obligations are extinguished on cancellation ‘secondary obligations, for example, 
the duty to compensate for damages arising from wrongful repudiation, however, remain.’459 
Van der Merwe et al, discuss De Vos’s construction of breach of contract based on primary and 
secondary obligations in terms of which primary obligations arise from the terms agreed to by the 
parties and secondary obligations arise from terms implied by law which become activated by a 
breach of contract. Importantly, although also using the same terminology of primary and secondary 
obligations this description of breach of contract is not the same as that given by Lord Diplock.460 The 
secondary obligations to which Lord Diplock refers arise ‘by implication of the common law’ rather 
than from an ex lege term as De Vos suggests. 
The authors of Van der Merwe et al suggest an alternative construction, which they attribute to 
Nienaber, in terms of which breach of contract is seen as ‘a new category of obligationary fact’ 
which gives rise to a new obligation to pay damages.461 Van der Merwe et al prefer Nienaber’s 
construction primarily because, they suggest, it provides a satisfactory basis for accepting 
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wrongfulness as a requirement for breach of contract in contrast to De Vos’s model which does not. 
The authors do not elaborate much further on this reasoning and it is difficult to determine if this 
provides sufficient basis for preferring Nienaber’s model over De Vos’s. 
Although a full consideration of this issue is beyond the scope of this thesis, it would seem that Van 
der Merwe et al are correct in preferring a model which does not rely on ex lege terms as the source 
of the secondary obligations. Although it may be possible to construe ex lege terms which would 
give rise to the obligations which arise from the breach of a contract this would seem to be an overly 
elaborate mechanism to achieve this result. Directly imposing these obligations by operation of law, 
without construing them as being derived from ex lege terms, would provide a simpler explanation 
and have the same effect.  
There also appears to be a coherent basis for distinguishing between the primary and secondary 
obligations under a contract.462 The primary obligations provide a reason, justified by the party’s 
promise, to do what they have promised to do.463 The secondary obligations serve to mitigate the 
wrong created by the non-performance or imperfect performance of the primary obligations, to 
correct the earlier failure.464 Applying a model using ex lege terms this distinction is lost, the 
aggrieved party is merely enforcing an alternative obligation under the contract, making it unclear 
why these are then referred to as secondary obligations at all.  
Questions can also be raised as to whether Nienaber’s construction, which describes breach of 
contract as a source of obligations, is entirely satisfactory. The justification for the imposition of 
these secondary obligations must ultimately be rooted in the contract between the parties. Although 
it is the breach of contract which may be the proximate source of these obligations it is the existence 
of the contract which ultimately justifies the imposition of the obligations which arise from its 
breach. Nienaber’s construction perhaps fails to acknowledge the continuity that exists between the 
primary and secondary obligations and therefore runs the risk of viewing breach of contract and the 
imposition of obligations arising from such breach as separate from the underlying contract.465 
However, this criticism may not be one of substance. Nienaber’s and Lord Diplock’s models would 
appear to be largely consistent and may only differ to the extent that different labels are used to 
describe the secondary obligations.  
The conception of anticipatory breach of contract drawn from Nienaber JA’s findings in Datacolor 
and set out in Chapter 2 above establishes an anticipatory breach on the basis of conduct or 
circumstances which support the conclusion that a party will commit a breach which will justify 
cancellation of the contract by the aggrieved party. Like Liu’s construction of anticipatory breach in 
English law, this conception requires a mechanism for determining whether a predicted breach will 
justify cancellation. The unitary conception of ‘fundamental breach’ that arises from Lord Diplock’s 
model provides a coherent explanation for the operation of breach of contract and is consistent with 
the construction of breach of contract favoured by Van der Merwe et al, in terms of which breach is 
a source of legal obligations.  
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Application of Lord Diplock’s model of primary and secondary obligations as a basis for breach of 
contract would also seem to avoid the major criticism levelled by Liu at the current English 
conception of anticipatory breach of contract. As is discussed above, Liu criticises the current 
academic explanation of anticipatory breach of contract in English law, which he labels as the 
renunciation approach, on the basis that the model’s focus on the intentions and attitude of the 
potentially breaching party results in it being superficial and uncertain. 466 Lord Diplock’s model, 
providing a unified basis for anticipatory breach of contract which is rooted in the predicted 
substantial deprivation which an aggrieved party is likely to suffer, supports Liu’s conception of 
anticipatory breach of contract as an ‘inferred fundamental breach’. 
Nienaber JA’s finding in Datacolor that ‘whether a party will be entitled to resile will ultimately 
depend on the nature and the degree of the impending non- or malperformance’, does not provide 
any mechanism for determining whether a breach will justify cancellation and leaves open what 
justifies affording a party a right to cancel. The understanding offered by Lord Diplock’s model of 
primary and secondary obligations and the application of this to anticipatory breach by Liu provides 
a potential answer to the questions left open by Nienaber JA. Further insight into possible 
mechanisms for determining whether a breach will justify cancellation can be gained by examining 
transnational instruments employing concepts of ‘fundamental’ or ‘material’ breach of contract and 
recognising anticipatory breaches of contract. These are discussed next. 
3.4 Anticipatory breach in transnational instruments 
Article 72 of the CISG, Article 9:304 of the PECL and Article 7.3.3 of the PICC all deal with cancellation 
for what is labelled ‘anticipatory non-performance’.467 The provisions of these different instruments 
are very similar to one another and it is therefore sensible to consider them jointly. Article 71(1) of 
the CISG provides that: 
‘If prior to the date for performance of the contract it is clear that one of the parties will commit 
a fundamental breach of contract, the other party may declare the contract avoided.’
468
  
This article, along with the equivalent articles in the PECL and PICC, incorporates the English doctrine 
of anticipatory breach of contract by entitling a contracting party to cancel the contract on the basis 
that the other party will commit a fundamental breach.  
In addition to incorporating the doctrine of anticipatory breach, the CISG, PECL and PICC all rely on a 
unified concept of breach justifying cancellation. This is labelled as a ‘fundamental breach’ in the 
CISG and ‘fundamental non-performance’ in the PECL and PICC,469 with Article 25 of the CISG 
providing 
‘[a] breach of contract committed by one of the parties is fundamental if it results in such 
detriment to the other party as substantially to deprive him of what he is entitled to expect 
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under the contract, unless the party in breach did not foresee and a reasonable person of the 
same kind in the same circumstances would not have foreseen such a result.’ 
The concept of ‘substantial deprivation’ which provides the basis for the test is drawn from the 
English case of Hong Kong Fir Shipping Co Ltd v Kawasaki Kisen Kaisha Ltd discussed above,470 and is 
also used to define ‘fundamental non-performance’ in the PECL and PICC. In the absence of the 
English distinction between ‘conditions’, ‘warranties’ and other terms these instruments have 
entirely generalised the notion of a breach giving rise to cancellation. 
As noted above the unified concept of fundamental breach (or non-performance) applied in these 
instruments also provides for consistency in treatment between actual breach and anticipatory 
breach. In both cases it is the ultimate consequences of the breaching (or non-performing) party’s 
conduct which will determine whether the aggrieved party will be entitled to cancel. Naudé notes 
that this unified approach has the advantage of norm reduction and promotes consistency of 
treatment across different manifestations of breach.471  
The PICC, which lists a set of potentially relevant factors provides further clarity which addresses the 
degree of vagueness that is present in the CISG and PECL formulation and that is expected of an 
entirely generalised test.472 These factors include whether the aggrieved party would suffer 
foreseeable substantial detriment, whether the non-performance is intentional, reckless or gives the 
aggrieved party reason to believe that they cannot rely on future performance and whether the non-
performing party would suffer a disproportionate loss as a result of the cancellation.473 
Naudé and Lubbe in reviewing the South African case law find that these same factors have been 
considered by judges when deciding on whether a right to cancel arises.474 Although the South 
African courts ‘often do not fully articulate’ the factors considered, Naudé and Lubbe note that there 
are ‘parallels between South African judicial practice on cancellation for material breach and articles 
25 of the CISG and 7 1 3 of the [PICC].’475 The fractured approach to breach would seem to provide 
an obstacle to recognition of generally relevant factors and Naudé and Lubbe note further that the 
vague formulation of the tests for material breach leads to legal uncertainty and that courts should 
rather follow the direction of the decisions noted by Naudé and Lubbe which have considered these 
factors when deciding whether a right to cancel arises.476 
As was noted above, the standard of certainty required in order to establish an anticipatory breach 
in these instruments is that it must be clear. The language used establishes that this is an enquiry 
into the likelihood of the breach occurring rather than the historical standard in the form of an 
assessment of how clearly a party has indicated their intent. Although there has been some debate 
as to the exact meaning of this standard, drawing on the official comment to the PICC, it would seem 
that a very high degree of probability is required, with a mere suspicion not being enough.477 The 
right to cancel the contract afforded to the aggrieved party is clearly founded in the prejudice likely 
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to be suffered by the aggrieved party arising from the fundamental breach and it is afforded to the 
aggrieved party immediately on the basis of the high degree of probability that such a breach will 
occur. 
These instruments differ from the model of anticipatory breach proposed in Chapter 2 above, and 
Nienaber’s and Liu’s constructions, in that the transnational instruments continue to distinguish 
anticipatory breach from actual breach on the basis that anticipatory breach occurs before the date 
for performance. It is therefore necessary to deal with conduct or circumstances occurring after the 
date for performance which would suggest that a fundamental breach will arise as an actual non-
performance, as it must necessarily be, because at a minimum the party has delayed in fully 
performing its obligations. This is explicitly captured in Article 7.3.1(2)(a) of the PICC which lists as a 
relevant factor to be considered when determining whether a breach is fundamental as whether: 
‘the non-performance gives the aggrieved party reason to believe that it cannot rely on the other 
party’s future performance’.  
A breach of contract which would otherwise not amount to a fundamental breach could amount to a 
fundamental breach on the basis that it provides a reason to believe that the breaching party will fail 
to correctly perform their future obligations. Following the model proposed in in Chapter 2 above 
and by Liu this conduct would rather be characterised as an actual breach which, because it indicates 
that a party will fail to correctly perform its future obligations correctly in a manner justifying 
cancellation, also amounts to an anticipatory breach. 
It is not entirely clear which approach is preferable but the approach in the transnational 
instruments does seem to miss the essential consistency between conduct or circumstances 
occurring after the time for performance which supports the conclusion that the aggrieved party will 
be substantially deprived ‘of what it was entitled to expect under the contract’478 and conduct or 
circumstances occurring before the time for performance which does not consist of an actual breach 
but nonetheless supports the same conclusion. In both cases it is the likelihood that the aggrieved 
party will be substantially deprived of the benefit of the contract which would seem to provide the 
justification for providing the aggrieved party a right to cancel. On the other hand the transnational 
instruments make it explicit that the effect of the actual breach and its likely future effects should be 
considered jointly, which is the preferable approach. A full consideration of the merits of the 
different approaches is beyond the scope of this thesis. 
The CISG, PECL and PICC also differ from the English and South African law by allowing an aggrieved 
party to make a request for an ‘adequate assurance of performance’, with this being generally 
required by the CISG before cancellation may be effected in the case of an anticipatory breach.479 
The mechanism in the PECL and the PICC allow a party to make a request for an adequate assurance 
of performance’ on the basis of a ‘reasonable suspicion’ (in the PECL) and ‘reasonable belief’ (in the 
PICC), that the other party will commit a fundamental non-performance.480 This mechanism is 
strongly analogous to a notice making time of the essence as it exists in the English and South 
African law, and as is available in the CISG, PECL and PICC, but instead of functioning with respect to 
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the seriousness of the delay rather functions with respect to the likelihood of the breach. This is 
discussed in more detail in Chapter 4 below. 
The unified basis for cancellation founded in the prejudice likely to be suffered by the aggrieved 
party and the adoption of a mechanism for anticipatory breach that considers whether a sufficiently 
serious breach is sufficiently likely to occur adopted by these supra-national instruments are 
consistent with the model for anticipatory breach considered above. The model rules therefore 
provide a useful basis for comparison with both existing and proposed South African rules on 
cancellation for anticipatory breach of contract and also a strong indication of the feasibility and 
practical effectiveness of the set of rules considered earlier in this chapter. 
3.5 Cancellation for anticipatory breach of contract in South African law 
If an anticipatory breach is defined as conduct by a contracting party or circumstances which support 
a reasonable inference that a party will commit a material breach and a material breach is defined as 
a breach justifying cancellation, a party will in principle always be entitled to cancel a contract on the 
basis of an anticipatory breach. Whether or not an aggrieved party will be entitled to cancel the 
contract is then determined by whether or not the offending party’s conduct or the surrounding 
circumstances amount to an anticipatory breach of contract. That is, whether a party’s conduct or 
the surrounding circumstances support a conclusion that they will fail to correctly perform their 
obligations under the contract and that this failure will justify the other party cancelling the contract. 
For conduct or circumstances to amount to an anticipatory breach it must then be established that a 
party will likely commit a breach of contract and that that breach will justify cancellation. The first 
aspect of this involves drawing a conclusion as to the likely consequences of a party’s conduct or the 
surrounding circumstances. It is clear that this is from an objective perspective, the perspective of a 
reasonable person in the position of the aggrieved party, and that although a party’s intentions are 
likely to be relevant it is the predicted outcome of their conduct, taking into account the surrounding 
circumstances, that is the determining criterion. Consistent with the position that cancelling the 
contract is a drastic remedy and it must be assumed that contracting parties are generally 
predisposed to respecting their contractual obligations, a high standard of probability is required. 
Importantly the standard is one of probability rather than of the clarity and certainty of a party’s 
expression of their intentions. The existing judicial statements of this standard, such as that a 
repudiation must be ‘clear and unequivocal’, relate to a party’s expression of their intent and, 
although confirming that a high standard is required, are only helpful where a party will be able to 
give effect to their intentions. These expressions do not provide the general standard of probability 
that is required in order to establish an anticipatory breach. The standard applied in the CISG, PECL 
and PICC, that is must be ‘clear’ that a party will commit a breach of contract is a useful guideline. As 
noted above, this would seem to indicate something that is more than just the most likely outcome 
but is rather reasonably certain to occur without it being necessary for it to be absolutely certain. 
It would however seem preferable to express the required level of certainty as an explicit measure 
of probability in order to avoid the focus on the breaching party’s intention which the enquiry into 
repudiation has followed in the past. The use of ‘clear’, although succinct could lead to confusion as 
to whether it is the potentially breaching party’s expression of their intention which must be clear or 
whether, as is the correct interpretation, that it must be clear that the predicted outcome will arise. 
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Requiring a reasonable certainty, something more than a possibility but less than an absolute 
certainty clearly labels the test as being one of probability and is also consistent with the necessity 
that it be a high but not insurmountable standard of likelihood. 
The second aspect of the test relates to the nature of the anticipated breach. Although the South 
African courts have shown some consideration of more general factors when deciding whether a 
right to cancel arises as a result of a breach of contract, there is as yet no recognition of a 
generalised notion of material breach of contract based on the substantial detriment to the 
aggrieved party.481 This provides an obstacle to the application of a test for anticipatory breach of 
contract that relies on such a notion.  
However, ‘the effect of the breach on the aggrieved party has in many decisions been considered in 
order to establish the materiality of a breach’ and it is has been suggested that it is whether the 
breach caused substantial detriment which was the ‘common denominator’ which was used to 
determine whether the breach justified cancellation.482 This is not unexpected, because, as was 
discussed above, cancellation as a remedy for breach of contract in South African law would appear 
to originate in English law and the English law has continued to play a significant role in its 
development.  
In the early cases on anticipatory breach of contract the courts appear to focus solely on whether 
there was a ‘clear refusal to perform the contract’.483 These cases mostly involved circumstances 
where a party was refusing to perform the contract at all or where a party has made it impossible for 
herself or himself to perform the contract in its entirety. An anticipatory breach indicating that no 
performance at all will be forthcoming must necessarily amount to a material breach and the courts 
failure to apply any materiality criterion is not unexpected. More recent cases have had to deal with 
circumstances where it was not immediately clear whether the breach is sufficiently serious to 
justify cancellation. 
 In Stewart Wrightson v Thorpe, where the aggrieved party had been denied work and access to his 
office, Jansen JA used repudiation to mean a ‘fundamental breach’ although no further content was 
given to this description.484 In Culverwell v Brown Nicholas AJA, writing for the majority on this point, 
based the conclusion that the seller had not repudiated the contract by leasing a portion of the 
premises sold to the buyer on the basis that this was not ‘a material breach’ and that the breach 
‘was not one which went to the root of the contract’.485 In both of these cases the predicted breach 
took the form of positive malperformance and the court in Culverwell v Brown in particular appears 
to have been influenced by the language used by South African cases on positive malperformance. 
As was noted above, the various phrases which have been used to express the materiality criteria in 
South Africa in the context of positive malperformance can themselves be traced back to English law 
and, in general, to decisions on anticipatory breach of contract.486 The notion of materiality which 
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has been applied in South African law in relation to anticipatory breach and in the context of positive 
malperformance is already largely consistent, both ultimately drawn from English sources. Applying 
this as a general materiality criterion in order to determine whether a predicted positive 
malperformance would justify cancellation does not therefore require any major conceptual shift.487  
This is also exactly what is to be expected based on Lord Diplock’s model for breach of contract. It is 
the prospective substantial detriment of the aggrieved party, balanced against the interests of the 
breaching party, which justifies the provision of a right to cancel. This is consistent across both actual 
and anticipatory breach and as such the concept of a material breach should also remain consistent. 
Cancellation for negative malperformance in South African law has however been more strongly 
influenced by Roman-Dutch law and does not employ the same materiality criterion. Although the 
notion of cancellation of the contract for an unreasonable delay by a party in performing their 
obligations likely originates in English law, the procedural mechanisms required to put a party into 
mora have largely been drawn from Roman-Dutch law. This means that an aggrieved party cannot, 
in general, cancel the contract only on the basis of a delay by the other party in performing her or his 
obligations which causes substantial detriment. The delaying party must in addition be in mora. 
Requiring an aggrieved party to put a party in mora for an anticipated delay is however problematic. 
Where a contract does not stipulate a time for performance a party would be required to set a date 
for performance, allowing the other party a reasonable time to perform, before they could acquire a 
right to cancel the contract. This becomes an entirely impractical and pointless exercise in 
circumstances where performance is not yet due but it is nonetheless clear that a party will 
substantially delay in performing. 
Similarly, using a notice to make time of the essence in order to acquire a right to cancel before the 
time for performance has even arrived seems incongruous. The justification for allowing a party to 
escalate a delay in terms of a notice making time of the essence, being that it allows a party to 
relieve the uncertainty of whether performance will be forthcoming at all that occurs when 
performance is delayed, is not present in the context of an anticipated delay. To illustrate, where a 
party indicates that there will be a minor delay in performance which will not cause substantial 
detriment the clear indication of a time for performance would not cause uncertainty as to whether 
performance will be forthcoming and there is no basis for allowing the aggrieved party to escalate 
the breach. Using a notice to make time of the essence should therefore be restricted to actual 
delay. 
Requiring a party to set a date for performance before cancelling on the basis of an anticipated delay 
also does not have any justification. Any benefit of increased certainty which such a rule offers is 
completely absent where the delay is anticipated rather than actual. Where it can be established 
that it is reasonably certain that a party is going to materially delay in performing this will be clear 
whether or not a specific date for performance has been set. Additionally because the aggrieved 
party is not entitled to escalate a non-material delay by means of a ‘notice making time of the 
essence’ there is no need to protect the delaying party. 
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There is already some indication that South African law is prepared to recognise a right to cancel a 
contract merely on the basis of a material delay.488 In the context of anticipatory breach of contract 
there is no justification for applying the procedural requirements for putting a delaying party in 
mora and the possibility of a notice of recission, which distinguish cancellation for breach in the form 
of delay from breach in the form of a positive malperformance. There is also no basis for restricting 
cancellation for anticipated delay to circumstances where there is a lex commissoria or ‘time is of 
the essence’, as has also been suggested by Nienaber and Van der Merwe et al.489 A substantial 
delay in performance is just as capable of causing sufficient detriment to the aggrieved party to 
justify cancellation as the malperformance of an obligation and where such a delay is reasonably 
certain to occur the aggrieved party should be entitled to cancel. Restricting the right to cancel for 
an anticipated delay to circumstances where there is a lex commissoria or ‘time is of the essence’ 
therefore has no justification. 
This raises the question of whether a party should be entitled to cancel a contract on the basis of an 
anticipatory breach where the other party’s conduct or the surrounding circumstances indicate that 
they will commit a non-material breach which, if it arose, would fall with the ambit of a cancellation 
clause in the contract and entitle the aggrieved party to cancel the contract. The obvious example is 
the one considered above, that being where a contract does contain a lex commissoria entitling a 
party to cancel for any delay, regardless of its duration. Van der Merwe et al’s position, given above, 
that cancellation would be allowed, fails to take into account that it is the material nature of the 
prospective breach which creates the dilemma faced by the aggrieved party and provides the 
justification for affording the aggrieved party a right to cancel the contract before the time for 
performance has arrived.490 
This is consistent with the position in English law and provides the motivation for Lord Diplock’s 
finding in The Afovos that ‘it is to fundamental breaches alone that the doctrine of anticipatory 
breach is applicable.’491 Conduct or circumstances which indicate that a party will commit a non-
material breach which would entitle the other party to cancel the contract in terms of a lex 
commissoria, or cancellation clause, do not amount to anticipatory breach of contract as the 
predicted breach would not cause the aggrieved party to be substantially deprived of the benefit of 
the contract and therefore do not justify affording the aggrieved party an immediate right to cancel. 
Lord Diplock’s discussion in Photo Production provides two different exceptions to the general rule 
that a failure to correctly perform the primary obligations under the contract, although giving rise to 
a secondary obligation to pay damages, leaves the not yet fully performed primary obligations of the 
parties unchanged.492 These exceptions entitle the aggrieved party to instead cancel the contract, 
putting an end to the unperformed primary obligations under the contract and giving rise to an 
anticipatory secondary obligation on the breaching party to pay damages.493 The first is where the 
resulting failure by one party to perform a primary obligation has the effect of depriving the 
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aggrieved party of substantially the whole benefit that was intended, an ex lege right to cancel.494 
The second is where the contracting parties have agreed that that any failure by one party to 
perform an obligation will entitle the aggrieved party to cancel, an ex contractu right to cancel.495  
Although both exceptions entitle a party to terminate the primary obligations, because the 
underlying justifications for affording a party this right are distinct, the doctrine of anticipatory 
breach is only applicable to the first exception.496 The basis for affording the aggrieved party a right 
to cancel for the first exception is that the aggrieved party will be substantially deprived of the 
benefit of the contract. For the second example, the basis rather rests in the party’s agreement that 
any failure will justify cancellation. 
Unlike circumstances where the right to cancel is based on the aggrieved party’s prospective 
substantial deprivation, where the right to cancel is based on the contracting parties’ agreement 
that any failure will justify cancellation the failure must actually occur before a right to cancel the 
contract will be justified. Conduct or circumstances indicating that a party will fail to perform her or 
his obligations correctly would not support the conclusion that that party has failed to perform her 
or his obligations correctly and so justify affording the aggrieved party a right to cancel the contract. 
Contrary to Van der Merwe et al’s position that a right to cancel for anticipated delay should be 
restricted to where ‘time is of the essence’ or the contract contains a lex commissoria it should 
rather be restricted to where the aggrieved will be substantially deprived of the benefit of the 
contract. The presence of a lex commissoria would not justify affording the aggrieved party a right to 
cancel before an actual delay had occurred.  
An anticipatory breach of contract therefore arises when conduct or circumstances indicate with 
reasonable certainty that they will commit a material breach of contract, either in the form of a 
material malperformance, material delay in performing their obligations or that they will not 
perform their obligations at all. The basis for affording the party the right to cancel the contract is 
founded in the high likelihood that the offending party will commit the breach and the substantial 
detriment that the aggrieved party would suffer as a result of the breach balanced against the 
effects of the cancellation on the breaching party. Because both actual and anticipatory breach give 
rise to a right to cancel the contract on the basis of a prospective substantial detriment of the 
aggrieved party, the considerations which are relevant when assessing whether an anticipated 
breach is material are the same as those which are relevant for actual breach. 
It should be noted that a complete refusal to perform, the classic example of a repudiation drawn 
from Hochster v De La Tour, or complete inability, is not, as is sometimes noted, any form of 
exception to this general rule.497 Application of the test set out above to these circumstances would 
yield the conclusion that it is reasonably certain that the offending party will not perform their 
obligations at all. This is not anticipation of delay but rather anticipation of complete non-
performance, which would necessarily amount to a material breach. A complete refusal or complete 
inability will almost always amount to an anticipatory breach and justify cancellation, not through 
any application of a positive rule to that effect, but because the consequences predicted by such a 
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refusal or inability will always almost amount to a breach which will deprive the aggrieved party of 
substantially all of the benefit of performance of the obligation. 
The earlier sections in this chapter established that, with the notion of cancellation for breach of 
contract having been drawn from English law, a general concept of a material breach, that is a 
breach justifying cancellation, is well enough established in South African law that it would be 
relatively easy to apply in the context of anticipatory breach of contract. It is clear that there can be 
benefits to categorizing different forms of breach.498 Naudé notes that this can be of assistance in 
determining which factors are likely to be relevant when assessing the nature of the harm the 
aggrieved party is likely to suffer and can bring greater legal certainty as ‘certain types of breach 
merit additional rules on when termination will be justified’.499 
However, Naudé notes further that this categorization can be applied in conjunction with a unified 
ex lege right to cancel for fundamental or material breach.500 This is well illustrated by the 
transnational instruments discussed above, which allow specifically for a non-fundamental breach in 
the form of a delay in performance to be elevated to a fundamental breach by a notice calling on the 
breaching party to perform correctly but do not allow for this possibility in the case of defective 
performance.501 
Unfortunately many of the decisions following Datacolor define repudiation in terms of an 
expression of an intention no longer to be bound and to exclusively consider the intention of the 
potentially repudiating party.502 In South African Forestry Co Ltd v York Timbers Ltd503 Brand JA’s 
judgment, although referencing the objective test set out in Datacolor, uses the ‘deliberate and 
unequivocal intention’ definition from Nash v Golden Dumps504 which Nienaber JA’s judgment 
qualifies.505 The decisions in Food & Allied Workers Union v Ngcobo NO and Another506 and Sandown 
Travel (Pty) Ltd v Cricket South Africa507 also make use of this phrasing and Binns-Wards J’s judgment 
in Latib v Pro Sana Medical Scheme,508 although noting that the assessment is objective, considers 
only the intentions of the repudiating party. 509  
As was noted above, the use of the potentially repudiating party’s actual intention does not 
necessarily lead to the incorrect result. In general a party is likely to be able to give effect to their 
intentions. The likely consequences of a party exhibiting a ‘deliberate and unequivocal intention no 
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longer to be bound’ are that they will commit a material breach of the contract and there is nothing 
in the cases discussed above indicating otherwise. However, these decisions clearly illustrate that 
the courts have, in general, not recognised the changes in approach which are necessitated by the 
developments that occurred in Datacolor as none of these decisions have determined whether 
conduct or circumstances amount to an anticipatory breach by considering whether such conduct or 
circumstances supports a conclusion that the offending party will commit a material breach.510 
A very recent decision by the Supreme Court of Appeal marks a welcome departure from this 
trend.511 In B Braun Medical (Pty) Ltd v Ambasaam CC Swain JA specifically criticises the approach in 
the high court decision which was the subject of the appeal for its reliance on the subjective 
intentions of the repudiating party and the subjective perceptions of the aggrieved party.512 
Although still making reference to ‘a deliberate and unequivocal intention … not to be bound by the 
agreement’, it is clear from Swain JA’s judgment that the basis for overturning the High Court’s 
finding that Braun had repudiated the contract was that ‘[t]he perception of a reasonable person 
placed in the position of Ambasaam could never be that proper performance by Braun of its 
obligations in terms of the contract would not be forthcoming.’513 
Swain JA justifies this conclusion on the basis that ‘[e]ven if the demands made by Braun were 
unjustified, this could never have led to the objective conclusion that Braun did not intend to 
perform its obligations.’514 Importantly, although the finding that a reasonable person in the position 
of Ambasaam would not conclude that proper performance would not be forthcoming is based on 
the objective appearance of Braun’s intentions, it is clear that it is the consequences expected by a 
reasonable person in the position of Ambasaam, that proper performance would be forthcoming, 
which is the determining factor and not Braun’s intentions. This focus on the likely consequences of 
a potentially repudiating party’s conduct rather than their attitude to the contract is what is required 
by the test set out in Datacolor and, as argued above, focuses on the actual harm which the 
aggrieved party may suffer.515 
3.6 Conclusion 
An anticipatory breach of contract consists of conduct or circumstances which indicate that a party 
will not perform their primary obligations under the contract correctly and that this failure will cause 
the aggrieved party to be substantially deprived of the benefit of the contract, justifying affording 
the aggrieved party a right to cancel the contract. Where it can be established that this failure is 
reasonably certain to occur, the aggrieved party may elect to immediately cancel the contract, 
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extinguishing the primary obligations and giving rise to a secondary obligation on the breaching 
party to compensate the aggrieved party for any losses arising from the cancellation. 
Unlike in circumstances of actual breach of contract, an anticipatory breach does not need to, 
although may, include a breach of the primary obligations under a contract. Anticipatory breach may 
therefore occur before the time for performance. However, because the anticipatory nature of the 
breach is derived from the fact that it anticipates a material breach of a primary obligation rather 
than anticipates the time for performance of such obligation, it can occur after the time set for 
performance of the obligation and as noted may be based on a non-material actual breach of the 
primary obligations which indicates that a further material actual breach will occur. 
Anticipatory breaches of contract must by definition justify the aggrieved party cancelling the 
contract. The appropriate question is not whether an anticipatory breach justifies cancellation but 
rather whether such conduct or circumstances amount to an anticipatory breach. Whether conduct 
or the surrounding circumstances will amount to anticipatory breach depends on whether it predicts 
a breach justifying cancellation and whether such breach is predicted with reasonable certainty. It is 
then necessary to consider what forms of predicted breach would justify cancellation and this 
chapter established that a general concept of material breach should be used. Such a material 
breach may arise in the form of an anticipated material delay, material malperformance or the 
anticipation that a party will never perform (complete non-performance). In all of these 
circumstances a general conception of a material breach, determined with reference to the likely 
detriment which the aggrieved party will suffer balanced against the interests of the breaching 
party, should be applied. 
The approach of considering whether a party’s conduct predicts a material breach of contract, rather 
than focusing on a party’s expression of an intention to not perform or incorrectly perform their 
obligations, has not yet been generally applied in the South African cases following Datacolor. The 
decisions which have continued to focus on the potentially repudiating party’s intentions have, as a 
result, largely missed the significant changes to the doctrine of anticipatory breach of contract which 
Datacolor established. The decision in B Braun Medical516 hopefully marks a shift to a consideration 
of the consequences predicted by a party’s conduct or the surrounding circumstances as the basis 
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4 ALTERNATIVE REMEDIES FOR ANTICIPATORY BREACH OF CONTRACT 
In Chapter 2 it was shown that an anticipatory breach of contract consists of conduct or 
circumstances which indicate with reasonable certainty that a contracting party will commit a 
breach of contract and that this breach would justify the aggrieved party cancelling the contract. 
Chapter 3 then argued that, despite the accepted approach in South African law of dividing breach of 
contract into various categories, each with its own rules on when a breach justifies cancellation, 
support for a general concept of material breach of contract can be found in the South African case 
law. It was then argued that this general concept of material breach was best explained using a 
model of contractual obligations drawn from English law, specifically from decisions by Lord 
Diplock.517 This model distinguishes between primary obligations under the contract, the primary 
performance obligations owed by the parties, and secondary obligations to compensate the 
aggrieved party which arise on breach of the contract. 
In terms of this model a material breach of contract consists of a failure by a contracting party to 
perform her or his primary obligations correctly, or conduct which indicates with reasonable 
certainty that she or he will fail to perform their primary obligations correctly, which will 
substantially deprive the aggrieved party of the benefit of the contract. If, balancing the interests of 
the parties, it would be fair to afford the aggrieved party a right to cancel the contract this conduct 
will amount to a material breach of contract. 
In Chapter 3 it was further argued that in terms of this model, anticipatory breach of contract could 
only consist of conduct or circumstances which would justify the aggrieved party in cancelling the 
contract, that is a material breach. This was because, in terms of the model, although a material 
breach could consist of either the actual failure to perform a primary obligation correctly or conduct 
or circumstances indicating with reasonable certainty that such a failure would occur, a non-material 
breach is restricted to circumstances where a contracting party actually failed to perform their 
primary obligations correctly. Consistent with the practical justifications for this position given in 
Chapter 2, Lord Diplock’s model provides a doctrinal basis for restricting anticipatory breach to 
material breaches.  
An anticipatory breach must then, by definition, justify affording the aggrieved party a right to cancel 
the contract. Importantly though, the aggrieved party is in general not required to cancel the 
contract and may exercise alternative remedies instead.518 The focus of this chapter is a discussion of 
whether the breaching party should be entitled to correct the anticipatory breach (if they are able to 
do so before the aggrieved party cancels the contract) and thereby deprive the aggrieved party of 
the right to cancel, what alternative remedies may be available to the aggrieved party in place of 
cancellation and lastly the impact of the model for anticipatory breach of contract set out in 
Chapters 2 and 3 on these situations. 
This chapter will first discuss what is generally referred to as a retraction of a repudiation. This refers 
to circumstances in which a party, after indicating that she or he will not correctly perform their 
obligations correctly, subsequently indicates that they will do so. This chapter will then discuss what 
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alternative remedies are available to an aggrieved party following an anticipatory breach, including 
whether an aggrieved party should be entitled to request an adequate assurance of performance. 
4.1 Retraction of a repudiation 
Anticipatory breach of contract potentially differs from actual breach of contract in that it is possible 
for a party who has committed an anticipatory breach to remedy the breach before the time for 
performance has arrived. A party who has committed an anticipatory breach of contract could 
correct the consequences of the breach before her or his performance obligations became due and 
then perform the contract correctly at the time performance is due. This occurs most easily in the 
context of repudiation where a party who has repudiated the contract can subsequently indicate 
that they will perform their obligations correctly. It is therefore generally referred to as a ‘retraction 
of a repudiation’, although it should be noted that it is also possible in the context of relative 
prevention of performance, although not where performance has become impossible.519 
As was often the case in the context of anticipatory breach of contract, it would appear that this 
principle was introduced into South African law on the assumption that the English law of the time 
was also applicable in South Africa. Wessels gives only the decision of Parke B in Ripley v M’clure 
when stating the principle.520 Ripley v M’clure is actually a decision predating the recognition of 
anticipatory breach in Hochster and which had found that a repudiation of a contract before the 
time for performance was no breach at all and on that basis obviously capable of withdrawal.521  
This proposition, that a repudiation could be withdrawn before performance became due, was 
however maintained in the English law after the recognition of a refusal to perform occurring before 
the time for performance as a breach of contract in Hochster.522 English law still recognises that 
‘[t]he injured party will … lose his rights in respect of the anticipatory breach if he does not accept it 
and if, before performance from the guilty party has become due, that party withdraws his 
repudiation’.523 Clearly this can no longer be based on the reasoning employed by Parke B in Ripley v 
M’clure524 and it would seem that this was rather premised on the position that an anticipatory 
breach, unlike an actual breach, is only completed upon acceptance by the aggrieved party and so 
can be withdrawn and undone prior to acceptance.525 
The English position that a repudiation can be withdrawn was endorsed by De Wet and Yeats.526 The 
authors’ discussion  would suggest that the basis for this position in South African law also rested on 
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the notion that a repudiation was only completed upon ‘acceptance’ rather than on the basis 
provided by Parke B in Ripley which had been suggested by Wessels.527  
A number of South African decisions have repeated this position.528 However, as Lubbe notes, the 
legal position was nonetheless not entirely clear as in each of these cases the remarks have been 
obiter and are not without contradiction.529 Briefly, in HMBMP Properties (Pty) Ltd v King530 the 
finding by Thirion J that ‘[t]he party who has repudiated is entitled to withdraw his repudiation 
before the other party has made his election’ is unnecessary to reach the conclusion as to when 
prescription began to run which formed the basis for the decision, as was the remark in Cole v 
Stuart531 from which this principle was drawn. In Vromolimnos v Weichbold,532 Langverwacht 
Farming Co v Sedgwick & Co Ltd (II)533 and Culverwell v Brown534 the courts would again endorse this 
principle without relying on it to reach their ultimate decisions.535 By contrast, in Kameel Tin Co v 
Brollomar Tin Exploration Ltd Greenberg J, in a rather confused judgment and restricting his finding 
to a refusal persisting past the date when performance was due, found that a withdrawal of the 
repudiation and tender of performance would not affect the aggrieved party’s right to cancel.536 
It is generally accepted that, outside of the context of repudiation, a breaching party cannot deprive 
the aggrieved party of a right to cancel the contract by means of a tender to cure the defective 
performance.537 A contracting party is rather entitled to a reasonable period in which to elect 
whether or not to exercise the right to cancel the contract. It is not merely the elapse of the 
reasonable period which deprives the party of the right to cancel the contract but rather that in 
appropriate circumstances it is possible to infer that the aggrieved party has elected to affirm the 
contract.538 It is only this tacit or express affirmation or the reliance on the appearance thereof that 
would deprive the aggrieved party of the right to cancel.539 Lubbe has suggested that, absent any 
clearly binding authority supporting the position that a right to cancel can be lost on the retraction 
of a repudiation, the same position should apply in the context of repudiation.540 A number of other 
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academic commentators have also questioned whether a retraction should deprive an aggrieved 
party to cancel the contract on this basis.541 
It is clear that the possibility that a repudiation could be retracted on the basis that it remains 
incomplete before being accepted can no longer be endorsed in South African law. The finding in 
Tuckers Land and Development Corporation542 and subsequent confirmation in Datacolor543 that an 
anticipatory breach is an immediate breach make that reasoning untenable. Similarly the distinction 
made in Kameel Tin544 between a refusal before the time performance is due and one occurring after 
the time performance is due is difficult to sustain where anticipatory breach includes both forms of 
refusal. It is then unclear why a repudiation occurring before the time for performance could be 
withdrawn but not in the case of a repudiation occurring at or after the time performance became 
due. 
However, the construction given to repudiation by Nienaber JA in Datacolor,545 does potentially 
provide an alternative basis for allowing a party to withdraw their anticipatory breach and deprive 
the aggrieved party of the right to cancel the contract. Nienaber has set out this reasoning himself 
on a number of occasions and confirmed this position in an obiter remark in Datacolor.546 Consistent 
with the definition Nienaber JA gives to repudiation in Datacolor,547 Nienaber, in his earlier academic 
writing, notes that repudiation is ‘characterised by a definite relationship existing between the act of 
repudiation and the actual breach it predicts.’548 It is the expectation of this eventual actual breach 
which provides the basis for affording the aggrieved party an immediate right to cancel the 
contract.549  
Nienaber suggests that this explains why a retraction of a repudiation deprives the aggrieved party 
of the right to cancel the contract.550 Where a party retracts their repudiation the expectation of a 
non- or malperformance is replaced with ‘the original expectation of full performance,’551 ‘with the 
result that, strictly speaking, nothing remains after the repudiation has been withdrawn on which to 
justify the recission of the contract.’552 On Nienaber’s reasoning it is the likelihood that the 
repudiating party will commit a non- or malperformance that would justify cancellation which forms 
the basis for the right to cancel and because this expectation is reversed when the repudiation is 
withdrawn the right to cancel the contract should fall away. Nienaber notes that any immediate loss 
suffered as a result of the repudiation would remain recoverable.553 
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Liu applies essentially the same reasoning in his discussion of English law.554 He defines anticipatory 
breach as an ‘inferential breach of a future obligation’ and notes that ‘[a]s a result of its futurity, the 
loss of performance that the victim might sustain is in a state of flux.’555 The aggrieved party must 
accept the breach in order ‘to render the anticipated breach in effect “inevitable”’.556 Prior to 
acceptance it is then open to the repudiating party to retract their repudiation and destroy the 
inference that they will in future commit a fundamental breach. It is on this basis that Liu describes 
an unaccepted anticipatory breach as a ‘retractable wrong’.557 
Both Nienaber and Liu suggest that the basis for affording the aggrieved party the right to cancel the 
contract is the predicted breach, a breach which will result in the aggrieved party being substantially 
deprived of the benefit of the contract. However what both Nienaber and Liu miss is that although 
the expectation that the aggrieved party will be substantially deprived of the benefit of the contract 
provides the justification for affording the aggrieved party a right to cancel it does not form the basis 
for such right. The anticipated breach is an expectation which will most likely never arise once the 
aggrieved party takes any action as a result of such expectation. Using the anticipated breach as the 
basis for affording the aggrieved party a right to cancel would create a paradox in that the remedy of 
cancelling the contract would destroy the basis for affording the aggrieved party the remedy. 
The basis for the right to cancel is rather the material breach of contract which is constituted by the 
conduct or circumstances giving rise to the expectation that the breaching party will fail to correctly 
perform their primary obligations.558 It is this immediate infringement of the right to performance 
which constitutes the anticipatory breach, and not the anticipated future infringement of the right 
to performance, which forms the basis for affording the aggrieved party a right to cancel the 
contract. Although a party may withdraw their repudiation and by doing so may reverse the 
expectation that the aggrieved party will be substantially deprived of the benefit of the contract they 
cannot reverse the fact of having committed a material breach of contract.  The repudiating party 
may be able to restore the expectation that they will perform their obligations correctly but cannot 
‘undo’ the circumstances which constituted the material breach. 
Anticipatory breach is then no different from actual breach of contract. Although the expected 
substantial deprivation provides the justification for affording the aggrieved party the right to cancel 
it is the present conduct or surrounding circumstances which form the basis for such right. This is 
true for both actual and anticipatory breach of contract. Actual breach differs from anticipatory 
breach only to the extent that this basis takes the form of a material non- or malperformance rather 
than conduct or circumstances which predict that such material non- or malperformance will occur. 
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From a practical perspective, as Lubbe notes, it is not clear that the retraction of a repudiation 
necessarily reverses the expectation that a party will commit a breach.559 Lubbe further notes that 
retraction is also open to abuse, potentially allowing ‘an unscrupulous contract breaker to play ducks 
and drakes with the aggrieved party’. It could also incentivise aggrieved parties to act quickly, and 
perhaps rashly, in cancelling the contract on the basis of a repudiation in order to prevent the 
repudiating party from withdrawing their repudiation. Lubbe correctly points out that to ‘permit 
retraction will result in the very uncertainty the avoidance of which forms the basis of the 
recognition of repudiation’.560 
What Lubbe does acknowledge is that if, as some commentators suggest, a retraction would need to 
be accompanied by some tender or assurance of performance in order to be effective, this would to 
some extent address these concerns.561 However, if it is accepted that a party who had committed a 
material breach could take steps which sufficiently mitigated the prejudice to the aggrieved party 
such that it justified taking away the aggrieved party’s right to cancel it is not clear why this should 
be restricted to anticipatory breach of contract. What is then described would appear to be 
consistent with what is sometimes referred to as a ‘tender to cure’ a breach.562 
In the context of actual breach of contract this would presumably take the form of a tender of full 
performance. For anticipatory breach of contract, because performance is not yet due, this would 
likely be achieved by providing an ‘adequate assurance of performance’.563 At this stage in South 
African law, a tender to cure a material breach will, in general, not affect the aggrieved party’s right 
to cancel the contract, although strong arguments have been presented in favour of introducing a 
mechanism that would allow for such.564  
Importantly it would seem clear that the right to tender to cure a material breach (whether for an 
actual or anticipatory breach) and deprive the aggrieved party of the right to cancel the contract 
must be subject to requirements and restrictions that serve to avoid possible prejudice to the 
aggrieved party.565 Although curing an anticipatory breach may be easier, because the breaching 
party has not yet necessarily committed any malperformance and may still have time available 
before she or he is required to perform, as was shown above, from both a practical and doctrinal 
perspective, there is no reason that the same restrictions as are suggested in the context of actual 
breach should not also apply in the context of anticipatory breach. The distinction between actual 
and anticipatory breach which is created by allowing ‘retraction’ of a repudiation but not allowing a 
breaching party to ‘tender to cure’ a material actual breach is unwarranted. Arguments in favour of 
allowing a right to correct an anticipatory breach because it may be easy to do so only make 
arguments in favour of introducing a right to tender to cure both forms of breach all the more 
pressing. 
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There is no doctrinal justification for depriving an aggrieved party of the right to cancel on the basis 
that a party who has committed an anticipatory breach offers a bare retraction of such anticipatory 
breach. Further, allowing the party committing an anticipatory breach to deprive the aggrieved party 
of the right to cancel is also not justified from a practical perspective. It is not clear that a retraction 
will reverse the effects of the anticipatory breach and restore the aggrieved party’s expectation of 
proper performance and it could be open to abuse by an unscrupulous contracting party. Finally, the 
suggestion that a breaching party should be entitled to deprive the aggrieved party of their right to 
cancel by retracting their repudiation and tendering full performance rather than supporting an 
argument in favour of recognising ‘retraction’ instead supports an argument in favour of allowing a 
right to ‘tender to cure’ a material breach generally. 
4.2 Alternative remedies 
It was established above that an anticipatory breach will always entitle the aggrieved party to cancel 
the contract and that the breaching party cannot deprive the aggrieved party of their right to cancel 
the contract by withdrawing their anticipatory breach. There are nonetheless circumstances in which 
a contracting party can face prejudice in the face of an apparent anticipatory breach of contract 
which the remedy of cancellation does little to address. 
This prejudice can arise, firstly, where the aggrieved party’s performance is due at the time, or will 
be due shortly after, a party commits an anticipatory breach of contract. In these circumstances the 
aggrieved party must either perform her or his contractual obligations in the face of the uncertainty 
created by the anticipatory breach or cancel the contract, thus terminating their obligation to 
perform. The prejudice arises because, although the breaching party cannot deprive the aggrieved 
party of their election on whether or not to cancel, the obligation to perform could inhibit the 
opportunity to make such election. If a party wishes time in which to make a decision as to whether 
to cancel or to push for performance, absent a remedy, she or he would also be required to perform 
their obligations or breach the contract themselves, despite the indication that the breaching party’s 
performance will not be forthcoming.  
Secondly, prejudice can arise where it would appear that a party is likely to commit a material 
breach of contract but where it may not be possible to be reasonably certain that they will commit 
the breach. This means that the conduct may or may not amount to an anticipatory breach. These 
have been labelled ‘uncertainty of performance’ cases.566  In these circumstances where a party may 
have committed an anticipatory breach the aggrieved party faces a dilemma. If she or he cancels the 
contract she or he will risk committing an anticipatory breach themselves if it turns out that her or 
his assessment was incorrect. If she or he chooses not to cancel the contract she or he will be 
uncertain as to whether the performance owed to her or him will be forthcoming and may be 
required to perform in the face of this uncertainty. 
South African law recognises a remedy for the first case. Where a party has committed a repudiation 
the aggrieved party is entitled to suspend performance of their outstanding obligations while the 
repudiation persists or she or he elects to cancel the contract.567 In Moodley v Moodley, Nienaber J, 
as he was then, finds the basis of the rule in the notion that a party cannot advantage herself or 
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himself by their own wrongful action.568 That is, the repudiating party, being the reason why the 
aggrieved party is withholding performance, cannot use the failure to tender performance to her or 
his advantage.  
This remedy, which has also been described as being derived from the principle of reciprocity, allows 
a party who would otherwise be obliged to perform in the face of an anticipatory breach of contract 
by the other party to suspend their own performance, giving them the opportunity to consider their 
position or press for performance without being prejudiced by the obligation to perform in the face 
of the breaching party’s refusal or impaired ability to perform.569 
Allowing a party to suspend their performance in the face of an anticipatory breach by the other 
party also provides an extra curial remedy which the aggrieved party could use to try and enforce 
performance by the breaching party. Importantly, this enforcement function, unlike where it 
provides the aggrieved party time to consider their position, would not only be useful in the context 
of an anticipated material breach but any anticipated breach. This then raises the question as to 
whether it would be appropriate to afford parties anticipating a non-material breach a remedy and 
by extension recognise such conduct as amounting to a breach. Although perhaps attractive, as an 
anticipated non-material breach does infringe a party’s interest in the promised performance, the 
argument presented above, that a predicted non-material breach is not a sufficiently serious 
infringement of a contracting party’s interest in the performance so as to justify providing a remedy 
is nonetheless persuasive.570 
Importantly though, the remedy does not, as has been suggested, provide any assistance in the 
second set of circumstances described above, the uncertainty of performance cases, for which no 
adequate remedy is provided.571 This follows from the conclusion that suspension of performance as 
a remedy is and should only be available where a party has committed an anticipatory breach of 
contract, that is where it is reasonably certain that a party will commit a material breach. As with 
cancellation, the suspension of performance in a case of uncertainty of performance could itself 
amount to an anticipatory breach. The party facing this uncertainty experiences the same dilemma 
whether they seek cancellation or suspension of performance as a remedy if it turns out that the 
uncertainty is insufficient to establish an anticipatory breach. They therefore risk committing an 
anticipatory breach themselves by cancelling or suspending their own performance. 
A contracting party in the uncertainty of performance case, as an alternative to cancellation or 
suspension of performance, could seek an order of specific performance. While there would appear 
to be no reported South African decisions in which a court ordered specific performance, this can 
likely be attributed to fact that the dominant the view as to what constituted repudiation for most of 
the recent case history was that repudiation was only completed as a breach of contract upon 
acceptance by the aggrieved party.572 This position, that an anticipatory breach is only completed on 
acceptance, would preclude an aggrieved party from obtaining an order of specific performance on 
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the basis of an anticipatory breach as the breach would only be completed after the contract had 
been cancelled. The rejection of the ‘breach conversion’ rule, as it is termed by Liu, in Stewart 
Wrightson v Thorpe573 has however ended any objection to such an order being made. 
Although seeking an order of specific performance does not carry the risk of such action amounting 
to an anticipatory breach, as is potentially the case with cancellation or suspension of performance, 
it is nonetheless not an effective remedy. This is firstly because, again, the remedy only arises where 
a breach can be established.574 If the party seeking the order was unable to establish that an 
anticipatory breach has occurred, as is potentially the case in uncertainty of performance cases the 
party would not be able to obtain an order of specific performance and would potentially face an 
adverse costs order in bringing the matter to court. Further, the availability of an order of specific 
performance does not effectively address the prejudice that is likely to arise in the circumstances.  
Prejudice is most likely to arise where a party is in a precarious position and needs to establish with 
a degree of urgency whether or not the party whose performance is uncertain is or is not likely to 
perform. That is, where a party needs to resolve the uncertainty as to whether there is or is not an 
anticipatory breach of the contract. In these circumstances a likely slow moving curial remedy would 
be of little assistance even if it could resolve the uncertainty of performance. 
An innovative extra curial remedy was introduced by the Uniform Commercial Code in the United 
States of America and has subsequently been adopted by a number of transnational instruments to 
address these ‘uncertainty of performance’ cases.575 This remedy entitles a party in an uncertainty of 
performance case to make a request for an ‘adequate assurance of performance’ from the party 
whose performance is uncertain. If the party whose performance is uncertain fails to provide an 
‘adequate assurance of performance’ the aggrieved party is then entitled to cancel the contract. This 
can be seen in the wording of Article 7.3.4 of the PICC, which also incorporates a similar right to 
suspend performance as was discussed above. 
‘A party who reasonably believes that there will be a fundamental non-performance by the other 
party may demand adequate assurance of due performance and may meanwhile withhold its 
own performance. Where this assurance is not provided within a reasonable time the party 
demanding it may terminate the contract.’
 576
 
One of the key features of Article 7.3.4 and how it functions to address the uncertainty of 
performance cases is that the standard of probability required for the article to be applicable is that 
the aggrieved party must ‘reasonably believe’. This is a lower standard of probability than is used in 
Article 7.3.3, which affords the aggrieved party an immediate right to cancel the contract, where it is 
‘clear’ that a party will commit a fundamental breach.577 This lower standard of probability makes 
the remedy in Article 7.3.4 applicable in uncertainty of performance cases in addition to cases where 
it is clear that a party will commit a fundamental breach. 
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The mechanism in Article 7.3.4 allows a party facing uncertain performance to address this 
uncertainty with the request for an adequate assurance of performance. The official comment to the 
PICC states that what constitutes an adequate assurance of performance depends on the 
circumstances but could be as little as a declaration that performance will be made or as much as 
providing security or guarantees of performance.578 It is clear from the examples given and the label 
used that an adequate assurance of performance must be sufficient in the circumstances to create a 
reasonable belief that due performance will be made, thereby addressing the aggrieved party’s 
uncertainty. If an adequate assurance of performance is not provided the aggrieved party will be 
entitled to cancel the contract, thereby also resolving the uncertainty, effectively escalating the 
likelihood of the breach and allowing the same remedy as would be the case if it was clear that a 
fundamental malperformance was going to occur.579 
It is also worth noting that the operation of Article 7.3.4 is restricted to where there is a reasonable 
belief that a ‘fundamental breach’ will occur.580 As was discussed above the notion of a fundamental 
breach used in the PICC is strongly analogous to the concept of a material breach used in South 
African law.581 For the same reasons as were discussed above in relation to anticipatory breach 
generally, the necessity for a remedy in uncertainty of performance cases is restricted to 
circumstances where there is a reasonable belief that a material breach will occur. Those being that 
it is only the anticipation of a material breach that will likely lead to wasted expenditure and which 
will create the dilemma for the aggrieved party over whether or not to cancel. Article 7.3.4 therefore 
serves to resolve uncertainty over whether or not such fundamental or material breach will occur.  
This procedure of allowing a party to cancel after a party whose performance is uncertain fails to 
provide an adequate assurance of performance within a reasonable time after such request was 
made has a logical consistency with the remedy of immediate cancellation that is allowed where it is 
clear that the party will commit a fundamental or material breach. Where a party is either unable or 
unwilling to provide an adequate assurance of performance it will often provide a strong indication 
that they are unable or unwilling to perform their obligations correctly and this would in turn, in 
general, serve to confirm the doubts as to their likely performance and make it clear that they will 
not perform correctly. The adequate assurance procedure therefore serves to reinforce the logical 
conclusion that would generally follow the failure to cater to such a request. 
In addition to its logical coherency, Naudé has noted that there is existing South African authority 
which supports a principle which would entitle a party to request an assurance of performance on 
the basis of a reasonable belief that the party to whom this request is made will commit a material 
breach.582 In Hayne v Narun Bros,583 drawing on principles set out by Domat and Pothier, the court 
allowed a seller of goods on credit to request an assurance of payment in the form of a bank 
guarantee after the buyer assigned his estate, failing which the seller would be entitled to cancel the 
contract.584 It should be noted that Vivier JA, although specifically avoiding making a finding as to 
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whether the rule could be extended, noted in an obiter statement with regard to the rule expressed 
in Hayne that: 
‘I doubt whether there is any need for the application of the rule in a sale of land for cash in our 
law where the obligations of the seller and buyer are reciprocal and concurrent and where the 
seller is adequately protected by the ordinary guarantee…’
585
 
This could militate against the extension of this principle on this basis. However, even if Vivier JA’s 
position is accepted, there is nonetheless an alternative basis on which the request for an adequate 
assurance of performance could be based and that is by analogy with the notice of recission applied 
in the context of delay.586 Naudé has cogently argued that the notion of escalating the seriousness of 
a breach by notice in order to obtain a right to cancel should not be extended to allow for the 
escalation by notice of a breach consisting of a non-material positive malperformance. Naudé notes 
that the German law and Dutch law allow for the possibility of a notice of the intention to cancel on 
the basis of a non-material positive malperformance in terms of a Nachfrist notice.587 However, 
because of the restrictions put in place to protect the breaching party from cancellation for a trivial 
breach the introduction of such a procedure would not serve to introduce any greater certainty on 
when termination is allowed and on balance does not justify a departure from the South African 
position.588 
A procedure allowing a contracting party to demand an adequate assurance of performance, and to 
cancel if such is not provided, on the basis of a reasonable belief that the other party will commit a 
material breach would not require any such protections as it would only apply where a material 
breach was expected. Like the notice of recission in the context of delay such a demand would serve 
to resolve the uncertainty created as to whether performance will be made correctly by putting the 
party whose performance is uncertain to an ultimatum. The party whose performance is uncertain, 
either based on their delay in performing or as a result of their conduct or circumstances which give 
rise to a reasonable belief that they will commit a material malperformance, must then resolve this 
uncertainty either positively, by complying with the requirements of the notice and restoring 
confidence, or negatively, by failing to do so which would give rise to a right to cancel the contract. 
The demand for adequate assurance of performance, unlike the Nachfrist notice, would not allow a 
party to cancel for a non-material breach. Rather, as is suggested is the correct theoretical basis for 
the notice of recission, it would afford a contracting party the right to put the other party, whose 
performance is in doubt, to an ultimatum. Compliance with this ultimatum would remove the doubt 
and the failure to comply with it would be deemed to be a confirmation of this doubt and so would 
then justify affording the aggrieved party a right to cancel the contact on the basis of what would 
amount to an anticipatory breach of contract.589 
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4.3 Damages for anticipatory breach and mitigation of losses 
As was noted above, Nienaber has suggested in his academic writing that conduct which predicts a 
non-material breach should also be recognised as constituting an anticipatory breach of contact.590 
Nienaber premised this position on the basis that the rejection of the ‘offer-acceptance’ model for 
anticipatory breach of contract meant that an anticipatory breach need not amount to an offer to 
cancel the contract and that there was therefore no longer any basis for insisting that an anticipatory 
breach must justify the cancellation of the contract.591 However, as was discussed above, although 
Jansen JA writing in Stewart Wrightson v Thorpe592 correctly rejected the construction of repudiation 
as consisting of any form of offer this did not also imply a rejection of the ‘conditional damages 
claim’ model described by Liu.593 
In terms of the conditional damages claim model, although an anticipatory breach is an immediate 
breach constituted by conduct or circumstances giving rise to an inference that a contracting party 
will fail to correctly perform their obligations, this breach does not, in general, give rise to an 
immediate right to claim damages. The damages claim arises only after the aggrieved party has 
elected to cancel the contract on the basis of the anticipatory breach. As was discussed above, this 
conditional damages claim model provides a more coherent explanation for the earlier decisions on 
the operation of anticipatory breach of contract and further, that restricting anticipatory breach of 
contract to material breach, as entailed by the model, promotes certainty and economic 
efficiency.594 The conditional damages claim model, in terms of which an aggrieved party is, in 
general, only entitled to claim damages on the basis of an anticipatory breach after cancellation, is 
also consistent with the model of obligations arising from breach of contract proposed by Lord 
Diplock.595 
As was also noted above, Lord Diplock’s model describes a secondary obligation to pay damages that 
arises from a breach of contract consisting of a failure to perform a primary obligation under the 
contract and an alternative anticipatory secondary obligation to pay damages arising after a contract 
is cancelled on the basis of a material breach of contract. The secondary obligation to pay damages 
is directed at mitigating the negative financial effects of the imperfect performance of the primary 
obligations.596 Where a party commits a material breach the aggrieved party may instead of 
enforcing the secondary obligation to pay damages elect to cancel the contract, that is terminate the 
outstanding primary obligations.597 It is this termination of the primary obligations under the 
contract, the cancellation, which then gives rise to an anticipatory secondary obligation to pay 
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damages, an obligation to mitigate the negative financial effects arising from the cancellation of the 
contract.598 
This creates a small but significant distinction between damages arising from breach generally and 
damages arising following the cancellation of the contract. The secondary obligation to pay damages 
finds its basis in, and arises at the time of, the breach of contract. By contrast the anticipatory 
secondary obligation finds its basis in the cancellation of the contract and therefore can only arise 
once the aggrieved party has made the election to cancel the contract. This would hold true not just 
for cancellation following anticipatory breach but also where the aggrieved party cancels the 
contract following a material actual breach. Whether a contract is cancelled on the basis of a 
material actual breach, or an anticipatory breach, it is the cancellation which gives rise to the 
obligation to pay damages rather than the breach itself. This makes the time at which the obligation 
to pay damages after cancellation of the contract arises consistent with the time at which the 
obligation to effect restitution after cancellation arises, that being the time at which the contract is 
cancelled.599 
This distinction between the time at which the secondary obligation to pay damages following 
breach arises and the time at which the anticipatory secondary obligation to pay damages following 
cancellation arises affects the time at which the aggrieved party is required to take steps to mitigate 
their loss and when prescription begins to run. Because the anticipatory secondary obligation only 
arises on cancellation and not at the time of the breach the earliest time at which an aggrieved party 
can be required to take steps to mitigate her or his losses and at which prescription can begin to run 
is after cancellation rather than, as has been suggested, at the time of the breach of contract.600 
Importantly, the effect of this distinction between the secondary obligation to pay damages arising 
from breach generally and the anticipatory secondary obligation to pay damages arising from 
cancellation is limited to creating a distinction between the time at which the damages claim arises 
in respect of secondary and anticipatory secondary obligation to pay damages. It does not affect the 
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manner in, nor the moment with reference to, which damages are calculated. This is because the 
purpose of the two different forms of damages obligation is the same. Despite some uncertainty in 
the South African case law as to the approach which should be used to determine the amount that 
an aggrieved party is entitled to recover as damages for breach for contract, the purpose of 
imposing the obligation to pay damages on the breaching party would seem clear.601 This purpose, 
as stated by Innes JA in Victoria Falls and Transvaal Power Co Ltd v Consolidated Langlaagte 
Mines,602 is to place the aggrieved party in the position she or he would have occupied had the 
contract been performed properly.603 
The distinction between the time at which the secondary and the anticipatory secondary obligation 
to pay damages arise would have no effect on this purpose of placing the aggrieved party in the 
position she or he would have occupied had the contract been performed properly. The position in 
which the aggrieved party finds themselves will obviously differ depending on whether or not the 
damages arise from a breach or from cancellation following a material breach because of the effects 
of cancellation on the aggrieved party’s financial position. However, the purpose remains consistent 
across both forms of damages obligation and there is no basis on which to distinguish them other 
than the time at which the obligation arises. There is therefore no basis for using a different 
approach to calculate the damages.  
The effect of this distinction is therefore limited to the time at which the damages obligation arises 
and, following from that, the earliest time at which a party can be expected to take steps to mitigate 
their loss and at which prescription can begin to run. Importantly this distinction is not made 
between damages arising from actual breach of contract and anticipatory breach of contract but 
rather between damages arising from a breach generally and those arising following cancellation of 
the contract. 
4.4 Conclusion 
Despite Nienaber’s support for the proposition that the retraction of a repudiation, if made before 
the aggrieved party has given notice cancelling the contract, should prevent the aggrieved party 
from cancelling the contract it would seem clear that the establishment of repudiation as an 
immediate breach and rejection of the ‘offer acceptance’ model in Stewart Wrightson604 and 
confirmed by Nienaber JA in Datacolor605 would rather suggest that a party committing an 
anticipatory breach cannot affect the aggrieved party’s right to cancel with a mere retraction. 
Rather, in the interests of promoting certainty, a breaching party should only be entitled to prevent 
the aggrieved party from cancelling a contract on the basis of a fundamental breach in terms of a 
general right to tender to cure a material breach, as suggested by Naudé . 
Similarly, in the interests of promoting certainty, in addition to being entitled to suspend 
performance of outstanding obligations on the basis of an anticipatory breach, a contracting party 
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should be entitled to request an adequate assurance of performance from the other party on the 
basis of a reasonable belief that the other party will commit a material breach, failing which the 
requesting party should be entitled to cancel the contract. In ‘uncertainty of performance’ cases, 
that is where there are reasonable doubts as to whether a contracting party will be able to perform 
their obligations correctly but it is not clear that the party whose performance is in doubt will 
commit a material breach, the aggrieved party runs the risk of committing an anticipatory breach by 
acting on the uncertainty but otherwise has no remedy to address these doubts. Allowing the 
aggrieved party to request an adequate assurance of performance as an alternative would enable 
the aggrieved party to resolve the uncertainty without taking the drastic step of cancelling the 
contract and would serve to promote performance of the contract ahead of cancellation. 
Lastly, the acceptance of the conditional damages claim model creates a small but significant 
distinction between damages arising from breach generally and damages arising following the 
cancellation of the contract. The difference is that unlike for breach of contract generally, the basis 
for claiming damages arising from cancellation rests not on the breach but rather arises as a result of 
such cancellation. Because this right to claim damages only arises after an aggrieved party has 
elected to cancel the contract the prescription of such claim and the requirement that a party take 
steps to mitigate their losses as a limitation on such damages claim also only arises at the time the 
cancellation is effected. 
The model for anticipatory breach set out in Chapters 2 and 3 provides a strong theoretical basis for 
anticipatory breach of contract which, it is argued in these chapters, would enhance clarity and 
certainty through its application. The impact of this model on the remedies available for anticipatory 
breach of contract is relatively limited. It would only serve to confirm the position that a party is not 
entitled to deprive the aggrieved party of a right to cancel the contract arising from an anticipatory 
breach by merely retracting their repudiation, that a party faced with an uncertain performance is 
inadequately protected by the existing primary remedy of cancellation and reveals a distinction 
between damages arising from breach of contract generally and damages arising from cancellation. 
These effects in turn have relatively limited impact, suggesting as they do that the argument for 
introducing a right to cure a breach be reiterated, that a party be entitled to request an adequate 
assurance of performance on the basis of a reasonable belief that a material breach will be 
committed and that the ‘duty to mitigate’, in general, only arises after cancellation in the context of 
anticipatory breach of contract. 
This limited impact is what would be expected of a model that is, as argued by Liu, consistent with 
the existing case law on repudiation.606 At the same time this impact is potentially highly significant 
where these issues are disputed and serves to increase the consistency and clarity of the doctrine of 
anticipatory breach of contract and its outcomes. 
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The doctrine of anticipatory breach of contract is directed at addressing the prejudice suffered by a 
contracting party where such party can be reasonably certain that proper performance of the 
outstanding obligations owed to them will not be forthcoming. This is achieved by allowing an 
aggrieved party an immediate action for breach of contract in circumstances where a breach of 
contract is predicted. This doctrine of anticipatory breach of contract, introduced into the South 
African law from the English law, has traditionally been divided into two broad categories of breach 
consisting of repudiation, where a party indicates an unwillingness to perform, and prevention of 
performance, where a party is inhibited or unable to perform.  
Although it has been generally acknowledged that the decision in Datacolor established a ‘new 
approach’ to repudiation in South African law, commentators and the courts have been slow to 
recognise the full impact that this ‘new approach’ has had on repudiation, anticipatory breach of 
contract and cancellation for breach of contract more generally. This thesis explains the effect of the 
decision in Datacolor on the South African law on repudiation and anticipatory breach of contract 
and then demonstrates and motivates the further implications of this decision on cancellation for 
breach of contract more generally and the remedies available to aggrieved parties facing an 
anticipatory breach of contract. 
The decisions of Jansen JA in Stewart Wrightson607  and Tucker’s Land and Development 
Corporation608  initiated a departure from the ‘traditional approach’ to repudiation with their 
rejection of the notion that the right to terminate a contract following a repudiation was completed 
upon acceptance and the finding that repudiation was therefore an immediate breach of contract. 
Although, in Stewart Wrightson, Jansen JA found that repudiation consisted of a violation of a duty 
not to repudiate, derived from the bona fides underlying the law of contract, this thesis 
demonstrates that Nienaber’s suggestion that anticipatory breach of contract arises as a result of a 
breach of an ex lege duty that is an incident of the duty to render performance in terms of the 
contract, provides a more convincing explanation of the operation of the doctrine of anticipatory 
breach of contract. 
Nienaber JA, in Datacolor, built on Jansen JA’s findings to define repudiation as consisting of an 
‘intimation … that all or some of the obligations arising from the agreement will not be performed 
according to their true tenor’609 and that ‘[w]hether the innocent party will be entitled to resile from 
the agreement will ultimately depend on the nature and the degree of the impending non- 
or malperformance.’610 This explicit link that Nienaber JA established between the nature of the 
predicted breach and the determination of whether or not the aggrieved party would be entitled to 
cancel the contract combined with his confirmation of the objectivity of the assessment necessitates 
a substantial shift in the conception of repudiation and anticipatory breach of contract in South 
African law. 
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In Chapter 2 it was shown that the test for repudiation set out Nienaber JA’s judgment in Datacolor, 
a test which uses the outcomes predicted by a contracting party’s conduct or the surrounding 
circumstances as the basis for determining whether an anticipatory breach of contract has occurred, 
requires the application of a purely objective test for anticipatory breach of contract. In terms of this 
purely objective test, although a party’s intentions are likely to be relevant, it is the predicted 
outcomes and not a potentially breaching party’s intentions which must be ultimately determinative 
of whether an anticipatory breach has occurred. 
The judgment further established that where a breach of contract was predicted, whether or not the 
aggrieved party would be entitled to cancel the contract would depend on the nature of the 
predicted breach. That is whether or not a party would be entitled to cancel the contract would 
depend on whether or not the predicted breach, if it were to occur, would justify affording the 
aggrieved party a right to cancel the contract (a material breach of contract). Unlike the ‘traditional 
approach’, which by focusing on the outward expression of intent places form over substance, this 
‘new approach’ rather focuses on the underlying basis for affording an aggrieved party a remedy, 
that being the anticipated breach. 
It was then established that the adoption of this approach, which defines repudiation with reference 
to the predicted consequences, destroys any basis for distinguishing between repudiation and 
prevention of performance occurring before, at or after the time for performance. Similarly it was 
shown that, following this approach, it is no longer possible to distinguish repudiation from 
prevention of performance on the basis that repudiation requires some positive expression of intent 
by the offending party. This has the effect of collapsing the categories into which anticipatory breach 
has traditionally been divided into a single doctrine of anticipatory breach of contract. 
However, contrary to the academic writing of Nienaber and the suggestion by his further, obiter, 
findings as Nienaber JA in Datacolor, the doctrine of anticipatory breach of contract should not be 
extended to include any anticipated breach. Including anticipated non-material breaches within the 
ambit of anticipatory breach of contract is, contrary to Nienaber JA’s suggestion, not adequately 
justified as it would not avoid wasted efforts and could undermine instead of enhance certainty. The 
opportunity for abuse by a contracting party and the possibility of engendering wasteful litigation 
further suggest that an anticipatory breach should only be recognised where it is clear that it is a 
material breach which is predicted. This restriction is founded on the nature of anticipatory breach 
of contract as consisting of conduct or circumstances that predict that a breach will occur rather 
than being based on an actual breach of contract. It is the uncertainty inherent in any prediction 
which ultimately justifies limiting the recognition of a breach to circumstances where a material 
actual breach of contract is anticipated. 
It was further shown that the ‘acceptance requirement’, in the form of the ‘conditional damages 
claim’ rule, serves a useful function in enhancing certainty in cases of an anticipatory breach of 
contract. The ‘conditional damages claim’ rule, which makes the claim for damages arising from 
anticipatory breach of contract contingent upon the aggrieved party cancelling the contract, 
promotes finality and consistency by preventing the aggrieved party from simultaneously claiming 
damages and attempting to uphold the contract and only allowing an aggrieved party to claim 
damages once these damages have been made certain by the cancellation of the contract.  
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Anticipatory breach of contract then consists of conduct or circumstances which indicate with 
reasonable certainty that a contracting party will commit a breach of contract and that this breach 
would justify the aggrieved party cancelling the contract. This model for anticipatory breach provides 
a clear test for determining whether or not an anticipatory breach has occurred, a test which directly 
addresses the source of the prejudice which the aggrieved party suffers, being the expectation of a 
material breach of contract. By doing so the proposed model for anticipatory breach of contract 
enhances certainty and economic efficiency. This is achieved by allowing parties to clearly determine 
when an anticipatory breach has arisen and by allowing aggrieved parties to cancel the contract 
immediately and thus avoid wasted expenditure.  
Importantly, this model for breach of contract requires consideration of the circumstances in which 
a predicted breach of contract, if it were to occur, would justify affording an aggrieved party an 
immediate right to cancel the contract. This has traditionally been answered by dividing breach of 
contract into various categories, each with their own rules on when a party would be entitled to 
cancel the contract. This does however raise issues particularly in respect of predicted negative 
malperformance, or mora, where the South African law can require an aggrieved party to engage in 
procedural steps before they are afforded a right to cancel the contract, even where a material delay 
has occurred. 
Chapter 3 examined the historical development of cancellation for breach of contract in South 
African law. It was demonstrated that the notion of cancellation for breach in South Africa was 
primarily drawn from English sources and that, with the exception of mora, there was strong support 
for a general standard of material breach justifying cancellation. Further, even in the context of 
mora, where the Roman-Dutch sources sets out procedural steps required before cancellation can 
be effected, the notion of a material breach of contract justifying cancellation can be 
accommodated. 
Building on this, it was then argued that despite the accepted approach in South African law of 
dividing breach of contract into various categories, each with its own rules on when a breach 
justifies cancellation, that support for a general concept of material breach of contract can be found 
in the South African case law. This general concept of material breach is best explained using a 
model of contractual obligations drawn from English law, specifically drawing on a number of 
decisions given by Lord Diplock relating to breach of contract.611 The proposed model distinguishes 
between primary obligations under the contract, the performance obligations owed by the parties, 
and secondary obligations to compensate the aggrieved party which arise on breach of the contract. 
In terms of this model a material breach of contract then consists of a failure by a contracting party 
to perform her or his primary obligations correctly, or conduct which indicates with reasonable 
certainty that she or he will fail to perform her or his primary obligations correctly, which will 
substantially deprive the aggrieved party of the benefit of the contract. If, balancing the interests of 
the parties, it would be fair to afford the aggrieved party a right to cancel the contract this conduct 
will amount to a material breach of contract. 
Anticipatory breach of contract can then only consist of conduct or circumstances which would 
justify the aggrieved party in cancelling the contract, that is a material breach. This is because 
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although a material breach could consist of either the actual failure to perform a primary obligation 
correctly or conduct or circumstances indicating with reasonable certainty that such a failure would 
occur, a non-material breach is restricted to circumstances where a contracting party actually failed 
to perform their primary obligations correctly. Consistent with the practical justifications for this 
position given in Chapter 2, Lord Diplock’s model provides a doctrinal basis for restricting 
anticipatory breach to material breaches.  
If anticipatory breach must be a material breach it will always justify affording the aggrieved party a 
right to cancel the contract, but this does not imply that an aggrieved party must cancel the contract 
or that an aggrieved party’s only remedy is cancellation. When considering what alternative courses 
of action an aggrieved party facing an anticipatory breach could pursue the first issue that arises is 
whether a party having committed an anticipatory breach of contract and thus entitling the 
aggrieved party to cancel could act to remedy the breach and deprive the aggrieved party of the 
right to cancel arising on the basis of the anticipatory breach. This is generally referred to as a 
‘retraction’. 
It was shown in Chapter 4 that a breaching party should not be entitled to prevent the aggrieved 
party from cancelling the contract by means of a retraction of her or his repudiation. Despite what is 
suggested by Nienaber JA in Datacolor612 and is supported in his academic writing613 it is not 
justifiable in principle or practice to depart from the current principle applicable to material breach 
of contract generally, that a party is not entitled to ‘cure’ a material breach of contract and thereby 
deprive the aggrieved party of the right to cancel the contract. 
It was shown in Chapter 3 that the right to cancel a contract on the basis of an actual material 
breach of contract and an anticipatory breach of contract is constituted by the immediate conduct of 
the breaching party and in both cases is founded on the basis that the aggrieved party will be 
substantially deprived of the benefit of the contract. There is then no doctrinal basis for 
distinguishing repudiation from other forms of breach by allowing a party to retract her or his 
repudiation. From a practical perspective, retraction does not necessarily undo the effects of the 
original anticipatory breach and, as Lubbe notes, ‘[would] result in the very uncertainty the 
avoidance of which forms the basis of the recognition of repudiation’.614 Rather, what support there 
is for affording a breaching party the opportunity to remedy an anticipatory breach of contract 
suggests that a general right to cure a breach should be available to parties who have committed a 
material breach of contract. 
It was then demonstrated that, in addition to being entitled to suspend performance of her or his 
outstanding obligations on the basis of an anticipatory breach of contract, a contracting party should 
be entitled to request an ‘adequate assurance of performance’ where she or he has reasonable 
doubts as to whether proper performance will be forthcoming.  This remedy, which is available 
under the Uniform Commercial Code615 and transnational model rules of contract,616 affords a party 
who is facing ‘uncertainty of performance’ an intermediate remedy.  This remedy allows the 
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aggrieved party the opportunity to obtain certainty as to whether or not proper performance will be 
forthcoming without risking committing an anticipatory breach her- or himself and serves to address 
the prejudice suffered by a contracting party that arises in ‘uncertainty of performance’ cases. By 
providing an alternative to cancellation this remedy also serves to promote the correct performance 
of contractual obligations over cancellation of the contract. 
Finally Chapter 4 addressed the relatively limited impact that the model for anticipatory breach of 
contract proposed by this thesis has on the existing remedies. This model distinguishes between the 
secondary obligation to pay damages arising from breach of contract generally and the anticipatory 
secondary obligation to pay damages arising from cancellation of the contract. Because the 
anticipatory secondary obligation to pay damages only arises at the time the contract is cancelled 
prescription of such damages claim only begin to run from the time the contract is cancelled and the 
requirement that a party take steps to mitigate such damages also only arises at this point in time. 
A series of decisions by the Supreme Court of Appeal following the decision in Datacolor617 
demonstrates how slow the court has been in recognising the full implications of the development 
of the law by Nienaber JA in Datacolor. The Supreme Court of Appeal, despite each time citing its 
own earlier decision in Datacolor, continued to frame repudiation in terms of the repudiating party’s 
intention, an approach which was strongly deprecated in Datacolor.618 It has been only be in the very 
recent decision of B Braun Medical (Pty) Ltd v Ambasaam619 that the court, although still using the 
language of ‘an unequivocal intention’, has clearly indicated that the basis of the repudiation is 
founded in the predicted breach rather than the intentions of the repudiating party.620 
This failure to engage with the substantial shift brought about by Datacolor has also on occasion 
resulted in significant confusion. For instance, in Sandown Travel (Pty) Ltd v Cricket South Africa621 
Wepener J draws an unwarranted distinction between anticipatory breach occurring before the time 
for performance and anticipatory breach occurring after the time for performance. In Sandown 
Travel (Pty) Ltd v Cricket South Africa622  Wepener J applies the ‘repentance principle’, the notion 
that an aggrieved party may reconsider an affirmation of the contract and instead cancel once the 
time for performance arrives, in order to justify the finding that despite at first affirming the contract 
the plaintiff was nonetheless entitled to cancel the contract on the basis of the defendant’s 
continuing repudiation.623  
The principle that a party, at first electing to affirm the contract, is entitled to cancel the contract 
where the breaching party persists in their repudiation would appear to be quite well established in 
South African law.624 This principle, as stated here, is entirely consistent with the definition of 
repudiation and anticipatory breach set out in this thesis, that is where an anticipatory breach is 
defined with reference to the predicted breach. Where a party persists in her or his refusal to 
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perform the contract such conduct continues to support a conclusion that proper performance will 
not be forthcoming and there is, in general, no reason to restrict the aggrieved party’s right to 
cancel. 
However, what is problematic is Wepener J’s finding that the opportunity to cancel arises at the time 
that performance is due.625 This relies on drawing a distinction between anticipatory breach 
occurring before the time for performance and anticipatory breach occurring or persisting after the 
date for performance, a distinction which this thesis has demonstrated as having no basis following 
the decision in Datacolor.626 The application of the ‘repentance principle’ in the way it was construed 
by Wepener J demonstrates a failure to engage with the significant shift in the law on anticipatory 
breach brought about by Datacolor, this is again in spite of the reliance on the Datacolor judgment 
by Wepener J.627 
This thesis is then an attempt to set out and explain the impact of the decision in Datacolor on the 
doctrine of anticipatory breach of contract in South African law and the broader implications that 
this has had on the South African law of breach of contract and to address any confusion or 
uncertainty about its application. 
In pursuit of this goal this thesis has demonstrated that material breach of contract is best 
understood as consisting of a failure by a contracting party to perform her or his primary obligations 
correctly, or conduct which indicates with reasonable certainty that she or he will fail to perform 
their primary obligations correctly, which will substantially deprive the aggrieved party of the benefit 
of the contract. If, balancing the interests of the parties, it would be fair to afford the aggrieved 
party a right to cancel the contract this conduct will amount to a material breach of contract. 
Anticipatory breaches of contract are then those material breaches which consists of conduct 
indicating that a failure will occur rather than consisting of the actual failure to perform a primary 
obligation. 
As was shown above, this understanding of material, and anticipatory, breach of contract follows 
from the ‘new approach’ to anticipatory breach of contract established in Datacolor.628 In terms of 
this ‘new approach’ anticipatory breach of contract is defined with reference to the consequences 
predicted by a breaching party’s conduct. This thesis showed that this ultimately necessitates the 
application of a purely objective test in terms of which anticipatory breach of contract consists of 
conduct or circumstances that indicate with reasonable certainty that a material (actual) breach of 
contract will occur. 
By focusing on the actual prejudice suffered by the aggrieved party, that being the prejudice caused 
by the anticipation of a material failure to perform the primary contractual obligations, the 
definition of anticipatory breach of contract proposed by this thesis clarifies what forms of conduct 
constitute anticipatory breach of contract and what remedies might be available to an aggrieved 
party. When defined in this way anticipatory breach of contract effectively addresses the prejudice 
suffered by contracting parties faced with the likelihood that proper performance of the obligations 
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owed to them will not be forthcoming while protecting the interests of the party who is required to 
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